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The 1960's vibrated with the fears and hopes of revolu­
tion. No area of human studies escaped demands to declare its 
sympathy for "the revolution." Every area of humane studies 
examined itself for the degree to which it could cooperate. 
Religion gained no exemption. In fact, theological literature 
of the late sixties abounds with direct references to the is­
sues raised for Christians by revolution in both journals and 
monographs. This literary and theological effort represents 
the most significant attempt in its history on the part of the 
church to come to terms with revolution. It is perhaps most 
cogently likened to the ongoing theological discussion of the 
"j ust war."
In spite of the literary deluge, however, the church's 
voice is equivocal. For some, revolution is anathema. For 
others, it is the future of the church and its most significant 
missionary enterprise. Between,, one discovers a variety of po­
sitions more and less approving of revolution upon theological 
grounds.
The desire naturally springs up for some clear, prophetic 
word of the Lord, some "authoritative theological literature." 
But such seems unlikely to appear.
Instead, the church must turn to an examination and an 
implementation of the social convictions born of her faith.
Only then can revolution as a social issue be evaluated. If 
not for answers, certainly for the model, Frederick Denison 
Maurice is a useful mentor. He was a well-known and contro­
versial Anglican theologian whose published words approached 
two million and whose working life continued from about 1830 
until he died in 18 7 2.
Maurice, the conservative who despises democracy and 
rejoices in class distinctions, is also Maurice, the Christian 
socialist whose involved sympathy with the workers and whose 
radical complaints against competition as the rule of society 
and atomism as its structure gained him deathless loyalty from 
his friends and virtually endless attack from his enemies.
His utility for the modern meditation upon revolution is 
his apparent ambivalence. He reflects what is actually hap­
pening in the modern church vis-a-vis revolution. Drawing up­
on the experience of man as member of a family, a nation, and 
a universal society, Maurice examines his own era as one of con­
frontation. There is a confrontation between order and dis­
order. There is a confrontation between the spirit of sacri­
fice and the spirit of empire. Order, in particular the "divine 
order," will appear where society is developed and protected 
by the law of sacrifice. Disorder is the inevitable effect of 
the imperial drive for acquisition and dominion. With these 
principles in mind, three comprehensive problems confronting 
the potential Christian revolutionary are examined.
The first is the problem of violence. Coercion is in­
evitable in human experience. Even the theological category 
of grace exhibits overtones of coercion. Coercion in a large 
social setting must, sooner or later, issue in violence, even 
when non-violence is the prevailing spirit. The issue for the 
Christian, therefore, is not violence or no violence. It is 
the responsible use of violence. Violence that betrays the 
spirit of its ultimate goal is ineffective and counter-produc­
tive. According to Maurice, sacrifice is therefore the only 
effective force. Sacrifice, understood as submission to the 
will of God, may become resistance to man. Revolution cannot 
therefore be precluded a priori because of its measure of 
violence.
Nor can revolution be precluded for- the Christian on 
the simple grounds that revolution is chaotic and disordering.
As much as any man, Maurice appreciated order. But he could 
see and approve the function of true revolution (i.e., the 
making of a new constitution), as a possible witness to an 
order long violated by an imperial establishment. In such a 
distorted society, men would choose to honor elective affini­
ties more than the relations of family, nation and universal 
society. They would hallow their contrived institutions over­
much. They would teach men to value possessions more than 
persons, and clubs more than communities. There is no essen­
tial reason why revolution should not be the chosen instrument 
of God for the overthrow of such disorder. Did not God use the 
armies of Israel to cleanse the land of the disorder of idolatry?
But the decision to join the revolution cannot be preci- 
cated automatically upon the above considerations. According 
to Maurice, it is left to the person, but not in subjective 
solitude. He has a conscience. That informs him of rela­
tions and reminds him that there is an ethos appropriate to 
each relation. The same conscience reveals to him God. God 
is the source of information for the conscience. God through 
the same spirit of sacrifice is calling men to conform their 
relations with others to the divine order and thus manifest 
the kingdom of God. The conscience is the "personhood" of 
man. To violate its divinely-appointed prerogatives is to 
violate the person and thus to inhibit truly human community. 
We are not, therefore, free to prescribe or proscribe 
revolution in abstracto. Conscience and context, not casu­
istry, are the guides. Neither the nostalgia of conservatism 
nor the chiliasm of revolution must shake us from the calm 
assessment of present order and present responsibility within 
the present Kingdom of God.
PREFACE
"Revolution and the Theology of F. D. Maurice" attempts 
to apply the salient features of the "social theology" of F. D 
Maurice to the contemporary experience of revolution. The 
book is neither a call to arms nor to armchairs. Rather, it 
suggests the ways in which a Christian, following the model 
Maurice provides, ought to assess his responsibility from 
within a revolutionary situation.
Interest in the "theology of revolution" was inescap­
able for American seminarians in the late nineteen-sixties.
In this case, that interest was generated and fostered in the 
classes and counseling of Professor J. Kenneth Grider of Naza- 
rene Theological Seminary in Kansas City, Missouri.
From his first suggestion of the place that F. D. Maur­
ice might be brought to fill in a theology of revolution, the 
assistance of the Reverend Professor Alan D. Galloway of the 
Faculty of Divinity of Glasgow University has been invaluable. 
His learning, his articulate criticism, his bursts of intel­
lectual excitement have been the stimulants for the rewarding 
drudgery of digging deeper on the one hand and the exhilara­
tion of insight on the other.
To libraries and librarians at the Universities of Glas­
gow and Cambridge, at Nazarene Theological Seminary, and North­
west Nazarene College, I owe a debt of thanks. Likewise to
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Mr. Jack Gamble, personal friend and antiquarian book dealer, 
I owe thanks for my rather unusually thorough personal col­
lection of works by F. D. Maurice.
And finally, as firstly, to Doris, my wife, whose hands 
and heart are also in this book, I am warmly grateful.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
To read objectively a book about revolution is certainly 
as hard as to write one objectively. The very word "revolu­
tion" is evocative. One feels its meaning and its implications 
before the rational function even engages. Revolution is one 
of those subjects which provides irrefutable documentation of 
the ambiguity of the most critical decisions humans are called 
to make. Witness, for example, the highly-paid after dinner 
speaker who in the late nineteen-sixties spent the first for­
ty-five minutes of his eloquent address decrying the demonstra­
tions and the civil disobedience of those years. The final 
forty-five minutes was a paean to "our revolutionary fore­
fathers . "
If the ultimate impossibility of objectivity in any 
philosophical enterprise is a truism, then a writer ought to 
discover the likely hindrances to objectivity and disclose 
them in candor. Whatever follows in this discourse cannot but 
be conditioned by the writer's experience which includes:
1) the long imprisonment of a missionary brother-in-law upon 
no charges and without trial by a revolutionary regime; and
2) knowledge of the terror produced for close personal friends 
held at gunpoint to listen for the bomb to explode that lamed 
their livelihood and, for a time, shattered their lives.
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Even so, the pages to follow reveal that such exper­
iences have not so much determined the writer’s response to 
revolution as they have simply given substance to what other­
wise might be of purely theoretical interest.
Objectivity on the part of one who reads this, or any 
other presentation of the subject of revolution is also dif­
ficult to maintain. In the first place, any thoughtful ob­
server of the contemporary human condition could hardly avoid 
assuming some position on the matter. The treatment accorded 
revolution by others might inform him. He will not likely find 
another's precisely his own.
When the reader has strong commitments in the matter, 
objectivity is even harder to maintain. Examiners of revo­
lution tend to be shunted like boxcars onto pre-laid tracks 
of "revolutionary" or "counter-revolutionary." One ought to 
keep in mind here the complaint of Jean Baechler whose at­
tempt to deal with the phenomenon of revolution from a soci­
ologist's perspective parallels virtually every perspective 
of serious scholarship.
The very word "revolution" is charged with such
passion (be it a repulsive or attractive charge)
that a serious attempt to discuss it like any 
other social problem is inevitably greeted with 
loud accusations of blasphemy or of complacency.
I am, to a limited extent, in the same situation 
as the early scientists who dared to treat reli­
gious phenomena as social facts, without refer­
ences to any orthodoxy except scientific ortho­
doxy . ^
The reading in the literature of revolution required for
^Revolution (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975), p. 8.
this thesis has demonstrated to this writer also with what 
facility human emotion can dismiss serious writing on the 
subject as simply "radical" or "counter-revolutionary,"
Even when the designations are appropriate, one must allow 
serious literature on revolution a correspondingly serious 
"freedom of speech." The best literature of revolution (and 
there is a great deal of it) is not merely pamphleteering,
A further obstacle to objectivity in the examination 
of revolution is the sheer humane breadth of the subject.
Every area of the humanities and social sciences have appro­
priate interests in the topic. For sheer literary bulk, the 
historians of our world have so far claimed revolution as 
peculiarly belonging to them. The progress of revolutions, 
anatomies of revolution, examinations of the social, economic, 
and political circumstances of revolution— these are the 
modern historian's stock in trade. But others, too, have a 
legitimate interest in revolution. Literature and the fine 
arts reflect the influences of revolution. Certainly, since 
Karl Marx, philosophy is interested in revolution, and its 
interest has become epistemological and metaphysical as much 
as political. Economists, sociologists and political scien­
tists obviously have interests. With the provincialism of 
discipline that always threatens academic inquiry, it is pos­
sible to dismiss revolutionary literature simply because its 
approach is not one's own. One is not only free, but also re­
sponsible to criticize the literature of revolution from the 
points of view of his own discipline. But the breadth of hu­
mane interest in revolution insures that more disciplines than
just his own will be able to comment with pertinence and enthu­
siasm.
It was inevitable, therefore, that Christian theology, 
too, should wish not only to consider, but also to comment 
upon the phenomenon and literature of revolution. As we will 
show in the following chapter, its voice has varied as it has 
attempted to tune its conclusions to its presuppositions. 
Theologians, too, must win their objectivity.
This thesis is presented as a contribution to that ob­
jectivity. It discovers that the fundamental theological is­
sues of revolution are akin to the fundamental political is­
sues, i.e., stability and change. In this thesis they are 
dealt with as "the divine order" and "effective force," and 
are raised for the Christian by the prospects of challenge 
to the establishment and involvement in violence.
The object of the thesis is to discover what one can 
say about the responsibility of the Christian in a revolu­
tionary situation. To define that responsibility, we will 
reach back to the middle of the last century for help in 
casting, interpreting, and resolving these problems. Frederick 
Denison Maurice, dead a century, lives,by his immense thought 
and labor, in the context of current social issues. The pro­
tectionist cast of utilitarian thought applied to the so­
cial and political facts of nineteenth-century Britain spurred 
him to "dig" for the true principles of social order. His 
theological excavations convinced him that the great task was 
to demonstrate by precept and example that the social implica­
tions of the Christian faith were absolutely indispensable to
truly humane society. We will see that the "socialism" 
with which Maurice responded to the prevailing social atom­
ism was fundamentally theological and not economic. Most 
important, we will see that his oracle of the divine order 
is responsible and not reactionary, not because it has set­
tled the question of the givenness of certain social struc­
tures, but because it reminds us that neither establishment 
nor revolution can justify its existence without referring 
to some such vision.
And finally he reminds the theological mind that one's 
relations to his fellowmen are engendered by his relation to 
God. In the conscience, Maurice sees, therefore, the con­
trol center of human relations both with God and man. The 
conscience is the most articulate witness to personality 
because it is the most articulate witness to personal re­
sponsibility. Neither the establishment nor the revolution 
is good which seeks to bind the conscience.
Since, according to Maurice, the function of conscience 
is set essentially in context rather than casuistry, attempts 
to define abstractly Christian responsibility in a revolu­
tionary setting must fail, And thus is achieved the thesis 
that revolutionary participation of a Christian must be de­
termined contextually. Establishments and revolutions are 
neither divine nor demonic per se. The legitimacy of either 
is specific to its existence in reality. One must assess a 
particular revolution, a particular establishment within its 
own context upon the grounds of Christian values, i.e., con­
science. To establish this thesis is the task ahead.
The procedure is straightforward. The following chap­
ter expresses the uncertain voice of Christian theology vis- 
a-vis revolution. The lack of and longing for some "authori­
tative theological literature" is explicit.
In chapter three we will examine descriptions and defi­
nitions of revolution. The aim of the chapter is, quite 
simply, to establish that there is a specie of change that 
is revolutionary. To do this, we will suggest a number of 
definitive features of revolutionary change such as delib­
erateness, speed, and profundity. Such change is markedly 
different from the change of society under normal conditions, 
usually designated progress, or even evolution,
Chapter four details the influences upon, and events 
in, the life of F. D. Maurice from a perspective, that, so far 
as I can discover, no one else has undertaken to do. The 
purpose is to ascertain his credentials to speak to the issues 
raised by revolution. We will argue that the ambivalence in 
Maurice concerning revolutionary issues, far from disquali­
fying him to speak, constitutes the model most needed of the 
Christian striving for responsibility in a revolutionary 
setting.
Chapter five is an exposition of Maurice's concept of 
the divine order. While he is firmly convinced of the given­
ness of the family, the nation and the universal society, he 
clearly leaves room for a variety of forms that these may 
take. So long as they serve to oppose the spirit of empire, 
so long as they operate on the principle of sacrifice, the 
actual forms of the family, nation or universal society
7signify little. It must also be emphasized that Maurice's 
concept of the divine order does not include hierarchical 
considerations. There is, for example, no notion of sub­
ordinating the church to the state or vice-versa. Thus, 
the divine order is not the rich source for the conservatism 
charged to Maurice that one, at first glance, might suppose 
it to be. On the contrary, the divine order is the source 
of Maurice's reformist enthusiasms,
The following three chapters— six, seven, and eight—  
comprise attempts to apply Maurice's concept of the divine 
order, including especially the principle of sacrifice to 
the three problems associated with a revolutionary era. 
Chapter, six examines the problem of violence, Violence can­
not be avoided in a revolutionary situation. The problem is 
to justify violent actions in the service of the establish­
ment or in the service of the revolution. Violence is an 
effective force only as it secures and does not undermine 
the ends desired. If the end desired is the kingdom of God 
(or, what is the same for Maurice, the divine order), then 
the only effective force is sacrifice. The principle of 
sacrifice is revealed in scripture and'experience to be more 
than passive submission. Submission to God can mean resist­
ance to man. Such resistance in a revolutionary situation 
is ultimately violent.
Chapter seven proceeds upon the assumption that revo­
lutionary violence is not, therefore, precluded in an a 
priori manner for the responsible Christian. It raises the
8question, "then for which cause shall I yield consent for 
acts of violence, for the cause of the establishment or for 
the cause of the revolution?" Maurice is helpful in answer­
ing this question because he distinguishes between those 
societies to which we must belong and those to which we 
might belong. The former are essential and constructive.
The latter are subordinate and must be assayed for their 
value alongside family and nation and universal society.
They can, in fact, become the partisan expressions of a 
spirit of empire. Such societies of choice are features of 
both establishment and revolution. The Christian's loyalty 
lies with the side that protects the home, that values 
nationhood and senses most keenly the universal bonds of 
human society. Elective affinities must never subordinate 
relations.
Chapter eight examines the implications of Maurice's 
notion of the divine order from a more contemporary perspec­
tive. Man, the individual, in his communities is the topic, 
The divine order founded upon given relations is the only 
protection for either the individual or the community, The 
fulfilling of relational obligations is accomplished through 
heeding one's divinely-informed conscience. For Maurice, 
therefore, the conscience mediates the revelation of indi­
viduality, of human societies and of God, It is the secur­
ity against subjectivity in an otherwise ambivalent situation 
The conscience is the last line of resistance against the 
spirit of empire and the prime guarantor of a truly humane
society in which I and Thou value the other as surpassing 
every lesser consideration.
Chapter nine will draw the evidence together and con­
clude the thesis that the Christian facing revolution en­
joys no automatic exemption from participation among either 
of the belligerents— the establishment or the revolution.
The Christian is charged to act responsibly. Responsibility 
implies ambivalence. Thus the ambivalence found in Maurice 
must be such as is common to every Christian confronting 
revolution. We cannot^perhaps^conclude that there is a 
divine order objectified as simply as family, nation and uni­
versal society. But there must be some vision of order. We 
might find the spirit of sacrifice to be a weak virtue. But 
what, then, is the effective force, the dynamism able to pro­
duce real change? We might be unwilling to concede the multi­
function conscience of Maurice's theology. But we are left 
with a lingering assent to the view that the mark of a truly 
humane community is its capacity to tolerate, the conscien­
tious dissident.
Maurice, the "conservative," when brought to speak on 
the "radical" elements of revolution, reminds us that neither 
the conservative past nor the radical future is the theater 
of our Christian service. Freed from both of these, we are 
thrust into the present with a decision to make about the 
establishment and about the revolution. There is no reliev­
ing casuistry. Revolution is a Christian responsibility,
The Christian, too, must find the unity of state and dynamic, 
the concourse of order with change.
CHAPTER 2 
REVOLUTION AND THE CHURCH
Now that we have inherited a revolutionary world we 
are not quite sure what to make of it. That we have in­
herited a revolutionary world at least since the time of 
the French revolution would be ridiculous to dispute.
One hesitates to begin the catalog of evi­
dences because he cannot end it, and one knows 
that after he lays down his pen and submits 
his writing for publication, many new events of 
revolt, rebellion, revolution— and certainly 
reaction and repression— will have begun to 
make his listing out of date.^
Since to list the evidences of the revolutionary 
character of our world would be gratuitous, we will defer 
in favor of suggesting why we live in a revolutionary era.
The first suggestion bears a practical stamp. If 
success in a revolutionary context may be defined as the 
expelling of colonial powers and the achievement of na­
tional self-determination, then revolution has, on occasion, 
proven its effectiveness for achieving success. One may ar­
gue that neo-colonialism and malignant national governments 
Ce,g, Uganda) mitigate success but even these factors cannot 
obliterate the efficacy of revolution for nations less free,
^Dean G, Peerman and Martin E, Marty, "Theology and 
Revolution," New Theology, No, 6 (New York: Macmillan,
19 69), pp. 8-9.
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The second suggestion is more philosophical. It derives 
from the diffusion of Marxian thought among the intelli­
gentsia of the nations. Far from shunning the less glorious 
aspects of revolution, Marxism insists that a titanic struggle 
is demanded to wrest the power from the bourgeoisie in the 
name of the proletariat. Its prognosis bears hope for the 
distraught and may imply vengeance for the oppressed. Revo­
lution in a Marxian schema is not one option among others.
It is the expression of the historically inevitable.
A more esoteric reason for the prominence of revo­
lution in our world has to do with the balance of power 
among the major nations of the world. The prospect of a 
nuclear holocaust has rendered outbroken war a counsel of 
insanity. Actual war has been replaced with "cold war" and 
the arms race and saber-rattling, A fragile nuclear stale­
mate serves as a thoroughly negative motivation to divest 
our world of war. Intolerable conditions in such a static 
world become the focus of political innovators. And revolu­
tion becomes their stock-in-trade.
In the contest that divides the world today 
and in which so much is at stake, those will 
probably win who understand revolution, while 
those who. still put their faith in power poli­
tics in the traditional sense of the term and, 
therefore, in war as the last resort of all 
foreign policy may well discover in a not too 
distant future that they have become masters 
in a rather useless and obsolete trade.
Assuming that Hannah Arendt is accurate in this fore­
cast, and assuming that revolution will continue to exert a
^HannahArendt, On Revolution. (New York; The Viking 
Press, 1963), p . 8,
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pragmatic and philosophical appeal, the future will see revo­
lution becoming more, and not less, thematic.
As such a pertinent category for interpreting the 
human situation, revolution properly demands the attention of 
Christian theology. However, the attempt of the church to 
set revolution in a theological context has not got very far, 
Christian nationals of any country will find the prospect of 
revolution bewildering and fraught with peril for the Chris­
tian witness he is constrained to bear. In the moment of his 
need for guidance, however, he will look in vain to the church, 
for, as J. M. Lochman bewails:
There is no authoritative theological lit­
erature in this field at all. The way in 
which the theme is handled is "stepmotherly," 
as if it were an unwanted illegitimate child 
who presents a menace to the legitimate chil­
dren (the traditional Christian orders of the 
West) . . . .  The conservative view of the 
theme has therefore helped to "daemonize" the 
phenomenon of "revolution" rather than to cast 
light on the concept and challenge.
The paucity of the conceptual response in theology to 
the phenomenon of revolution has spawned, predictably ambig­
uous responses to the demand for Christian action, Richard 
Shaull's judgement is that
In the past, the Christian churches have not 
done a very creative job of responding to the 
challenge of revolution. In some instances, 
they have been among the main bulwarks of the 
old order; in others, they have simply stood on 
the sidelines and watched the struggle. Usually, 
some decades after the success of a revolution, 
the churches have reluctantly entered into
^"Ecumenical Theology of Revolution," The Scottish 
Journal of Theology, Vol. XXI, No, 2 (June, 1965), pp. 182-3 
Also in Peerman and Marty, pp^ cit.
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dialog or established a modus vivendi with the 
revolutionaries.
Jacques Ellul somewhat unwittingly demonstrates the
substance of the complaint of Lochman and Shaull, In his
book Violence, he writes:
From all quarters nowadays we are told that the 
Itheology of revolution" is one of the most re­
markable developments in modern theological 
thought and that, thanks to it, we shall get 
rid of the conformism that has long marked the 
churches. Not so. At most, this theology rep­
resents a return to traditional currents of 
thought. I do not disparage it, but I should 
like to see its partisans moderate their enthu­
siasm. 5
The fact is, however, that while Ellul cites exam- • 
pies of revolutionary enthusiasm from out of the broader 
context of church history, he does not show that revolution­
ary sympathy has ever been discoverable within the estab­
lished churches, that is, those churches which have worked 
out a successful modus vivendi with the prevailing political 
order. Every example he cites^ was considered to be a threat 
not only to the political status quo, but to the ecclesiast­
ical status quo as well.
The revolutionary stance of these movements was worked 
out, says Ellul, "primarily by 'political' men,"
^"A Christian View of Human Liberation," Listening, 
Vol. Ill, No. 3 (Autumn, 1968), p, 172. Also in When All 
Else Fails; Christian Arguments on Violent Revolution. 
Edited by IDO-C. (Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1970), p. 53.
^(London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1970), p, 23,
^They include Anchorites, Joachimites (Illuminati), 
Thomas Mtinzer, Jan of Leyden, Boucher, Cromwell and the 
Levellers (John Lilburne),
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Faith and theology had small part in it and in 
any case were not the point of departure, the 
deep motivators. Rather, Christianity served 
as the justification, the legitimization of this 
position, as a complementary argument. What in­
terested these people was political or social 
action. They held that faith or theological ar­
guments might be means, instruments, but never 
decisive factors. And that such was the case 
is proved by the fact that no biblical or theo­
logical reasoning, no appeal to the community of 
the faith, ever induced them to change their 
position.7
So, in fact, Ellul is confessing that faith and theology 
have never come to terms with revolution. And one is left 
with the question, what appeal to biblical or theological 
reason or to the community of faith is possible when all 
such arguments are preempted to support the prerogatives of 
the establishment? How can one justify by such appeal any 
revolutionary action when the decision has already been 
taken that violence used by the establishment, even unjustly, 
is force; whereas violence used by its enemies, no matter 
how justified, is simply violence? This is a fine example 
of the medieval reasoning that still drives the comfortable 
church. And it gives substance to the complaint voiced by 
Lochman and Shaull.
Perhaps the only credible exception (and it is a limited 
one) to the complaint are the writings of Augustine and the 
subsequent development of the "just war" theory, Augustine, 
writing amidst the cataclysmic events that would mark the end 
of the Roman Empire,attempted to come to terms with war from 
a Christian perspective. "Peace should be the object of your
^Ellyl, Op. cit,, p. 22.
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desire; war should be waged only as a necessity, and waged 
only that God may by it deliver men from the necessity and 
preserve them in peace." Here is perhaps the only ecclesi­
astical model for the Christian consideration of circum­
stances similar to revolutionary ones. But war can differ 
from revolution as a congress differs from a cabal.
As has been suggested by Ellul, the revolutionary 
character of the apocalyptic movements of the Middle Ages 
appears at first glance clearly to bridge the gap between 
revolution and church. In fact, the repudiation of these 
movements on the part of the Medieval church serves better 
to vindicate Lochman and Shaull, Revolutionary sympathies 
are consistently more frequent in the sect than in the church.^
In fact, the church has largely formed its conceptual 
approach to revolution in the forge of its opposition to the 
revolutionary tendencies of some of its constituents. The 
result, according to Johannes Verkuyl, has been not a theol­
ogy of revolution (which Verkuyl euphemizes with the presum­
ably more acceptably "Christian" word "transformation") but 
a theology of restoration. In other words, according to 
Verkuyl, the best that the church has been able to do amounts 
to a theology of liberal reformism. As a consequence, Chris­
tianity is quickly (perhaps too quickly) identified as a theol­
ogy of counter- or anti-revolution and forfeits credibility 
with the restive oppressed.
 ^Cf.. Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millenium (London: 
Temple Smith, 1970), also, William Dale Morris, The Christian 
Origins of Social Revolt (London : Allen and Unwin, 1949).
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In the Roman Catholic church the model of restoration 
theology is natural law. Verkuyl says:
Roman Catholic theology has through the cen­
turies defended the existing orders, and sought 
somehow to preserve intact the bond between 
throne and altar. . . : Catholic theologians are
still trying to find their way along the path 
of natural law and natural theology.^
Verkuyl faults Protestantism for relying too heavily 
upon Luther’s doctrine of the two kingdoms' and the reformed 
notion of created orders. The effect of each of these has 
been counter-revolutionary and protective of the establish­
ment. Attempts to move along these well-established lines 
to a more empathie positon has met with little success.
Finally, the church has responded to the problem of 
revolution with a pietistic answer that avoids considera­
tion of the needs of the "body and brains" and concentrates 
on saving the soul. Verkuyl mentions that:
New Christian intellectuals in developing coun­
tries often complain that the Western missionary 
is too pietistic. . . . Pietism, unconsciously for
the most part, makes a private agreement with the 
powers of the world: "We will concentrate on the
hereafter and the personal, and you may occupy the 
arena of political and social affairs." The powers 
promise in return: "We will support you'as long as
you limit yourself to the arena of the private spir­
itual life of individuals.
Verkuyl's assessment suggests that what is needed is a 
transformation in the approach which the church takes toward 
the political and social upheavals of our day. Before it
^Johannes Verkuyl and H. G. Schulte Nordholt, "Revo­
lution, The Response of Faith," Responsible Revolution 
(Grand. Rapids : Eerdmans, 1974),- p. 23.
10Op. cit., pp. 3 0-31.
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will be able to speak with relevance to the revolutionary 
situations of our world^ the church must first overcome its 
own tendency to conservatism.
This task will not be done easily. Perhaps it ought 
not to be done at all. The identification of the vested 
interest of the church with the vested interests of the 
establishment may serve to caricature. It does not always 
accurately reflect the bases of the ecclesiastical tendency 
to conservatism. Other more legitimate reasons for the 
conservatism of the church can also be offered.
For example, the church is conservative because it 
is understandably protective of an environment that yields 
success for the church in its mission to encourage con^ 
version, "The fact that conversion had been experienced 
within a certain social framework served to sanctify that 
framework as 'the ’ framework within which conversions 
were possible.
Furthermore, the church is conservative because among 
the immediate fruits of conversion is an improvement in the 
primary social movements of the converts. The very improve­
ment betrays a wider vision of social betterment. Instead 
of pursuing social change on a wider scale, the church tends 
to turn inward. It maintains work in the interest of social 
improvement within the perimeters of its immediate influence
^lEmilio Castro, "Conversion and Social Transformation,"
The Church Amid Revolution, Edited by Harvey Cox, (New York 
Association Press, 1967), p , 101,
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only, that is, upon its. own constituents, î^evolution demands 
a wider vision,
With reference to revolution especially^ the church is 
conservative because ^ as Gabriel Bowe puts it ^ the church 
"has a long memory, Verkuyl makes the content of that
memory explicit:
Bloody revolutions are usually mad adventures 
that lead to anarchy and sadistic aggressiveness.
They exchange one group of scoundrels for another 
group of scoundrels. Instead of introducing a 
new era of justice, they give birth to anarchy.
They can function as an alibi for sheer lust, 
murder, and brutal, generalized inhumanity.
Despising the route of patient progress toward 
necessary reforms-, men can be so intoxicated 
by the passion of revolution that they destroy 
what chances there are of real social achieve­
ment ,^4
With these reasons as samples of a larger rationale 
that can be marshalled to defend the conservatism of the . 
church it becomes apparent that "vested interests" are 
hardly adequate to explain all the facts, especially 
when those vested interests are gratuitously identified 
with those of the political and economic establishment,
The church cannot divest itself of conservatism at a trice. 
Even to scrutinize the bases of ecclesiastical conservatism 
is too excruciating for some members of the church.
When that conservatism has political overtones it is 
even more troublesome. For to separate one’s politics from
^^Castro, loc. cit,
"Poverty and the Church," Listening, Vol, III, No, 3 
(Autumn, 1968), p. 184,
14Op, cit., p. 34.
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the purview of one’s religion is a difficult feat. Both 
emerge from a world view more or less consistent, Perhaps 
this is especially true in the United States where, says 
Paul JRamsey,
conservative and liberal religious opinion 
is the same thing as conservative and liberal 
secular opinion— with a sharper edge. In short, 
the polarization of public debate on most issues 
is simply aided and abetted by the polarization 
of the religious forces,
Consequently, the quest for a common Christian ap­
praisal of the church ^ s stance in a changing world is frus­
trated by the predispositions of the very groups, whether 
right or left, that are required for fruitful dialogue.
Few would really want a major effort to be put 
forward to see whether there are not better 
ways to be or try to be the church speaking.
That might threaten some cherished particular 
policy we most urgently want to be sure is 
spoken to the church and to the world. So 
we say that these others have "dropped out of 
the dialogue,
In light of a defensible conservatism of the church and 
an explicable reticence on the part of its members, the pro­
duction of Lochman's aim of an ecumenical theology of revo­
lution seems unlikely at best. Yet modern experience in 
Russia and Red China and secular opinion akin to Hannah 
Arendt's conspire to warn the church that she will ignore 
the phenomenon of revolution at the peril of her continued 
relevance. So the church is caught between guilty silence 
and uncertain speech. Those who presume to speak about
-^ W^hp Speaks for the Church? [New York; Abingdon 
Press, 1967), p. 101.
16ib±d.
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revolution for the church do so with such a diversity of opin­
ion that the problem is exacerbated rather than settled.
That diversity may be quickly discovered and extensive­
ly illustrated. From the nineteenth century, heavily influ­
enced by the thought of created orders, come clearly anti- 
revolutionary sentiments, Lochman cites typical conclusions.
To Julius Stahl revolution was simply "the rule 
of sin" and "the opposite pole" to Christianity.
And in the view of A, Fr. Vilmar the Church is 
the last stronghold of legality and of divinely- 
appointed authority, it is therefore anti-revolu­
tion incarnate and will victoriously outlive de­
mocracy and despotism, with which it has nothing 
to do,^
This same appraisal of revolution is available today
in German Lutheranism, Otto Dibelius responded to the
Geneva Conference of 1966 by juxtaposing in opposition the
"church's spiritual life" and revolution.
May God preserve us from a "theology of revolu­
tion" as advocated in Geneva, During the twen­
tieth century the clearance-sale of the church’s 
spiritual life has gone so far that this final 
suggestion is really not n e c e s s a r y , i8
No doubt Dibelius speaks here for a large number of 
Christians, Lochman, on the other hand, complains about 
Dibelius’ "almost consistently maintaining the view of the 
nineteenth century"--in other words, the principle of order 
in opposition to the principle of revolution.Ï9
i^Lochman, op, cit,, n, 182,
^^Ibid,
19In the view of this writer, this is a faulty dichot­
omy, The "principle of order" is surely distinct from a par' 
ticular doctrine of orders, This thesis depends upon and 
demonstrates the assumption that some notion of order is as
But Dibelius is not alone, Lochman also mentions 
W. Trillhaas, who contends that revolution has come to mean 
"the release of egoism, the falsification of truth, the 
breakdown of all respect; the lowest come up on top and the 
upper classes (the nobility) are forced d o w n , "20
What Lochman complains of in German pietism is dupli­
cated in American evangelicalism. In consecutive issues 
Christianity- Today carries two articles equally explicit 
in the condemnation of revolution as anti-Christian,
Joel H, Nederhood in an article entitled "Christians 
and Revolution" argues that the "revolutionary model" is 
incompatible with the Christian faith. It is closely allied 
with the spirit of atheism. It produces totalitarianism and 
has had a devastating effect upon Western culture allowing 
whim and fantasy of the Andy Warhol type to dominate the 
spirit of the arts. Consequently, while the Christian is 
not disinterested in promoting needed change— and ought him­
self to be at work to produce that change— the Christian the­
ory of change "should include a repudiation of the spirit of 
revolution on the grounds that the revolutionary posture is 
incompatible with biblical Christianity,"^^
Nederhood, the radio voice for the Christian Reformed 
Church, recommends the "Christian alternative" as it is
essential to revolution as to conservatism. The real dichot­
omy is between the principles of justice and order,
^Qlbid,
^^Christianity Today, Vol, XV, No. 7 (January 1, 1971), 
pp, 315-317,
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expressed and intended in the New Testament phrase "new 
creation," Even the radical change therein conveyed 
ought not to be referred to as revolution, according to 
him.
It would be a mistake to call the Christian 
alternatives simply a Christian revolution, for 
the term revolution is not really usable for 
Christians anymore, nor does it do the Christian 
vision justice, Christians can speak of a new 
order and a new life through the operation of 
Christ's Spirit, These possibilities suggest 
that we may expect radical renewal of both so­
cial and individual life through Christ, And 
those who understand the dynamic of this majes­
tic Christian possibility will not easily use 
revolutionary terminology to describe their 
goals. The possibilities for change compre­
hended in the concept "new life in Christ" are 
in fact anti-revolutionary.22
A similar position is taken in the other article by 
Vernon C, Grounds,who is the president of the Conservative 
Baptist Theological Seminary in Denver, Colorado, Once 
again, social transformation is made to depend upon an 
individualistic redemption. Although Grounds is not sen­
sitized to the word "revolution" to describe the radical 
transformation effected by Christian conversion and its 
side effects, understood politically and socially it has 
no real place in a Christian context.
In God's Name, the God of peace and order who 
ordains government as the antidote against anar­
chy, the Church must keep enunciating the prin­
ciple asserted by Jesus Christ, "They who take 
the sword will perish by the sword," It must de­
clare that, while human society is in crying need
22jbid, One cannot help but think however, of the 
work of another evangelical, Bill Bright, of the Campus 
Crusade for Christ, One of his books speaks of the 
"new life" Nederhood is describing with the bold title 
Revolution NowI‘
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of reform, a better world of liberty and equality 
and fraternity cannot be achieved through bombs 
and bullets, sabotage and guerrilla warfare. All 
these tactics can do is destroy. The Church must 
tell the radicals on the left that revolution has 
always been a brutal, bloody, barbaric business; 
revolution has always been a reign of terror that 
has its end in the rise of a dictatorship like 
that of Joseph Stalin, a totalitarianism far worse 
than the society that has been smashed. The Church 
must preach in season and out of season that unless 
individuals are radically changed by the sin-for­
giving grace of God, there is no possiblity of any 
radical change in institutions.23
Obviously, the notion that the gospel is counter­
revolutionary or anti-revolutionary is not shared by all 
Christians, Even where revolutionary sympathies are greater, 
however, there is no uniformity of opinion, John Carey, 
writing in the Anglican Theological Review, distinguishes 
between what he calls hard and soft theologies of revolu­
tion, What he in fact accomplishes, is to show that much 
which passes for a theology of revolution is so only to 
a degree. There is still suspicion of the classical idea 
of revolution with its overtones of violence and dis­
ruption and its more recent association with Marxist doc­
trines of historical inevitability and economism, Carey’s 
summarization of the views of the hard theologians of revo­
lution suggests that they are not, after all, that hard.
Some would' allow that given the diversity of 
contexts, a revolutionary political stance is 
not the only valid response to the Gospel in 
our day, and certainly their Christian orien­
tation keeps them from assuming that every
"Bombs or Bibles? Get Ready for Revolution !", 
Christianity Today, Vol. XV, No, 8 (January 15, 1971), 
p. 361,
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movement for political revolution is worthy of
Christian endorsement. 24
Carey's conclusion is reaffirmed in an article which 
appeared in Theology Today with the title, "How Revolution­
ary is ..Revolutionary Theology?" The author, Robert Banks, 
examines the positions of a number of Christian writers on 
revolution and concludes that only one, Neil Middleton,
"is a genuine prophet of revolution."25 in other words, 
Banks, using Carey's designations, would say that all the 
rest propound a soft theology of revolution.
Banks, more than Carey, fails to see that the theology 
of revolution is still tentative and basically dialogical.
He gives the impression that any theology of revolution 
worthy of the name must be, when fully articulated, identical 
with a philosophy or program of revolution, In other-words, 
theology must do all the moving and adaptation. When theol­
ogy rightly resists. Banks concludes that it is "for the 
most part, not revolutionary at all."26
Nevertheless, these articles are useful because they 
suggest the diversity of theological viewpoints sympathetic 
to the phenomenon of revolution. Furthermore,they remind 
one of a fact, almost unique in the history of the church, 
That is, the church is spending serious thought to gain a
^^"Theologies of Revolution; Hard and Soft," Anglican 
Theological Review, Vol. LIV, No. 3 (July, 1972), p. 152.
25vol, XXVII,■ No. 4 (January, 1971), p. 406,
^®Ibid.
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sympathetic understanding of revolution at last. It would 
be most unlikely that a multiplicity of voices should speak 
as one, especially about a subject so recently encountered 
with, fervent interest.
Among those voices, that of Richard Shaull speaks with 
an authority uniting academic enterprise with experience as 
a missionary to a developing nation (Brazil), Shaull recog­
nizes social revolution as the primary fact with which we
have to do in our time. He is convinced that revolutionary
potential is a worldwide phenomenon and that its only fu­
ture is to augment. The church betrays itself when it denies 
the revolutionary struggle because
. , , it will be on .the frontiers of revolution
that many of the major issues of humanization and 
dehumanization will be decided in our modern 
world; it will be on these frontiers that those 
most concerned for the well-being and for the 
future of man will find themselves involved, , , ,
If we hope to preserve the most important ele­
ments of our cultural, moral and religious heri­
tage and to contribute to the shaping of the 
future, we cannot remain outside the revolutionary 
struggle or withdraw from it. The path of re­
sponsibility is the one that passes through it
toward whatever may lie ahead,27
On the face of things, it appears that only Marxism 
has made an "attempt to understand revolution as essential 
to the creation of a more stable and.just society," How­
ever / as small groups of Christians become involved in revo­
lutionary struggles, they discover in the Christian heritage 
resources fp.r thought -and action of which, they were not
27f’î^eyQlutionary .Change in a Theological Perspective," 
The Church Amid Revolution, Edited by Harvey Cox, {New York: 
)^sociatibn Press, 19 671', Pn 2 9,
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previously aware," What they are discovering is a new per­
spective upon both the Bible and revolution, For, says 
Shaull, "If we look at our history in the light of biblical 
history, we may feel quite, at home in the midst of revo­
lution, "28
Shaull does not identify the Christian position with 
that of the revolution. But he does assert that ordinary 
categories of Christian doctrine are compatible with revo­
lutionary philosophy and action,29 Thus, for Shaull, in the 
midst of the revolution Christian theology belongs. It 
recognizes that change as well as stability are ruled over 
by God. Divine sovereignty guarantees that God works 
through the revolutionary efforts of men to accomplish his 
own purposes. Indeed, it is only God's working in these 
efforts that accounts for any improvement from them at all.
The God who is tearing down old structures in 
order to create the conditions for a more human 
existence is himself in the midst of the struggle.
It is his presence in the world and his pressure 
upon those structures which stand in his way 
that constitute the dynamics of this process,
God has taken human form in the concreteness of 
historical life and has called us to follow 
this path if we are to be the salt of the 
earth, and the light of the world (Matthew 5 ; 13-14). ,
In this context, the Christian is called to be 
fully involved in the revolution as it develops.
It is only at its center that we can perceive 
■ what God is doing, understand how the struggle
2 8lbid,
2 9These categories include: 1, the fact that God is
both, the Creator and Ruler-of all spheres of nature and of 
society; 2, the revolutionary character of biblical messian- 
ism; and 3, the dynamic historical character of God's action 
[Ibid., pp, 31-33).
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for humanization is being defined and serve as
agents of reconciliation,30
From within the revolution the primary role of the 
church is that of a servant-critic demythologizing the 
establishment in its intransigence and revolution in its 
demonic excesses. The church assumes its position along­
side St, Augustine, "As Augustine interpreted history in 
the light of God's sovereignty over an order of causes, 
so the Christian understands events in a revolutionary 
situation," The Christian does not deny or discount the 
real liberation effected through revolution. He does, how­
ever f attribute the dynamics of liberation to the work of 
God not to the determination of some inevitable law of
history, 3.1
If one could say that Shaull's focus is upon provid­
ing theological perspective for revolution, then it would 
probably be true that Richard Neuhaus focuses upon the revo­
lution itself, Neuhaus clearly finds in favor of revolution 
as a possible Christian imperative, His essay, "The Thorough 
R e v o l u t i o n a r y " ^2 seems to assume that there is no reason 
essential to the gospel which precludes the Christian from 
actively seeking revolution. What makes Neuhaus's essay 
identifiably Christian is the knowledge that the author is
3Qlbid,, p, 37
23lbid,, p, 38,
32jn Peter L. Berger and Richard J, Neuhaus, Movement 
and Revolution (Garden City, New York; Doubleday, 197 0)',
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a Lutheran pastor,.-and the attempt of the author to set ' 
revolution into the context of the "just war,"^^
Neuhaus directs his essay to those whom he calls the 
members of the "movement," He admits that the movement is 
amorphous but contends that its members can be identified 
by their affinity with clusters of opinions about four 
major issues ; 1) the repressive use of American power in
world affairs; 2) the bankruptcy of the American political
system at home; 3) the hopelessness of the plight of the 
American black man under prevailing conditions; and 4) appro­
priate strategies for effecting change, In spite of varia­
tions, members of the "movement" solidify their unity about
these issues to contrast themselves with the liberal estab­
lishments, Thus, Neuhaus can identify himself with the "we" 
of the "movement" when he verbalizes its revolutionary 
posture,
"We" are for revolution, A revolution of con­
sciousness, no doubt, A cultural revolution, 
certainly, A non-violent revolution, perhaps,
An amued overthrow of the existing order, it 
may be necessary. Revolution for the hell of 
it or revolution for a new world, but revolution,
Yes,34
Lest one interpret these strong words as carte 
blanche for the making of revolution the balance must be 
quickly adjusted with Neuhaus's insistence upon evaluating 
the revolution with the same criteria as are used to
33Neuhaus has served, for several years, a predomi­
nantly black and Spanish parish in the Williamsburg Bedford- 
Stuyvesant sections of Brooklyn,
34Berger and Neuhaus, op, cit,, p. 127,
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evaluate the "just war." He is critical of "some enthu­
siasts presently auditioning for the revolution (who) talk 
about the 'amorality' of the revolution, or about 'revolu­
tionary ethics' or about 'the ethical reversal' required for* 
revolutionary action."35 Neuhaus makes it clear in the 
ensuing discussion that revolution is not amoral, but comes 
under the same ethical scrutiny as war. His words of en­
couragement and sympathy with the revolution are explicitly 
directed only to those who are willing to acknowledge this 
fact, and to consider accordingly.
I have written for such men as are prepared 
to consider a just revolution legitimately de­
clared and in response to real injury, as a 
last resort and prosecuted with good intention, 
in which the.damage incurred is not greater 
than the injury suffered, employing moral means 
and with a reasonable hope for success.
The sympathy of Neuhaus toward revolution is shared by 
Gonzalo Castillo-Cardenas of Colombia. Lochman records that 
at the Geneva Conference the division about the use of revo­
lutionary force, i.e., violence, sometimes approximated the 
division between the developing and the advanced nations.
The basis for the position of the developing nations was set 
in a Christian context by Castillo-Cardenas. According to 
Lochman:
He said that if Christians are coming more and 
more to realise that the present order is "an 
affront to God because it is an affront to man"
. . . and when they realise how many forms of
force are employed in order to protect this
^^ibid., p. 162.
36ibid., p. 236.
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unjust order against the under-privileged and 
oppressed, the poor and the weak, then (if 
they really love their neighbour) they cannot 
content themselves with "certain isolated re­
forms equivalent to social anesthesia." What 
is required is "to take power away from the 
privileged minorities and give it to the poor 
majorities,"37
The conclusion drawn by Castillo-Cardenas is logical, 
if radical. "Therefore, revolution is not only permitted, 
but is obligatory for those Christians who see it as the 
only effective way of fulfilling love to one's neighbour."38
Thus, one may define the extremes of the continuum of 
theological appraisals of revolution and at the same time 
give some suggestion of the more moderate positions in be­
tween. What we have demonstrated in these few pages is the 
paucity of "authoritative literature in the field." Upon 
apparently thoroughly Christian grounds one may either pre­
scribe or proscribe revolution. Is revolution the betrayal 
or the expression of Christian faith?
The literature surveyed in these pages indicates that 
the answer to that question is, of necessity, as complex as 
it is varied. At either end of the spectrum, problems 
emerge for the Christian confronted with the prospect of in­
volvement in revolution. He may ignore the problems at one 
end or the other in favor of his own opinion, but he does so 
at the peril of sacrificing either the relevance of the 
Christian faith or the relevance;of the human situation,
37Lochman, op. cit., p, 177,
38ibid.
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The research herein presented will establish that any 
decision about revolution based upon Christian presuppositions 
may isSue in either revolutionary or counter-revolutionary 
sympathies when that decision is taken vis-a-vis an actual 
situation with revolutionary potential. In negative terms, 
judgments about the Christian validity of "revolution" in 
abstracto are illegitimately drawn. If the Christian faith 
has any relevance for the human social situation, it does 
for revolution.
The thesis to be defended, then, is that revolutionary 
participation on the part of the Christian is decided con­
textually. Revolution might or might not be legitimate for 
the Christian. Christian theology and revolutionary philos­
ophy , inasmuch as either can be isolated and identified, have 
not been the same and may collide. But that is not an ade­
quate rationale to preclude automatically the alignment of 
Christian aims with those of a revolutionary movement. The 
decision depends upon the responsible assessment of the issues 
of force, establishment and community as they become problem­
atic within the context of a particular revolution,
These three issues are major, interlocking and inevi­
table. They are able to subsume every conflict of the 
Christian conscience in a revolutionary situation. Thus, they 
guarantee that the ethical position of the conscientious 
Christian in a revolutionary situation is not immunity, but 
responsibility.
The examination of these three issues is the "work"
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to come. But first one needs to understand what is meant 
by revolution and what credentials F , D, Maurice brings 
to his speaking "for the church" about revolution.
CHAPTER 3
WHAT IS REVOLUTION?
Ironically, "revolution" is one of the most stable 
facts with which we have to do. Where nationalistic inter­
ests are so intricately balanced and intervention of "for­
eign powers" on one side or the other is predictable (be­
cause inevitable), "all revolution is now, in a way never 
before so, world revolution."^
The thematic impact of revolution upon the contem­
porary world is easily demonstrated'. One hears of a sexual 
revolution or of a revolution in education. Wherever there 
is a novelty in any degree, there seems to arise the temp­
tation to attach the appellative "revolution." Garbled 
meaning is the product. Thus, we assimilate uncritically 
the words of the newscaster who reports the establishment 
of a "revolutionary government" in Mozambique and follows 
his report with a commercial declaiming the remarkable 
cleansing powers of a "revolutionary" soap powder, complete 
with secret (not to say "clandestine") ingredients.
Most of the confusion surrounding the concept of revo­
lution stems from the notion which constitutes its tap root.
^Krishan Kumar, Revolution: The Theory and Practice
of a European Idea (Brooklyn Heights, N.Y.: Beekman, 1971),
p . 82.
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i.e., change. Whatever else revolution means— however it 
might be further qualified— the primordial meaning of revo­
lution is change. Yet change on its own is absurdly in­
sufficient to define revolution. Not every change is revo­
lutionary. Change which is revolutionary is deliberate, 
accelerated and fundamental change pursued by means of un­
usual force with human happiness as its objective.
This description of revolutionary change employs a 
number of qualifiers which, by themselves, are inadequte to 
distinguish revolutionary change. Only when these quali­
fiers are themselves explicated and their meanings conjoined 
will this definition of revolutionary change become func­
tional. With that purpose in view, let us examine each 
qualifying term on its own.
First, revolutionary change is deliberate change.
Not always has this been understood to be the case. Histor­
ically speaking, the deliberate element in revolutionary 
change is a novel idea. Krishan Kumar asserts that it was 
only in the eighteenth century, in the course of the French 
Revolution, that the word acquired its modern meaning. It 
was only then that "revolution" ceased to be a phenomenon 
of the natural or divine order, made by non-human, elemental 
forces, and became part of a man-made, conscious purpose to 
create a new order based upon reason and freedom,2
The history of the use of the term "revolution" can 
illustrate the importance of the deliberate element demanded
2lbid., p . 29.
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by our description. Kumar cites Rosenstock-Huessey, who 
discovers a threefold usage of the word "revolution" in 
history.
The earliest phase and the lengthiest (extending from 
classical antiquity to the French Revolution) Rosenstock- 
Huessey calls the naturalistic phase. Revolution is used 
as it applies to astronomy. In politics this implies an 
objective, elemental, non-human force. Revolution is 
subsumed as an alternative description of the cycle of 
history.3
Stasis (civil disturbance) in the Greek city states 
was inoperable to effect change because change was incon­
ceivable. Although sometimes translated" revolution" its 
opposite is the real meaning.  ^ Revolution in the city 
state was, in fact, a periodic upheaval prompted by en­
trenched and established factions seeking to wrest political 
control with its attendant power. No deliberation of any 
more creative end than the seizure of power characterized 
revolution in classical antiquity for none was conceived 
as possible. Revolution had little to do with revising
3lbld., p. 35.
^There is an irony in the use of the word stasis to 
speak of revolution that approximates an historical Freud­
ian slip. Derived from the verb histeimi, "I stand," stasis 
literally means "a standing" or "a state." On the face of
things, therefore, there is no connection whatever with the
dynamism of revolution. But when political revolution is 
understood naturalistically, on the astronomical model, then 
its function is to complete the cycle of political change
and refound the state.
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the constitutional basis of power and more to do with whose
c
hands wielded it.
The naturalistic understanding of revolution prevailed 
much later, too. In England, when "Clarendon and the mon­
archists designated the Restoration of 1660 a 'revolution' 
they used the word in its older sense of the turning of a 
wheel or a cycle.
The Whigs, in 1688, used the word in precisely the same 
sense, but this time to expel a king, declaring that he had 
broken the social contract by flouting the laws. In other 
words, revolution implied the according with a cycle, not 
the attempt to modify or ignore the cycle. Whether the 
word was used to justify the expelling of a king or his 
ascendance, it was taken in the sense of the turning of a 
wheel or cycle. In fact, it was used with the express pur­
pose of denying that any novel precedent was being set.^
The second stage delineated by Rosenstock-Huessey 
comprises the reaction to such an understanding of revolu­
tion. He calls it the "romantic phase." Born in renaissance
^Ibid., p. 30ff. On the understanding of stasis in 
Aristotle, see W. L. Newman. The more basic terminology is 
metabolei politeias and refers to any change in constitution, 
including changes only in part or degree. It also refers to 
changes in who holds power, even when‘such change is not 
accompanied by stasis, "civil disturbance." For this reason, 
"our word 'revolution' does not exactly correspond to stasis 
or metabolei politeias." The Politics of Aristotle, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1887-1902), Vol. I, p. 522.
^Kumar, p. 17.
^Ibid., p . 17.
37
optimism, this phase asserts man's freedom to choose his 
own destiny against the more deterministic features of the 
naturalistic phase. Revolution becomes the expression of 
man's subjectivity as he strikes out upon the trail of 
history with the vision of himself as master. This phase 
is best illustrated by the era of the French Revolution and 
its hopes, grounded as they were upon the twin assertions of 
reason and freedom.
The third phase Rosenstock-Huessey calls the realist 
phase. Under the influence of Marxism, revolution comes to 
be understood through a dialectical synthesis of the two 
preceding phases. Naturalism was preserved in the insist­
ence that revolutions are not simply the products of human 
will/ but depend upon objective conditions which make so­
ciety ripe for revolution. Lenin himself recognized this. 
Only a matter of weeks before the February revolution, while 
playing the role of elder prophet to a young audience in 
Switzerland he reflected that "we," the old, may not live 
to see the decisive battles of the coming revolution. But 
romanticism also was preserved in this realist view. For 
the doctrine prevails that nevertheless, revolution is a 
human, not a superhuman, phenomenon, and objective con­
ditions are not sufficient on their own to bring about 
revolution.
The debate about whether revolutions are spontaneous 
or caused is set in motion by the estimation of the signi­
ficance of the element of deliberateness integral to the 
definition of revolution. Brinton shows that the side one
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takes in the debate may be determined less by objective 
facts than by one's bias for or against the revolution.^
His conclusion, as might therefore be expected, accords with 
the realist phase of understanding revolution. While cer­
tain objective conditions are indispensable, revolution 
occurs only when there is a deliberate attempt to capitalize 
upon such conditions with a view toward political change. In 
other words, change that occurs upon purely naturalistic 
lines is some other form of change. It may be evolution.
It cannot be revolution.
The second qualifier in our definition of revolution 
is the word "accelerated." This term, like the former one, 
serves to distinguish revolutionary from evolutionary change. 
If we use a dialectical model the point of this qualifier 
becomes obvious. Change inevitably occurs as thesis and 
antithesis move toward synthesis. This we might call pro­
cess, or even evolutionary change. It is change that is 
less than extraordinary either for its velocity or for its 
effects upon fundamental elements. Revolutionary change 
occurs at the nexus between the thesis and the antithesis. 
Agitation compounds as the point of synthesis nears. De­
mands for change increase, and the fulfillment of those 
demands looms suddenly as Unavoidable. The heretofore in­
transigent elite who hold the reins of power set about to 
make changes which they evaluate as adequate and done in good
^Graine .Brinton, The.Anatomy of Revolution (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1965)., p. 40.
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faith. "Nothing can be more erroneous than the picture of 
the old regime as an unregenerate tyranny, sweeping to its 
end in a climax of despotic indifference to the clamor of 
its abused subjects."^ The potential to ease the crisis is 
mitigated by the appearance of incipient w e a k n e s s ^ ^  and the 
tacit admission of inefficiency inferred by the opponents of 
the government from attempts at reform.
This tendency of change to accelerate as movement 
toward the nexus of synthesis progresses provides the theo­
retical basis for Alexis deTocgueville's practical observa­
tion that the most dangerous moment for the ancien regime is 
the moment it sets about reform,H
The implication in Tocqueville's statement is that 
revolution is ignited by an unbearably low standard of liv­
ing, which the government proceeds to set aright. Kumar
suggests that Tocqueville be amended.
He is basically saying that men do not make radi­
cally new and sweeping demands, however miserable 
their conditions of life, until these conditions 
change in some significant way. The point is, 
those conditions do not have to change for the bet­
ter, as he assumed; they may change for the worse, 
and yet still have the effect of precipitating radi­
cal demands. What matters is that something should 
happen to shake men out of the habitual pattern of
action, their traditional ways of life with its tra­
ditional level of expectations.
^Ibid,, p, 39.
^Qjnfra, p. 42.
^^On the State of Society in France Before the Revolu­
tion of 1.78 9, (L'Ancien Regime et la Revolution), Translated 
by Henry Reeve, (London: John Murray, 1856), pp. 322-323.
3-2op, cit. , p, 46,
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That "something" which happens and shakes men out of 
their traditional ways of life Chalmers Johnson calls an 
"accelerator." In his analysis of the causes of revolution, 
the accelerator is the third a n d  f i n a l . e l e m e n t . ^3 This "ac­
celerator" Johnson defines as "particularly intense sources 
of dysfunction that make their effects felt suddenly and 
powerfully and that typically constitute the final aggregate 
in a growing burden of dysfunctional conditions.
An important analysis of the source of dysfunction is 
offered by James C. Davies. Like Kumar, Davies sees revolu­
tion growing out of a change for the worse, but only after a 
period of change -for the better.
Revolutions are most likely to occur when a pro­
longed period of objective economic and social 
development is followed by a short period of 
sharp reversal. The all-important effect on 
the minds of people in a particular society 
is to produce, during the former period, an 
expectation of continued ability to satisfy 
needs— which continue to rise— and, during 
the latter, a mental state of anxiety and 
frustration when manifest reality breaks 
away from anticipated reality. The actual 
state of socio-economic development is less 
significant than the expectation that past 
progress, now blocked, can and must continue
in the future.^3
Davies shows that the change for the better is essential
^3The first two are 1: social dysfunction, and 2: the
intransigence of the elite.
34Revolution and the Social System (Published by the 
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford 
University, 1964), p. 12.
^3"Toward a Theory of Revolution," The American Socio- 
logical Review, Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (February! 19 62) pp. 5-19. 
Cited in Why Revolution, Edited by Clifford T. Paynton and 
Robert Blackey. Morristown, New Jersey : General Learning 
Press, 1971), pp. 178-179.
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to the revolutionary mentality inasmuch as survival needs
will preclude interest in political and social abrasions,
. , . Revolutions ordinarily do not occur when
a society is generally impoverished— when, as 
deTocqueville put it, evils that seem inevitable 
are patiently endured. They are endured in the 
extreme case because the physical and mental 
energies of people are totally employed in the 
process of merely staying alive,36
Johnson's description of the Millenarian rebellion 
makes it clear that, unlike Tocqueville and Davies, he 
does not think of the accelerator as deprivation. Such a 
rebellion, distinguished by its- peculiar ideology, depends 
upon the appearance of a "Messiah." While there might be 
widespread discontent the sources of social dysfunction 
might also be obscure and so, in themselves, inadequate 
to touch off the flames of rebellion. What is required is 
the positive impulse of a prophet conjuring for the dis­
enchanted a vision of the millenium.
The point is that accelerated change may be negatively 
or positively motivated. ", , ., What provokes a group to 
attack a government is not simply deprivation or misery, 
but 'an intolerable gap between what people want and what 
they get',"17 And one cannot begin to speak properly of 
revolution until change accelerates.
Whether this acceleration is planned or spontaneous is 
a subject of d e b a t e . Less debatable is the uniform
16Loc. cit.
3-7j^mes C. Davies, loc. cit. 
^^Brinton, op,cit., p. 40.
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appearance of one factor that coincides historically with
the acceleration of change, Plato speaks of it in the
eighth book of the R e p u b l i c "Is it not a simple fact
that in any form of government, revolution always starts
from the outbreak of internal dissension in the ruling
class?" Louis Namier enlarges the theme,
Discontent with government there will always be? 
still, even when grievous and well-founded, it 
seldom engenders revolution till the moral bases 
of government have rotted away; the feeling of 
community between the masses and their rulers, 
and in the rulers a consciousness of their right 
and capacity to rule,.
The intent of "moral" has less to do with "ethical"
than with "morale," Brinton elucidates this.
When numerous and influential members of such a 
class begin to believe that they hold power un­
justly, or that all men are brothers, equal in 
the eyes of eternal justice, or that the beliefs 
they were brought up on are silly, or that "after 
us the deluge," they are not likely to resist 
successfully any serious attacks on their social, 
economic and political position.20
Thus emerges, according to Louis Gottschalk
, . . the last and the most important of the . . .
causes of the revolution--the weakness of the con­
servative forces. This is the necessary immed­
iate cause of revolution. Despite the universal 
demand for revolutionary change, despite intense 
hopefulness of success, unless those who wish to 
maintain the status quo are so weak that they can­
not maintain themselves, there is little likeli­
hood of a successful revolution.21
Accelerated change, then, is change that proceeds
^^Kumar, op. cit., p. 50.
20Brinton, op. cit., p. 52.
21"Causes of Revolution," The American Journal of 
Sociology, Vol. L, No. 1 (July, 1944), pp. 1-8, Cited in 
Paynton and Blackey, op. cit., p. 107.
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apace motivated by a gap between expectation and fulfill­
ment and encouraged by apparent decadence in the ruling 
structure.
The third qualifier in our definition of revolution is 
the word "fundamental." With this qualifier functioning, 
the contemporary understanding of revolution separates it­
self again from revolution as it would have been understood 
in naturalistic or romantic contexts. Revolution understood 
as fundamental change implies that wherever its influence is 
felt, the sanctions for society as formerly structured are 
challenged and changed. Whether the structures themselves 
are changed is not so important as that the means of legit­
imating those structures are changed. In the terminology 
of Chalmers Johnson, revolution means the destruction of 
one "integrative myth" and its eventual replacement by an­
other, About this we will have more to say. The point to 
be made here is that revolution understood in contemporary 
terms produces more than a handing over of the reins of power, 
or even a change of social structures. Revolution is marked 
by a rethinking and a refounding of community.
Refounding community, (it goes without saying), is not
accomplished with a snap of the fingers.
"Community" is a concept of a different order from 
those of "government" and "regime"? and a sense 
of community never comes into being at a given 
instant, , . , The old order, including the old
integrative myth, collapses everywhere at once.
But it is not strictly necessary to our defi­
nition to insist that a new sense of community 
emerges at o n c e . 22
22c. Johnson, op. cit., p. 46.
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"In fact," Johnson says, "it is doubtful that there 
ever was a community-changing revolution."22 By this he 
means that revolution cannot destroy all sense of community 
and survive. Revolution re-founds the community on bases 
fundamentally different from the former foundations. Thus, 
revolution might emphasize national consciousness, or, as in 
Marxism, class consciousness. The sense of community is in 
no wise completely destroyed. Only the sanctions for its 
existence are redefined and its integrative myth replaced, 
or reinterpreted [e.g.,Holy Russia or the Third Reich).
"Fundamental change" is more specifically defined by 
Hannah Arendt, For her it means the "constitution of free­
dom." Accordingly, revolution has as its aim freedom, while 
rebellion more properly pursues the liberation from oppres­
sion. The discovery of the capacity for humans to constitute 
freedom was the great discovery of the eighteenth century 
revolutions. The reclamation of civil rights paled into rela­
tive insignificance as the new experience of creating some­
thing new dawned anew upon European man with a corona of 
implications. Specifically, that "something new" was a new 
body politic which afforded apparently greater guarantee 
for the constitution of freedom. This, according to Arendt, 
is revolution properly so-called. "Only where this pathos 
of novelty is present and where novelty is connected with
9 4
the idea of freedom are we entitled to speak of revolution."
Z^ibld.
24Op, cit., p. 27.
Thus, not every political change or outbreak of civil vio­
lence is revolutionary.
Only where change occurs.in the sense of a new 
beginning, where violence is used to constitute 
an altogether different form of government, to 
bring about the formation of a new body politic, 
where the liberation from oppression aims at 
least at the constitution of freedom can we
speak of revolution.22
The constituting of freedom, therefore, is descriptive 
of a truly revolutionary epoch and implies, of necessity 
fundamental change. As was mentioned, Chalmers Johnson 
refers to the- change as affecting the "integrative myth" 
of a society. Hannah Arendt alludes to similar guasi-re- 
ligious sanctions by citing Rousseau as a typical repre­
sentative of an inevitable dilemma for the constitutors of 
freedom. "The great problem in politics, which I compare 
to the problem of squaring the circle'in geometry . . .
(is); how to find a form of government which puts the 
law above m a n . "22 in France, the solution was to cease talk 
about the transcendent, divine right of kings and to begin, 
instead, to speak of the equally transcendent "general will." 
The shift was not subtle. It was, however, fundamental.
The integrative myth had undergone fundamental change.
Sigmund Neumann suggests that such fundamental change 
may sweep through political organization, social structure, 
economic property control or the predominant myth of social
25ibid., p. 28.
26ibid., p. 184.
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order. The requisite identifier of revolution remains; the 
change must be fundamental.
The next qualifier in the definition of revolution 
delimits the effective cause of revolutionary change. Change 
that is truly revolutionary must be pursued by means of "un­
usual force," The thrust of this qualifier, like that of 
"deliberate" and accelerated," is partly to distinguish 
revolutionary change from evolutionary change. But it ac­
complishes more than just this distinction.
Ordinarily the term "violence" is automatically em­
ployed to describe revolutionary activity, Violence, how­
ever, as the descriptive term, suffers from one serious limi­
tation, A revolutionary mentality is usually well-formed 
before a stage of violence is reached. Until that time, 
revolutionary activity is non-violent. Still, it functions 
tq promote the revolution. Because of this limitation, the 
term "unusual force" is preferable.
In the first place, "unusual force" suggests at least 
as clearly as "violence" the paradox of all revolutionaries 
who, in the name of law, step outside of law, ostensibly to 
accomplish the establishment of law. This terminology sub­
sumes not only illegal acts of violence, but also acts of 
non-violence which may also be illegal.
However, it should be observed that the word "unusual" 
is not necessarily synonymous with illegal. Unusual force 
may still be within the bounds of strict legality. What 
makes the force unusual is that, while in the strictest sense
47
it is within legal bounds, its conscious tendency is to under­
mine the structure [including the juridical structure) against 
which, on the face of things, it is not offending. In other 
words, while it may not be an illegal display of force, in 
terms of the change it seeks to effect, the force exerted does 
not follow the conventional channels. Revolutionary change 
can be promoted by work to rule, boycott, demonstrations, etc.
Revolutionary change, then, is change effected by force 
alternative to conventional political channels. What makes 
this force unusual is not its content of violence or even its 
generation of maximum coercive power. Nor is it that if the 
force is successfully exercised the ordinary political chan­
nels will be done away. What makes the force of revolution 
unusual is its grasp and use of sources of power alternative 
to constitutional and conventional channels of public deter- 
minacy. What is important is that the ordinary channels are 
repudiated and alternatives sought to demonstrate the inef-. 
fectiveness of the former to precipitate change.
The final qualifier of our definition of revolution 
has to do with the objective of revolutionary force. Only 
the objective of human happiness is adequate to define true 
revolution and to maintain the distinction we have consist­
ently made between revolutionary and other types of change.
By asserting that human happiness is the true and 
only objective of genuine revolution, we may beg the ques­
tion, "What is human happiness?" Any attempt to answer that 
question, however, must be left to the work of others. At
48
this point, our only interest is to identify a character­
istic common to all revolutionary movements. Diverse though 
the definitions of human happiness may be from one revolu­
tionary movement to another, each is convinced that its ob­
jective, once accomplished, will produce happiness for man 
from a society heretofore barren of that p o w e r . 27 "Human 
happiness" implies the ideological element common to revo­
lutionary movements. Thus, the Marxist prosecutes revolu­
tion in the hope of a classless society?, the Frenchman with 
the vision of liberty, equality, and fraternity? the American 
for political freedom? the Maoist to preserve the process 
of change.
But all authentic revolution seeks more or less implic­
itly to achieve what the American Declaration of Independence 
makes explicit, i.e., that men by nature and by inalienable 
right will "pursue happiness."
The question, then, "What makes human happiness?" may 
become the grounds for criticism of a particular revolution. 
This is not the same, however, as to deny that a movement of
2^Herbert Marcuse also uses the term "happiness" to 
describe the "good" revolution. He speaks of "a basic con­
cept of classical political philosophy which has been all 
too often repressed, namely, that the end of government is 
not only the greatest possible freedom,.but also the great­
est possible happiness of man, that is to say, a life with­
out fear and misery, and a life in peace." "Ethics and 
Revolution," Revolution and the Rule of Law, Edited by Edward 
Kent. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1971), p. 46. Marcuse distinguishes between freedom and 
happiness, then proceeds to justify revolution with an 
historical calculus reminiscent of Jeremy Bentham and social 
hedonism. "Happiness" as we will use it, however, is to be 
construed in its simplest sense as a broad term, comprehending 
all specific, legitimate aims of the political enterprise, 
including, for example, whatever Marcuse means by freedom.
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which one is critical on eudaemonic grounds is not therefore 
truly revolutionary.
The significance of the qualifiers for our concept of 
revolution must not be subsequently overlooked. If they 
function successfully, the problems raised for the Christian 
conscience by potential revolution will not lightly be cast 
off. Authentic revolution means more than historic inevi­
tability, more than a mere exchange of the reins of power. 
Authentic revolution is an expression of more than frustra­
tion. It entails an affirmation of values, hopes, fears 
and all things most essentially human and, therefore, essen­
tially religious.
We will nowhere argue the relative effectiveness of 
revolution to attain its own ends.. Such arguments are read­
ily available from historians and sociologists. The problem 
for the Christian conscience is not raised and cannot finally 
be alleviated by pragmatism alone.
We will continue to argue, however, that certain revolu­
tions might be more acceptable to a Christian conscience 
than others. The Christian, therefore, is responsible to 
assess his situation vis-a-vis the revolutionary potential 
and react accordingly. If the authentic revolution is as we. 
have described it by the attached qualifiers, it becomes 
apparent that the more revolutionary the situation the more 
acutely arises the problem of revolutionary versus counter­
revolutionary for the .Christian. The function of "authori­
tative theological literature" would not be so much to pre­
scribe a course of action that is "Christian." Rather, it
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would provide guidance for the assessing of genuinely revo­
lutionary potential and leave the course of action to one's 
own conscience.
This is exactly the way in which one can profitably 
read F. D. Maurice. The following chapters will detail that 
fact.
CHAPTER 4 
WHY MAURICE?
To suggest that F. D, Maurice can be a guide in the 
creation of a theology of revolution evokes immediate incre­
dulity from a number of people. Maurice, the revolutionary, 
creates a strange image to those who have made a study of 
his life and work. Torben Christensen, for example, docu­
ments in his volume The Origins and History of Christian 
Socialism, 1848-1854 the precision with which Maurice could 
frustrate the plans of the Christian Socialists and exasp­
erate its leadership. The impression that remains from 
reading Christensen on Maurice is an a fortiori argument 
against Maurice-s conversance with revolution, i.e., since 
Maurice was a drag on such mild, nineteenth-century reformism, 
how much more so on twentieth-century revolution,
A second reason why Maurice seems an unlikely guide 
through the windings of revolution as a theological problem 
is that he really knew nothing of the twentieth century’s ex­
perience. Maurice is strikingly nineteenth-century. His ca­
pacity for prognostication is limited.■ He is aware of Colenso 
and the beginnings of biblical literary criticism,^ He is
2-See his response to the storm created by the publica­
tion of the Essays and Reviews in "The Mote and the Beam," 
Tracts For Priests and People, No, 2 (Cambridge: Macmillan
and Co,, 18 61),
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aware of Darwin and even of the approaching evolution-crea- 
tion storm. In spite of this awareness, he fails to appre­
ciate the capacity for upheaval that biblical criticism and 
evolutionary hypotheses will manifest even before his life 
ends in 1872. Their influence in the twentieth century goes 
entirely unapprehended by Maurice. Revolutionary considera­
tions reveal the same incapacity. Maurice says nothing of 
Karl Marx or his writings. He did know of Hegel. But, like 
Kierkegaard, Maurice resented the rationalism of the Prussian 
philosopher. The extent of his critical appreciation of Hegel 
was that the notion of the dialectic ought to confirm in their 
fears those who "knew from history what attempts had been 
made in other ages to bring heaven and earth within the terms 
of the intellect, and what had come of those attempts."2 The 
potency of Hegelian dynamism to change radically the world of 
Maurice's purview eludes him. The result is that Maurice 
seems to have lived, written, and thought in a social and po­
litical context quaintly foreign to his intellectual poster­
ity of a century later. The question of the relevance of 
Maurice's thought to the twentieth-century experience of revo­
lution is, therefore, legitimate.
Then there are specific instances to be found in the 
writings of Maurice that sound anything but "revolutionary." 
Maurice, the royalist, the aristocrat, the implacable opponent
2Cf, the dialogue in his preface to Moral and Metaphysical 
Philosophy (2 vols,; London: Macmillan, 1872).
^Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 657-658.
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of democracy in Britain, the nationalist, could hardly pro­
claim his arch-conservatism (not to say, "counter-revolu­
tionary bias") better with banners.
Nevertheless, there is in Maurice a degree of ambiva­
lence that ought not to be overlooked. If one cannot say 
that Maurice was a revolutionary by principle, neither can 
one say that Maurice was a counterrevolutionist by principle. 
For there is evidence that Maurice discovers occasional sym­
pathy with certain revolutions and with revolutionary causes.
Doubtless, this ambivalence can be traced to the home 
of his boyhood.4 And primarily, it can be traced to the in­
fluence of Frederick's father, Michael. Michael Maurice, 
at the wish of his father, who was a dissenting, although 
"orthodox" minister, had been sent for educating to Hoxton 
Academy, a Presbyterian stronghold. The liberal atmosphere 
of the school accounts for the avowed Unitarianism of its 
professors. But more important a consideration for our pur­
poses is that
. . . before and beyond all things, the most pow­
erful minds among them were political Liberals,
The aspirations of the time were far more politi­
cal than religious, and Michael Maurice issued
[Frank M. McClain, Maurice, Man and Moralist, (London: 
SPCK, 197 2), and Olive Brose, Frederick Denison Maurice : Re­
bellious Conformist 1805-1872, [________ : Ohio University
Press, 1971) have produced detailed works concerning the na­
ture and influence of Maurice’s unusual boyhood home. A host 
of other authors have felt constrained to sketch Maurice’s 
early life in less interpretive biographical introductions 
to his life and work. For that reason, the biographical ref­
erences here and throughout this paper will be selective 
rather than comprehensive. Be it noted, however, that such 
selectivity is done with care not to wrench or contrive the 
larger biographical context.)
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from Hoxton Academy, or rather from Hackney College, 
which was in connection with it, and to which he 
removed in 1786, a Unitarian in opinion, but heart, 
soul, and spirit an enthusiastic political L i b e r a l . 2
Michael Maurice would later in life become a member 
of the pacifistic Peace Society, a fact that led F. D,
Maurice to surmise that by 1805 his father had a dislike for 
all fighting.2 Yet as late as 1823, Michael Maurice wrote 
to a former student: "The taking of the Bastille is still
one of the Dies Fasti in my calendar."  ^ He was associated 
with those suspected of French sympathies by Pitt's govern­
ment. And Maurice puzzles that his father never came to 
distinguish accurately between the first French war, fought 
preserve the revolution, and the second French war, fought 
to preserve the integrity of European nations atainst 
Napoleonic designs.  ^ It can be concluded, therefore, that 
Michael Maurice retained all his life a fervent appreciation 
for the French Revolution.
Partly to this appreciation must be attributed his later 
support for the Constitutionalist Party in Spain. The prin­
ciples upon which they were prosecuting attempts at reform 
were certainly as important to him as the hope of earning a 
respectable return from the bonds he owned which were issued
Frederick Barton Maurice (ed.), The Life of Frederick
Denison Maurice Chiefly Told in His Own Letters (London:
Macmillan, 188 4. - Cit, Lif e) , Vol. i, p . 7~.
^Life, Vol. I, p. 15,
^Life, Vol. I, p, 9.
^Life, Vol. 1, p. 15.
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by the party. When the Constitutionalist cause failed and 
its proponents were exiled, the bonds became instantly value­
less. The loss, joined with other financial failures about 
the same time left the Maurice home of 1828 with insuffi­
cient income even to maintain the large Southampton house 
where they lived. The sacrifice left the family spiritually 
unaffected, except as it rallied to relieve the inconvenience 
caused by the diminution of income.  ^ As to Frederick's re­
action there can be no question. The support of the Spanish 
exiles was a political duty,
There never was an error in which the grossness 
of the ignorance it displayed was more suitable 
to the malignity of the motive which produced it 
than the pretence that the Spanish exiles were 
bloodthirsty and anarchical innovators. They 
are the heirs, representatives, and champions of 
the old liberty of Spain. Their- antagonist is 
an anarchy compounded of despotism and democ­
racy. Their only object was the establishment 
of legal and constituted order. The Spanish 
exiles were driven from their homes because they 
opposed what all Englishmen, Tory and Whig alike, 
must consider as a tremendous evil, the license, 
namely, of arbitrary p o w e r . 10
And if political duty were not enough to enlist the 
support of the English for the needs of the banished Spaniards, 
considerations of humanity should suffice to accomplish the 
same end. Thus, with enthusiasm, the young Athenaeum edi­
tor identified himself with the cause as well as the plight 
of the Spanish patriots.
It is, of course, impossible to determine with
^Life, Vol. I, p. 90.
lOLife, Vol, I, p. 85.
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precision the degree of influence the political biases of the 
father exerted upon the political interests of the son. On 
the other hand, it is incredible that a father so politically 
enthusiastic should rear a son who remained unaffected. 
Whether his political interests sprang from heredity or en­
vironment F. D. Maurice never speculates. He does confess, 
however, to a political selectivity even of his boyhood 
attention.
. , . anything social or political took a hold of
me such as no objects in nature, beautiful or use­
ful, had. My sister Emma said to me, when we were 
both grown up, that the scent of some violets which 
we gathered together as children at Normanstone had 
never passed out of her soul. How I envied her the 
freshness and freedom of heart which that experience 
implied I 2-1
Reason accords with the judgment that such selectivity,
perpetuated throughout the lifetime of F. D. Maurice could
only heve felt nurtured in the home of Michael Maurice. So
we are not surprised to discover in the description by a
boyhood friend of F, D. Maurice, a Dr. Goodeve, that
. . , his chief ambition was to become a leading
barrister and a member of parliament for some dis­
tinguished constituency, He had two or three 
idols in the latter class— Brougham, Sir Francis 
Burdett and Joseph. Hume were amongst t h e m .  2-2
Not even the avowed utilitarianism, with its material­
istic overtones, of these radical reformers could diminish
2-2-Life, Vol, I, p, 16; (cf, also pp. 19-20, where F.D.M. 
recounts his disinterest in any reading except "such history 
as I could connect with the events which I heard of as passing 
in our time, or with some party feeling that had been awakened 
in me.")
2-2]Life. Vol. I, p. 39,
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the admiration of the critical boy. For Maurice, the pur­
pose of his life was determined before his fifteenth year 
and set in the following pledge which Maurice composed and 
to which he and Goodeve both subscribed.
"We pledge each other to endeavour to distinguish 
ourselves in after life, and to promote as far as lies in 
our power the good of mankind.
While, therefore, the influence of the liberal senti­
ments of Maurice's father upon him must remain indetermi­
nate, it is strongly suggested in Maurice's own words about 
himself and his childhood.
Allusion has already been made to Maurice as the edi­
tor of the Athenaeum. He opposed, through this organ, the 
ascending star of utilitarianism as the "radical" solution 
to the problems of social ills. He wrote, under the influ­
ence of Coleridge, that the nation is not an atomistic col­
lection of individuals, but an invisible entity. Solutions 
to problems are not to be gained by the contemplation of the 
outer world only; but by using such contemplation to adduce 
hints of the invisible reality, man can come at last to per­
ceive directly the eternal world.
It is usual to pass off such a point of view as philo­
sophically idealistic and, therefore, unlikely to produce 
much understanding or change in men's circumstances. Such is 
not the case with Maurice. During the same period he wes 
attacking utilitarianism through the pages of the Athenaeum,
2-3Life, Vol, r, p, 40,
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he was contributing to the Westminster Review, the orgen of 
philosophical radicalism, Maurice's idealism was the source 
of political sympathies quite in line with the philosophic 
radicals. Although he did not "wear the proper Liberal livery, 
, , , on practical questions I shouted with them. "2.4
A case in point is Maurice's article on the Memoirs of 
the Irish independence leader, Theobald Wolfe Tone. Tone had 
sought to secure Irish independence from English rule by en­
tering into negotiations with the French. The Napoleonic 
wars were the backdrop of the negotiations and Tone was 
seized by the English, convicted of high treason, and sen­
tenced to death. Maurice's sympathies for Tone stemmed from 
his sense of the national entity. Unlike the political lib­
erals amongst the Whigs who felt for the people. Tone had 
felt with them. In other words. Tone had entered into the 
life of the nation. He was no external observer but rather 
a voice raised from the heart of Ireland. He should, .there­
fore, be listened to.
Most particularly should those listen who were then in 
positions of power and whose reactionary opposition to benef­
icent reform was born of a steady conviction that "a super­
stitious veneration for ancient institutions will induce men 
patiently to endure practical g r i e v a n c e s . "2-2
In Mauricien terms, what Wolfe Tone cried out for was 
not a cosmetic reorganization of Irish political structure.
2-^ Life, Vol. I, p. 178.
2-5westminster Review, Vol. IX (January, 1828), p. 98,
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It was for a social fabric that would constitute a distinct 
expression of the spiritual life of the nation. Particulars 
aside, such a drive could not help but win the support of 
Maurice. And in spite of opposition from church and conser­
vative circles that would be engendered by the Act of Catholic 
Emancipation of 182 9, Maurice seized upon Tone as an exemplar 
of genuine national concern.
So far, all the evidence adduced to support the politi­
cal ambivalence of F. D. Maurice has been drawn from his ear­
lier years. Occasional radical posturing is thoroughly con­
sistent with youth. Therefore, one might conclude that 
Maurice had yet to "grow up,"
Apparently, this conclusion would be bolstered by the 
elderly Maurice's confessions to his son that a period of 
personal crisis commenced in 1828.2-2 There were sufficient 
reasons for such a crisis: the financial plight of the fam­
ily, the financial plight of the Athenaeum, and the terminal 
illness of his sister, Emma. But oyer and above them all 
was a spiritual searching precipitated long before by the 
religious controversies that tore at the unity of Maurice's 
family. These culminated in his conscientious refusal to 
declare himself a bona fide member of the Church of England
^^Much of what follows in this and the next paragraph 
is extracted from "An Autobiographical Letter Written in 
187 0 to Explain the Origin of 'Subscription No Bondage,'" 
"Subscription No Bondage" was a pamphlet published in 1835 
by Maurice in which he defended his subscribing the Thirty- 
Nine Articles upon entry to Oxford after refusing to de­
clare himself an Anglican at Cambridge, The Letter appears 
in Life, Vol. I, pp. 173-184.
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even though such a declaration would have allowed him to re­
ceive the LL.B. already earned at Cambridge. Through the 
pages of his novel, Eustace Conway, produced during the next 
year and a half, Maurice projected his own spiritual quest.
In essence, the spiritual crisis accomplished a sever­
ance of Maurice from a "sham creed and pretentious tolera­
tion." Maurice was beginning to suspect himself guilty of 
intellectual philanderings. His sense of condemnation grew 
not so much out of holding wrong opinions but out of holding 
opinions wrongly. Like Eustace Conway, "he saw, with amaze­
ment and shame, that instead of having a right to boast that 
he had really tried many faiths, he had never fairly tried 
any." This period of spiritual crisis was sparked by the 
growing realization that Maurice was the victim of an in­
tellectual i zing mood that could only detach one from truth.
The thorough, objectivity of pompous tolerance was sterile 
spiritually. God and oneself remained alike secluded. The 
desire for a personal immersion in divine truth now emerged 
from the suppression that had kept it bound from the days of 
bitter religious controversy in Maurice's boyhood home. The 
result of this crisis period was an experience and apprehen­
sion of God that would give form to his theology, and thus 
to the whole of Maurice's life-work.
Henceforth, Maurice would think of man as totally de­
pendent upon God. Christ is the "Head and King of the Race." 
Only as Christ bestows upon man the power to live a life of 
self-sacrifice can man approach his capacity for a truly human
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life. Only then can he manifest that he is made in the image
of God, and thus become what he is.
Society, too, is constituted by God. The purpose of
society in all of its institutions is to promote life that
is truly human. The family and the nation are ordained of God, 
in part, as pedagogical institutions to teach man the truth 
about himself.
The social implications of such a theology are enormous. 
There is doubtless a built-in conservatism. Suggesting alter­
natives to the family or the nation as structures is to deny 
their quality as divine givens, and thus to suggest heresy. 
Nevertheless, Maurice himself provides evidence of his tolera­
tion for a variety of familial or national structures so long 
as they fulfill the purpose for which they have been ordained. 
Thus, he can be quite intolerant of either family or national 
structures that pervert themselves into instruments of domi­
nation, in the case of the family, or imperialism, in the case 
of the nation. If there is a built-in conservatism, then, 
there is also a built-in radicalism. Maurice, as much as any 
sincere mantis driven by a teleology.
In later chapters, then, we will assess the impetus 
Maurice's mature theology provided for his endeavors on be­
half of the social needs of his day. All that needs to be 
accomplished here is to assert again that the ambivalence 
found in Maurice is predictable on the ground of his child.- 
hood and his theology. Later chapters will show the more 
radical side of Maurice's convictions which was capable of
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stirring him to unpopular actions, In fact, controversy 
was a constant companion of Maurice,
The ambivalence which we have portrayed and which was 
to be a lifelong characteristic of Maurice could be considered 
problematic in applying his thought to the issue of revolution. 
Some would judge him disqualified for dialogue in a theology 
of revolution. This judgement would be strengthened by the 
clear conservatism discoverable even to the casual reader of 
Maurice. Such a judgement, however, concludes less about 
Maurice and more about the Christian interest in revolution. 
That is to conclude that a theology of revolution is limited 
in an exclusive way to those who are predisposed to nod 
approvingly of revolution as a specie. Dialogue thus slips 
into monologue. Far from being a disadvantage, the ambiva­
lence in Maurice is indicative of the genuine contribution 
he can be brought to make to current theological dialogue 
about revolution. In that sense his ambivalence is a great 
advantage.
Furthermore, the ambivalence in Maurice reflects an 
ambivalence not unfamiliar to contemporary ponderers of revo­
lution as a theological problem. The legitimacy of any theol­
ogy of revolution depends upon its correspondence to the act­
ual information of the Christian conscience. If ambivalence 
is a possibility for the Christian considering revolution, 
that possibility requires to be disclosed in a legitimate 
theology of revolution.
Finally, Maurice is useful to the Christian considering
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revolution on principle because Maurice knows no other way 
to consider any problem. Maurice is not an opportunist. That 
is, Maurice does not oscillate in principle from issue to 
issue. He can follow Burke in condemning the French revo­
lution while condoning the revolution of the American colo­
nists. But these two, differing positions are squarely based 
on the same principles of national life. There is, there­
fore, a remarkable consistency about Maurice's ambivalence.
What allows revolution to be a problem for Maurice is 
that it does not always accord with his understanding of the 
principles he felt to be at work in the world, i.e., the 
Divine Order.
In times when a popular revolutionary mentality prevails, 
the notion of a divine order is declared to be old-fashioned 
and regressive. Upon it is laid serious responsibility for 
class divisions, for oppressive societal superstructures, 
for exploitation of some people by other people. Thus, Alec 
Vidler hedges his admiration for Maurice by confessing the 
uncertainty of the modern mind of a divine ground for under- 
girding the social and universal arrangements by which men 
live. 2-7 In calmer times, however, it must confessed not only 
that the notion of a divine order is more appealing, but that 
revolutionary pretensions are discovered to manifest a parallel 
For they too have a vision, a mythical substructure for their 
ideologies,
2-^ F. D. Maurice and Co, (London; SCM, 1965), p, 178,
"For us the future is inevitably much more open and much more 
uncertain than it was for him, since few Christians, whatever 
they may say r are now really confident about their anchorage 
in the Divine Order."
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What we will discover in Maurice is that he is a 
theologian. As such, he does not busy himself defending 
the principles of hallowed structures. Rather, he describes 
the structure of hallowed principles. On the grounds of 
those principles, he achieves a perspective from which to 
judge an establishment or a revolution. And when he feels 
it necessary he is sparing of neither. Consequently, he 
is critically aware of the problems which both lead to, 
and stem from, revolution. For the Christian conscience, 
therefore, he is both current and relevant. And to him we 
now turn.
CHAPTER 5 
THE DIVINE ORDER
In subsequent material the position will be defended 
that the exponents, as much as the opponents, of revolution 
require a vision of society as it "ought to be," Both the 
establishment and the revolution depend for their lives upon 
the ability to maintain the conviction that their particular 
social "mythology" is the good or true or real one. Thus, 
the thoughtful person cannot responsibly escape the diffi­
culties associated with the emotive term "establishment" sim­
ply by opting for a revolution. The constituting of order is 
as critical for the achievement of revolutionary aims as 
it is for stability in the establishment.
In the theology of F. D. Maurice, the notion of order 
is the central one. Other aspects of his theology are deri­
vations of this principle one, for upon the idea of the divine 
order or the kingdom of God, every other idea pivots. Fur­
thermore, Maurice's concept of the divine order is alluring.
So systematically is it stated in Maurice's works, and so lib­
erating it is for his life and practice! Above all, it is 
beguilingly simple.
In brief, Maurice is convinced that the human develop­
ment of the individual is conditioned by the legitimacy of
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the society of which he is a part. The legitimacy of that 
society, in turn, is conditioned by its correspondence to 
the divine will. The divine will has manifested itself par­
ticularly in three elements which constitute truly human 
order. These elements are the family, the nation, and the 
universal society (or church).
The idea of created orders enjoys long theological cre­
dence. So Maurice's notion of the divine order was not un­
precedented. In fact, in general ways, it is like Calvin's 
before, and Emil Brunner's after him. The point of all such 
thinking is that society that is genuinely humane has no 
purely economic or political basis, but rather a theological 
basis. Human society has an ultimate reference to God.
An important distinction.between Calvin's doctrine of 
created orders and Maurice's notion of the divine order, how­
ever, is that Maurice does not assign the elements to a for­
mal hierarchy. There is no attempt to subordinate church to 
state or state to church. Even Maurice's own aristocratic 
biases are subdued in his description of the divine order. 
Thus, he cannot, on the grounds of his conviction of a divine 
order, set forth a repressive class structure. Nor does he. 
The importance of this distinctive absence of hierarchical 
considerations must be stressed. Its application will be 
obvious and explicit in the conclusion. The following pages 
of this chapter are devoted to a more detailed exposition of 
Maurice's doctrine of the divine order.
5 7
The Family
Although it is assumed in all his writings, the most 
thorough exposition of Maurice's doctrine of the divine 
order is to be found in his lectures on Social Morality.^
The basic element of human society is the family. The drive 
toward thoughtless individualism, toward social fragmenta­
tion or atomism, is first encountered and rebuffed by the un­
avoidable relationships of the family. •
At my birth I am already in a Society. I am re­
lated, at all events, to a father and mother.
This relation is the primary fact of my existence.
I can contemplate no other facts apart from it.
. . . If you determine not to take notice of this
fact, not to give it precedence of every other, 
the effect is, that instead of contemplating the 
world at large you will only contemplate yourself.
You will be the unit about which all events and 
persons will revolve. Each man will regard him­
self as the centre of the universe. You will 
at last come to an understanding— a very imper­
fect understanding--that each must occupy this 
place in his own estimation; you will be forced 
to construct a Society on that hypothesis.^
As well as to undermine this practical solipsism, the 
family functions to precipitate a clear distinction between 
things and persons, and thereby lays the groundwork for 
humane society.
^Social Morality: Twenty-rone Lectures Delivered in
the University, of Cambridge (2d edition; London: Macmillan,
1872. Cit . Social Morality) These lectures constitute 
the second in a series of three courses of lectures on moral 
philosophy. They were.first published in 1869. The first 
course was published the previous year under the title The 
Conscience : Lectures on Casuistry Delivered in the Univer­
sity of Cambridge. [London: • Macmillan and Co., 1868. Cit. 
The Conscience).
^Social Morality, pp.’ 21-22.
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The family order and constitution is the first great 
bulwark which God has provided against the dominion 
of the senses and of the outward world,— . . , the
feeling, "I am a member of a family, I am the son 
and brother of such a person," is the great balanc­
ing power against the feeling, that there are cer­
tain pleasant objects which my eye sees, and my ear 
hears, and my palate tastes,— . . , it is the great
influence which redeems the affections from things, 
and gives them a direction towards persons, — . . .
it is the commencement of all society,--, . , it is
the first step towards the acknowledgement of God,
The family is a training ground for the broader rela­
tionships of human society. Each familial relationship is, 
therefore, characterized by a peculiar ethos. And, since 
each ethos is capable of distortion, each familial bond is 
also capable of distortion, Maurice commits to five lec­
tures the analysis of these family bonds and their ethics 
under the general heading of "Domestic Morality,"
The first examines the relationship of father and son. 
It is characterized by the ethos of authority on the part of 
the father and obedience on the part of the son. The pa­
ternal ethos can be distorted into dominion. According to 
Maurice, "authority" is a personal term. "Dominion," on the 
other hand, has reference to things. Dominion refuses to 
recognize relation on humane grounds. It is to assert one's 
nature as separate. "If the separate Nature prevails over 
this relation, there will in all cases be dominion, but no
^The Kingdom of Christ; or, Hints on the Principles, 
Ordinances, and Constitution of the Catholic Church in 
Twelve Letters to a Member of the Society of Friends 
(3 vols.; 1st edition; London; Darton and Clark, 1838), 
Vol. Ill, p. 11, Cited in Alec Vidler, Witness to the Light 
(New York: Scribners, 1948), p. 178.
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authority; subjection, no obedience; brutality, no manners."'^ 
The filial ethos of obedience, on the other hand, can be dis­
torted into subjection. Thus, authority is not synonymous 
with punishment, and its aim is emphatically not the identity 
of the child.with the parent.
The obedience of a son is shown in receiving those 
influences and impressions from a father's, author­
ity which most tend to quicken his.own activity.
No true father wishes his son to present an image 
of his opinions. He knows that the copy will be 
probably a caricature; that an echo conveys tl?.e 
sound not the sense of the original voice.^
In the next lecture, Maurice turns his attention to the 
relationship of husband and wife. Marriage, he suggests, is 
sometimes forced to bear two faulty interpretations. The first 
is that of the sentimentalist who recognizes that marriage is 
a result of choice. Two persons, drawn by affections, choose 
to enter into marriage. 'So long as the affection lives the 
marriage lives. There is no real marriage where there is no 
affection. On the other hand, the legalist announces that mar­
riage is a result of decree. What he has pronounced to be mar­
ried cannot be dissolved at will. He alone can dissolve the 
marriage by the setting forth of another decree.
Neither of these points of view gets to the real heart 
of marriage. Marriage is a relation.
For this relation, I'ike the paternal relation, 
is not the creation of formal Law; but is implied 
in it, lies beneath it, must be recognised and 
adopted by it so soon as it comes into existence.
It is a Relation; therefore neither is it the
^Social Morality, p. 23.
5lbid., p. 27.
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creation of the persons who enter into it. This 
phrase truly expresses the fact. They enter into 
it. All the inward feelings which attract them 
to it do not determine its nature; that is de­
termined before.^
The attraction which draws persons toward marriage is 
born out of the sense of incompleteness without the other. 
The result is an interdependence not only of the weak upon 
the strong but of the strong upon the weak. Such inter­
dependence can only thrive in an atmosphere of trust. Thus, 
we arrive at trust as the ethos of the conjugal relation. 
Trust belies the weak view of the sentimentalist.
, . , the choice and affection are not, as in the
creed of the sentimentalist, the gratification of 
a separate instinct; choice meaning -a mere passive 
submission to an overpowering impulse; affection 
having very little respect to its object, being 
chiefly prized for its reflex operation upon the 
person who cherishes it.^
On the other hand, "Trust is not impatient of law as a 
restraint. It welcomes Law as a check upon the vagrant in­
clinations which would undermine it."^ .
Marriage, therefore, is the creation of neither senti­
ment nor law. For Maurice, marriage is a given, a state 
definitive of the legitimate relationship of husband and 
wife. As such it is the wellspring of trust.
. , . fostered,by the conjugal relation. . . it
diffuses itself from that through all the house­
hold; . . . From the family it goes forth into
the nation, . . .  It enters into all the
^Ibid. , pp. 43-44..
^Ibid.
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intercourse of life; where it is wanting, society 
becomes an intolerable lie.^
The succeeding lecture focuses upon the relationship 
of brothers and sisters: Despite distinctions traditional
in certain areas based upon sex or primogeniture, Maurice 
apprehends an ethos characteristic of the sibling relation­
ship essentially considered. This ethos he names consan­
guinity. Although he consents to complaints that the term 
may be legal and technical, he maintains that "the physical 
fact is connected with a fixed relation." The relation is 
defined by common origin. The acknowledgment of that rela­
tion brings to birth the ethos of consanguinity. The phys­
ical fact, by extension, yields a harvest of more spirit- . 
ual implications. It demands the recognition of equality. 
But since equality can never mean absolute similarity, the 
demands of equality must be checked and softened by the rec­
ognition also of fraternity. Where the demands of equality 
and fraternity are in balance, consanguinity is at work and 
the relation of siblings is actualized to the gain of the 
whole society. Consanguinity emerges as the great foe of 
the spirit of rivalry.
The competition of interest is checked as the 
sense of the relationship is strengthened; with 
the sense of the relationship comes also the 
feeling of distinct powers which each may put 
forth for the help not the overthrow of the 
other, of distinct vocations to which each may 
devote himself, and so may make the destiny of 
the whole family more complete.10
9lbid.
^°Ibid., p. 71.
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the negative aspects of competition are ever to be
checked, consanguinity is the only real hope. Artificial
expedients will never avail.
If the desire,of possession and rule is stronger 
in any man than the sense of brotherhood, he may 
be a tyrant or a slave; or both in one. He in 
whom the sense of brotherhood is uppermost may be 
a sufferer and a victim, but he will help to pre­
serve Society from destruction.H
The final relationship with which Maurice deals under 
the general heading of domestic morality is that of master 
and servant. The ethos of this relationship, whether the 
subordinate be a servant or a slave can be subverted by its 
origin. "I have won him with my sword. I have purchased 
him with my money," With such words, reasonable as they may 
sound, the master reduces a relation to a simple consider­
ation of chattel. As a consequence he introduces an "adder 
into the breast of the family,"
. . . the language which is applied to one part of
the family will gradually be applied to the whole 
of it. The belief in Property will become the ab­
sorbing belief in the mind of the Father; it will 
convert his authority over his Son into mere Do­
minion, It will be a question between the husband 
and the wife which shall have dominion over the 
other; notions of Property will regulate their 
union, Brothers will view their relation in the 
same aspect; it will be a struggle which shall pos­
sess most of that which the father leaves, . . If 
he admits the principle of Property in any case to 
be the ground of his connexion with one of his own 
race, that principle becomes predominant in his 
whole life; if the domestic feeling is stronger in 
him than the feeling of possession, that will work 
itself out in him till it leavens his thoughts of 
every one with whom he is brought into c o n t a c t . ^2
l^Ibid., p. 73; cf. also pp. 353-354.
12%bid., p. 78; cf. Maurice's defense of the working 
men's associations on the grounds of reasserting the real
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Obviously, conditions in which one man serves another 
will never disappear entirely. But do pecuniary rights pro­
vide the only way to understand those conditions? Maurice 
answers in the negative. To answer positively is both popu­
lar and devastating.
That is, in other words, "Between me and him there 
is no relation; the only bond between us is that 
which money has created." That is the feeling on 
the master's side. And the servant's of necessity 
corresponds to it. "I owe him nothing; he has had 
my work out of me. What more have I to do with 
him?"13
To focus upon the property aspects of the servant-mas­
ter relation is to destroy the relation. And relation 
is the primary fact. To focus upon the relation, whether one 
is servant or master, is to escape brutalizing and to avow 
commonality and awaken the sense of community. Interdepend­
ency springs to consciousness and the honorable ethos of 
reverence for service arises with vitality.
I am sure that unless they learn that reverence 
for each other which neither feudal bonds nor 
legal securities can create, they will become 
more and more enemies to each other, and the en­
mity will spread from that relation to all others 
till the entire household is infected with it.l^
Maurice has already made explicit the divinely appointed 
order which supports every true domestic relation and its
relation of master and servant against its pecuniary dis­
tortion, in "Reasons for Co-operation" (London: John W.
Parker, 1851), p. 17.
^^social Morality, p. 84.
^^Ibid., pp. 85f.
ISibid., p. 86.
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correlative ethos. For example, in describing the relation­
ship of brothers and sister he says;
What I affirm is, that in human beings this physi­
cal fact is connected with a fixed relation, and 
that in this relation a certain habit or manner is 
implied. It is implied in the relation, not arti­
ficially attached to it by certain later conven­
tions, Where it is lost the relation is denied; 
Society if it is more than a collection of brutes 
is subverted.
The mystery of domestic relations, inexplicable on 
naturalistic grounds, is the source of religious conscious­
ness. The experience of the true family is a worship ex­
perience because it leads to the divine ground on which the 
family stands. This family worship is the subject of his 
fifth lecture.
Familial bonds are the sources and verifiers of man's 
religious "suspicions," We shall see Maurice defending the 
proposition that true worship with its overtones of grace 
and sacrifice stands as the only adequate guarantor of 
familial relations first, and subsequently national and uni­
versal human society,
Thus, Maurice brings to a formal close the discussion 
of the ethics of the family. In fact, it is not the end of 
his understanding of familial relevance to society. Again 
and again Maurice returns to the family as the basic model 
for his understanding of man in all his relationships. The 
nation may be illustrated using the family. But the family
^^Ibid., p. 63.
3-'Infra, Chapter five.
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is never illustrated using the nation. Likewise with the 
universal society, Maurice speaks of the authority of a 
Father and the obedience of a Son in sacrifice. The roots 
of all that is bad and all that is good in society trail 
back to the soil of the family, according to Maurice.
The abolition of the family as Maurice views it, can 
precede by no more than a generation the destruction of the 
nation and the loss of the universal society in the spirit 
of empire. For the child emerges from the family with a 
sense of values crucial to man in his larger social group­
ings, The child learns the meaning of authority, of obed­
ience, of trust, of equality, of reverence for service. The 
ultimate reference of all of m a n s  social groupings, God 
himself, is first discovered within the family and owned 
through the exercise of family worship, "I believe this 
institution lies beneath, all others and that all others are 
strong as it is strong, or weak as it is weak,"^8 what the 
establishment does with the family, therefore, and what the 
revolution might do with it are the gravest of questions.
The Nation
About a fourth of the lectures on Social Morality are 
devoted to domestic morality. Another fourth deal with
^^"A Lecture at the Opening of the Lower Norwood Working 
Men's Institute" ' (.London; W, Kent and Co., 1860) , pp. 8-9. 
"The existence of this family feeling has been the ground of 
national life, and the preservation of it. All wise moral­
ists and legislators have desired to cultivate it: in any
causes which threatened its destruction, they have seen the 
sure presages of ruin to laws, manners, individual greatness, 
social order. The Church a Family [London: John W, Parker,
1850), pp. 2-3.
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national morality, and nearly half of the lectures are given 
to morality in the universal society.
The transition to national morality is accompanied by 
a change in method. Whereas in the discussion of domestic 
morality Maurice focused upon the inter-personal relation of 
the family, e.g., parent/child, sibling, etc.; in the lec­
tures on national morality, the focus is upon the phenomena 
of national identity. These he identifies as law, language, 
government, war, and worship. In the lectures on domestic 
morality, Maurice discovers an ethos bound up in each rela­
tionship, The only relationship Maurice recognizes in the 
context of the nation is "citizen." Thus, there is only one 
ethos, viz., my neighbor and myself.
, , . these are the factors which I must take ac­
count of, if I want to know what I mean when I 
claim to be the member of a City or State, Sup­
posing I forget either, I forget the other, I 
cease to recognise the distinctness or worth of 
my neighbour, if I do not recognise my own; I 
cease to recognise my own distinctness and worth, 
if I do not recognise h i s , 20
The. phenomena of national identity, then, function only 
to support this ethos. They do not evoke some special ethics 
of their own, Maurice, has in mind something more closely 
approximating virtues that should spring from each of these 
phenomena. These virtues are indispensable to realising the 
ethos born out of a relationship characterized by "contiguity 
of place and individual distinctness," i.e., "my neighbour and 
myself."
^^This clearly reflects Maurice's profound theological 
commitment to the notion of the kingdom of God.
20 Social Morality, p. 111.
77
Among the phenomena of national identity, law is the 
most fundamental. However, it becomes clear that Maurice 
cannot maintain the structure of morality as he presents it 
in these lectures without implying two laws, one particular 
and national, the other general and divinely ordained. This 
provides a rich source of ambivalence as Maurice surveys and 
prescribes for his society as he found it.
One's most immediate sense is of this latter general 
lawy Generically this is true. The emergence of domestic 
society into national society depends upon the apprehension 
of a law prior to the law of the nation and broader than the 
law of the clan. The sense of such a law accounts for the 
truly stupendous changes that create a nation out of a group 
of clans. In particular, it accounts for the broadening of 
the spectrum of obligation. In the clan, obligation ceases 
with the boundaries of the membership. In the nation, one 
discovers the "neighbour." In the clan each member is obliged 
for the actions of any other member, But in the nation, 
each man is responsible as an individual for his own actions.
Experientially, the discovery of a general, rather un­
defined sense of obligation as an individual to a person other 
than family comes at the time when one is thrust out from the 
home or clan. Maurice writes from the experience of the Bri­
tain of his time, where the child's first move out of the 
home is into the school. The "school is the preparation for
33-Ibld. , p. 119.
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National L i f e , "22 This preparation includes introducing us 
to those laws which are particular and national, Maurice 
follows George Herbert: "Then the schoolmasters deliver us
to Laws."
By "Laws" is meant the law of a particular nation.
Thus, Maurice turns to the subject of his second lecture on 
national morality. National law is the first of the phenom­
ena of national identity. It is first because of its pri­
macy. Each of the other phenomena are meaningful inasmuch 
as they render service to law. One must bear in mind, how­
ever, that all of the phenomena of national identity, in­
cluding the particular law of a nation, serve the ethos of 
the nation best when they best serve the law that is divine­
ly ordained.24
The law of a particular nation, when it functions in 
accord with the higher, general law, will discover and en­
force the sense of individual obligation. It will reveal 
the individual tendency to covetousness. It will secure 
against that individual tendency the rights of life,
^^Ibid., p. 119.
33ibid.. .
3^Although Maurice does not make this distinction ex-
plicit in his lectures on national morality, they are hope­
lessly contradictory unless one assumes it. This is espe­
cially apparent in his discussion of loyalty where he re­
lates loyalty to law but suggests that loyalty demands recog­
nition of a law which might cause Parliamentary forces to 
fight against the king in the name of the king. And why? 
Because "they beheld the majesty of law in him." The dis­
tinction is explicit in Maurice's "Lecture at the Opening of 
the Lower Norwood Working Men's Institute^" pp, 11-13.
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character, and property. To accomplish this, law demands 
and prizes individual distinctness. But it reminds the man 
that he cannot be taken on his own altogether because he is 
enmeshed in a variety of personal relationships. The main 
function of law, then, is not to protect property, but per­
sons. "The law takes under its care not only me and my 
neighbour, but all the conditions under which it finds me and 
ray neighbour. . . It cannot call forth an affection which
' p c
does not exist. But it stamps an obligation upon the relation.
The second phenomenon of national identity which Maurice 
treats is language. Language operates in the life of the 
nation to promote veracity. "A covenant not to lie is im­
plied in the language of every people under h e a v e n . O n l y  
when the words mean the same thing to both parties of a con­
tract or contest will the transaction be regarded as just.
Still, words represent not things, but purposes. Language 
witnesses to the right of every individual to be heard and 
understood within his community. Words are the purposive 
extensions of person. Words are more "sacred" than things 
because "they express bonds between persons, which there can­
not be between things or between persons and things. . . A
nation— I am not speaking too strongly— is held together by 
words."27
From this brief analysis^ one could conclude that for
25social Morality, p. 12 4.
36lbid., p. 138,
3^Ibid,, pp. 140f.
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Maurice language is a mystical category. With a kind of un­
canny prescience, however, he has divulged one of the most 
abrasive issues of the modern experience of revolution. Just 
as the Assyrian Rabshakeh taunted the inhabitants of Jerusalem 
in the Hebrew tongue in order to demoralize them (II Kings 
18:26-27), so the modern revolutionary has added language to 
his armory with stunning effect.
Language is an effective reinforcement for the foment­
ing of revolutionary zeal, Canada, South Africa, India, and 
Great Britain all know from experience the bracing effect up­
on separatist movements applied by the merest sounds of the 
movement's "national" tongue, e.g., French in Quebec. The 
anti-nationalism of pure Marxism has given way to the pro­
moting of revolution on the strength of "national fronts."
The right of a people to its own language is a revolutionary 
issue.
Furthermore, language is an effective preservative for 
the values of a revolution. The "success" of the cultural 
revolution in the People's Republic of China is attributable 
to some significant degree to the introduction of a new 
script. Although the spoken language is unchanged, access to 
the documents of China's past is available only to the dimin­
ishing few who can read the old script. Universal literacy 
may be one of the outcomes of the cultural revolution. Spa­
tially, it is surely possible. But it will be temporally 
tethered to no date earlier than the date of the revolution.
28Simon Leys, "China's War on the Mind," Saturday Review
(June 25, 1977), pp. 14-19. "This reform of writing will allow
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The specter of a world illiterate among the documents 
of its own history, even recent history, is morally terrify­
ing. Thus, certainly on the basis of modern experience any­
way, one should conclude that the interest of Maurice in lan­
guage is moral rather than mystical.
Next, Maurice deals with government. Government 
functions to evoke loyalty. Loyalty is related etymologi­
cally and actually to law. Thus, the form.of government is 
not so important a consideration as the success of the govern­
ment to lead and inspire every citizen, ruler and ruled, to
acknowledge the primacy of law over position and privilege. 
Neither monarchy nor democracy is essentially better at elic­
iting loyalty since loyalty is directed ultimately neither 
to the king nor to the people, but to the law. Thus arises
the possibility of fighting against the king in the name of
the king,
Loyalty therefore must be in the King, if it is 
to be shewn to the King, He must confess a law
which binds him; a law which does not bend to
his self-will, which will assert its dominion 
over him and punish him if he sets it at nought.
It is all very well to claim his people's obedi­
ence. It will not be rendered to him if ^  is
not an obedient m a n .  2 9 , ,
the Maoist powers tq do at one stroke and for good what a 
hundred cultural revolutions with, all their autos-da-fe 
could not do; make all that h^d been thought, felt and 
written in China from antiquity until the present day un- 
communicable and unreadable for all future generations of 
Chinese--with the exception of literature that, having 
found grace in the eyes of the Chinese government, will 
be adapted as the authorities wish for transposition and 
publication in alphabetic writing.
2^Social Morality, p . 19 9.
What Maurice says of the king would be true of all 
rulers. In the Tract for Priests and People entitled "Do 
Kings Reign by the Grace of God?" Maurice distinguishes 
between reigning by the grace of God and reigning by divine 
right,with the latter conveying the notion of privilege at-
O Q
taching to the person rather than to the office. Having 
defended the position that privilege corresponds to office 
rather than person, then, Maurice freely owns that all 
heads of state (sovereigns, kaliphs, presidents), are legit­
imate on similar g r o u n d s , I n  so doing, the implication is 
clear that the form of government is not the primary phenom­
enon of national identity, but the fact of government itself. 
Legitimacy is not confined to monarchy or to democracy. The 
legitimacy of a government is determined by its foundation, 
not its form.. And we have already said that true revolution 
is a thrust at the fundamentum.
The fourth phenomenon of national identity Maurice 
treats in a chapter on war, In fact, the chapter deals with 
the place of the military establishment in the life of the 
nation and asserts that from the soldier's discipline, the 
nation is inspired to obedience to law. Maurice denies that 
wars are always fought from materialistic motives. Instead,
thank Him (God) for the demonstration which the 
Revolution [French) furnished, that kings do reign by His 
grace, and not by their own self-will, and that if they be­
come either tyrants or rois faineants, He will arise to judge 
the earth, and requite the proud according to their deserv­
ings." No. 10 (Cambridge: Macmillan and Co., 1862), p. 43,
21"a 11 are legitimate whom God owns as legitimate.
They lose their legitimacy by not confessing the law under 
which they live." Ibid., p. 56.
individual nations are always threatened by the perverted spir­
it of authentic universal morality— the spirit of empire. War 
is the nation's surety against the encroachments of this spirit. 
War defends the law and language and government of a nation and 
thereby protects its identity. The soldier, therefore, is not 
a brute. The nobility of his profession lies in his disci­
plined willingness to bear, rather than to inflict, misery. He 
yields proof to the nation that obedience to law permits one 
to live with courage and to die as a sacrifice. We will con­
tend further on that what Maurice says of the soldier is appli­
cable as well to the revolutionary. The ultimate question is 
still the question of law. Who is struggling as a witness to the 
law and who is* struggling to bring it to serve his own purposes?
He who fights for law makes war. He fights for the nation.
Finally, Maurice turns to the worship of a nation. In 
an analysis oft-repeated in Maurice's works, worship springs 
not from the uncanny or exalting experiences of natural phe­
nomena, but from the experiences of interpersonal relation­
ships.^^ Primarily, the worship of a nation testifies to the 
existence of an underlying and upholding order and, therefore, 
to a person who administers that o r d e r . 33 Thus, the desire 
to worship does not dim with the growth of civil societies
32social Morality, p. 192, cf. also, pp. 90ff; The King­
dom of Christ: or Hints on the Principles, Ordinances, and
Constitution of the Catholic Church, .in Letters to a Member of 
the' Society of Friends (2 vols.; 2d éd.; London: Macmillan,
1842. Cit. The. Kingdom of Christ), Vol. I> pp. 232-233; Dia­
logues Between a Clergyman and a Layman on Family Worship 
(London : Macmillan, f862. Cit. Family Worship), pp. 74-75.
33social~ Morality, p. 19 4.
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(.as if the state of nature were the only state conducive to 
the religious impulse), Instead, "thoughts about divine pow­
ers . . . grow with the growth and development of Societies;
become complicated with their complications."34 in partic­
ular, national worship is the movement of religious conscious­
ness testifying that all of the phenomena of national iden­
tity— law, language, government, and military endeavors--along 
with their corresponding virtues— obligation, veracity, loy­
alty and obedience to law— depend upon their correspondence 
to the higher, general law, i.e.., the divine order.
This profoundest conviction about the nation is inevi­
table, and inseparably binds politics to faith. Two alterna­
tives present themselves as responses to this conviction. The 
first is to acknowledge as fact the divine ground of the na­
tion, National worship then takes the form of submitting the 
law of the nation for trial before the bar of divine order.
A Nation's worship is the witness in humility to the source 
and ground of its life. The second alternative is to recog­
nize as fact only the conviction of a divine ground. The con­
viction may then be manipulated to serve the interests of the 
manipulators with the appearance of profoundest piety for 
sanction. Maurice describes this alternative.
There must be a divine ground of Law, said the in­
ner conscience of the Nation and of the patriot.
How necessary it is to assume such a ground that 
Law may be upheld, that men generally may respect 
it, said the lower nature of the man justifying 
itself by the calculations of a sordid expedi­
ency. We must make men observers of their words 
by feigning to recognize a God of truthI We must
34Ibid., p. 194.
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cheat men into loyalty, seeing how little there is 
to awaken it in self-seeking rulers, by threatening 
them with the vengeance of the Gods if they are dis­
loyal ' We must ask the augurs, scarcely able to re­
frain from laughing at each other as they meet, to 
invent supernatural reasons for rushing into wars 
or avoiding them; else how shall the soldier keep 
his oath to his commander, or not forget his disci­
pline, or not shrink from the enemy when he should 
face him? Here was the hateful and accursed side 
of the worship, that which made it incredible to 
such men as Lucretius, who were sure that there 
must be in nature if there was not among men some 
order which was not based upon trickery and lies.35
The worship of a nation determines the destiny of that 
nation. If its worship is true it will preserve its own na­
tionhood through reverence for the national existence of 
others. Various forms of law, language, etc. will be valued 
as forms essential for the existence of nations. True wor­
ship will lead the nation to look beyond itself to the One 
who is the source and protector of the life of every nation. 
True worship will lead to the sense of a universal society 
comprised of men living in families and nation.
On the other hand, fallacious worship will undermine 
the life of the nation. The protector of the nation is iden­
tified with the person or body who is responsible for the 
decision-making within the nation. The will of that person 
or body is esteemed to be the will of the entire nation. Such 
a finite will would be incapable of discerning among the ap­
parent best interests of national existence. The desire for 
dominance is inevitable. Social morality is subverted. The 
spirit of empire is born.
35ibid., p. 209.
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The Universal Society
Whether men will live in a universal society or under 
the dominance of the spirit of empire is the final and criti­
cal question raised in Social Morality. To an analysis of 
this question Maurice devotes the final half of his lecture. 
His aim, although never made explicit, is to establish self- 
sacrifice as the ethos of the universal society. Getting to 
that point, however, takes him through theoretical consider­
ations and through the experiences of history.
Theoretical considerations are dealt with in the first
two lectures on universal morality. The spirit of empire
stands upon the conviction that religion is an instrument of
manipulation. Following Gibbon's dictum concerning Rome that
"to.the magistrates all religions were equally useful," .
Maurice describes the place of religion in the empire:
The Emperor was the standard of Godhead. His 
power was the image of the highest, of the uni­
versal, Power. He did homage to heavenly pow­
ers no doubt. He wanted their aid. But he was 
to all intents and purposes the God of the earth.
If the gods above protected him, he also pro­
tected them. They retained their authority by 
his permission. It would be a fair exercise of 
his prerogative that he should increase their 
number. He could not permit any of them, more 
than any mortals within his dominion, to encroach 
upon his supremacy.36
In this way a polity of manipulation is transposed and 
protected by a theology of manipulation. Even the gods are 
subject to the manipulation of the emperor. Maurice con­
demns such a theology as "religious unbelief."37
36ibid., p. 223.
37Ibid., p . 4 00.
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The counter to the universal empire Maurice calls the
universal family. This designation is intended to suggest
that the ethos of authority and obedience discovered on the
domestic level operates in all of man's legitimate social
structures. It also serves to remind us that "according to
the Christian Creed the authority of a Father, the Obedience
of a Son, lies at the root of the Universe, is implied in
its constitution."33 "% have endeavoured," says Maurice,
to shew you, that the deadly opposition between 
the Empire and the Church had its root in the 
fact, that the latter preached to the world of a 
Will which was not arbitrary, of a Will which was 
essentially righteous, of a Will to make men 
righteous. Because the image of such a Will was 
before the Christian Martyrs they could not do 
sacrifice to the image of the E m p e r o r . 39
Such a righteous will manifestly cannot be manipulated in
the better interests of anyone. Such a will can only be
submitted to and obeyed.
Lectures fifteen through twenty trace the repetitions 
of imperialism through history. The thrust of these lectures 
is that "World Empires are overthrown by the arms of Na-' 
tions."^^ The conviction of a will more absolute and more 
righteous than the will of the emperor is the basis of na­
tional life and the bane of imperial existence.
The ultimate foe, however, of universal empire is uni­
versal worship. Imperial mentality is inevitably self-centered.
38ibid., p. 246. 
^^Ibld., p. 247. 
40ibid., p. 249.
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It revels in selfishness and self-importance. It does rec­
ognize the importance of sacrifice. But the only sacrifice 
it knows is the sacrifice intended to coerce or manipulate 
the will of the diety so honored to conform to the will of 
the empire.
Universal worship is judgment upon the empire. There, 
the notions of sacrifice correspond to the goodness of the 
will of God. The true sacrifice is the sacrifice of self. 
Nothing could be more opposed to the selfish spirit of empire. 
Sacrifice is not a tool for manipulation of the diety but a 
witness to his grace operating in the life of a person. Sac­
rifice truly perceived suggests a change not in God but in 
man. This the empire could not abide.
And so Maurice comes down to his final lecture, "Human 
Worship." Apart from his book, The Doctrine of S a c r i fice^i 
there is no more thorough development of his high concept of 
sacrifice in any other of his writings, Maurice changes his 
pattern of searching for an individual ethos. Instead, he 
speaks of self-sacrifice as a cardinal virtue, i.e., "the 
hinge on which other virtues turn, without which they would 
have no coherence, no vitality,"^3 Nevertheless, in the sense 
of "a rule governing a relationship," self-sacrifice is the 
ethos of the divine/human relationship.
Wherever the gloom of imperialism arises, there the
4lThe Doctrine of Sacrifice Deduced From the Scriptures 
(London; Macmillan, 1893, Cit, The Doctrine of Sacrifice).
42gocial Morality, p. 395,
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witness of self-sacrifice gleams through. "If there is at 
the root of all human Society, of Humanity itself," says 
Maurice,
that divine Sacrifice which our Worship sets be­
fore us, the Spirit of which it teaches may go 
with us wherever we go, whatever we are doing 
or thinking or purposing; there must be a light 
penetrating the g l o o m .
A fuller discussion of Maurice’s doctrine of sacrifice 
awaits our treatment of dynamic, or effective force, as a 
problem for the prospective Christian revolutionary. What 
we have needed to show here is that, for Maurice, the spirit 
of empire and the spirit of self-sacrifice are implacably 
opposed. The only hope of a universal morality ever being 
actualized depends upon commitment to self-sacrifice. And 
self-sacrifice depends upon unwavering faith in the absolute 
righteousness of the will of God.
Although we have pursued the examination of Maurice's 
understanding of the elements of the divine order in the same 
sequence as he treats them, it would be an error to let the 
assumption that each element and its ethos is unconnected go 
unchallenged. The connection among them is first, but not 
primarily, chronological. According to Maurice, man has come 
to comprehend the nature of the societies he shares. This is 
true for the individual as for man generically. But the sig­
nificant connections are more subtle than chronology alone 
can explain. There is an interaction amongst the elements. 
The ethos of one depends upon the ethos of another. A good
43Ibid., p. 413.
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example is trust. This ethos, born in the relationship be­
tween a man and wife, has implications for all the daily life 
of society at large. A better example is authority and obed­
ience. Maurice first speaks of this ethos in relation to the 
father-son relationship. But he cannot speak of the life of 
the nation or of the universal society without frequent ref­
erences to it.
Social Morality reveals the appreciation Maurice had 
for the fragile complexity of truly human societies. Pur­
suing his self-proclaimed work as a "digger," Maurice here un­
covers the foundation of society. And it is a theological one.
Truly human society is ordered by the beneficent will 
of God, The structures fundamental to society--those which 
man cannot do without--are not the creation of the will of man, 
but are given by Gpd, Nor is society made possible by secu­
lar efforts to maintain the composite of ethics which Maurice 
himself suggests accompany each social relation. The family, 
nation, and universal society, with their attendant ethics, 
constitute the "divine order," They are, therefore, not ours 
to choose among other equally relevant options. They are ours 
to come to terms with, or we will forfeit our humanity.
Likewise, the dynamic of social progress is discovered 
within the will of God, Progress is not simply a function of 
economics or political theory or culture. Each of these may 
promote or violate truly human society. They are tools useful 
equally to either the nation or the empire. The dynamic of 
the truly human society is the will to sacrifice. That will 
is found primarily in God, But it is also visible in the
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lives and communities of men being made truly individual, tru­
ly social, truly human.
Maurice insists that the foundation of society is theo­
logical. He calls men to recognize the divine order and, 
through..the spirit of sacrifice, bring themselves and their 
communities to conform to it. He is convinced that this 
foundation cannot be finally displaced--that it will manifest 
itself, if need be through war and revolution, even where it 
seems most obscured. Such a foundation constitutes an inter­
section of nature and grace, of creation and redemption.
Two questions arise that appear to mitigate any attempt 
to construct a theology of revolution from Maurice’s point 
of view. Can a society so grounded endure fundamental change 
without violating the divine order? We shall see that the 
conservatism justly charged against Maurice stems from the 
reservations this question must suggest. But more important, 
we shall see that change can be necessary to move a society 
toward the divine order. Therefore, Maurice's conservatism 
is not bound to any particular status quo, and actually op­
poses any that distort or violate the elements of the divine
4^Maurice would not likely approve this attribution to 
him of the idea of the unity of nature and grace, In his 
sermon "Nature and Grace," in The Church a Family, Maurice 
objects to the naturism of Rousseau and his followers. He 
defends Paul’s statement that men are "by nature, children 
of wrath" (Eph. 2:3). And in other writings he criticizes 
the natural theology of Joseph Butler. But in the sermon 
mentioned, Maurice is at pains to describe without using the 
word "nature," those societies in which men find themselves 
which are not contrived and artificial. Bearing in mind, 
therefore, Maurice ''s objections to the term, this author 
finds it still useful to explicate what Maurice cannot other­
wise tidily say.
>^z
order through a spirit of empire, The other question is this; 
can the ultimate social value of self-sacrifice, so passive in 
itself, be turned to the necessarily active service of revo­
lution? We will show in the next chapter that, indeed, it can, 
even according to Maurice.
Maurice's social theory (theology) can support a vigor­
ously critical theology of revolution. The implicit fact 
assumed in every part of this writing is that the personal 
conservatism of Maurice which seems at times to border on 
quietism was a reflection of his character and sense of call­
ing more than his social theory, Alec Vidler expresses well 
this assumption. His words bridge the gap between the pro­
legomena and the propositions of this thesis. They are fitting 
as both preface and conclusion to a theology of revolution 
drawn from the life and writings of Frederick Denison Maurice.
He was more successful as an educationalist than 
as an active politician. For he was a man of 
thought rather than a man of action, made more 
for uttering prophecies than for framing policies.
His determination to look, for and cleave to prin­
ciples-— to principles of which his collaborators 
seldom had so firm a grasp as he had— made him a 
difficult man to work with. Yet he was personally 
so humble and his insights were so profound that 
his fellow-workers were never happy unless they 
could carry him with them. ^
^^Witness to the Light (New York: Scribners, 1948), p, 197
CHAPTER 6
REVOLUTION AND VIOLENCE— THE QUESTION OF EFFECTIVE FORCE
Hardly anything comes to mind so quickly at the mention 
of revolution as the prospect of violence. So closely linked 
with revolution is violence that it seems to be a term essen­
tial to the definition of revolution. Conservative elements 
exploit the horrific aspect of revolutionary violence to 
make more secure their own interests. Radical elements, on 
the other hand, anxious to exploit the revolutionary motif 
for its heroic overtones of justice and progress, make care­
ful use of propaganda to justify the violent aspect of the 
revolution by highlighting the oppressive violence of the 
establishment. The efforts of both elements confirm that vio­
lence is inevitable with revolution.^
Violence must certainly, therefore, be taken into con­
sideration by the prospective Christian revolutionary. And
^If violence is defined as the "avoidable injury suf­
fered by a person," then the forms of violence can be dis­
tinguished: "Violence can be usefully classified into four
different kinds based on two criteria, whether the violence 
is personal or institutionalized and whether the_violence is 
overt or a kind of covert or quiet violence." /Cf, N . Carver, 
"What Violence Is," in Philosophy for a New Generation,
Arthur K, Bierman and James A- Could (New York; Macmillan, 
1970), p. 35^/, Overt personal violence is physical,. Covert 
personal violence is psychological, the manipulation of an­
other that produces psychological injury and may eventuate 
in more than that. Overt institutionalized violence is seen 
in warfare, in revolutions and riots, or in the way police
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here arises a most immediate and straightforward dilemma.
Shall be become involved in such violence, and if so, how is 
his involvement to be justified in a Christian context?
This issue cannot be avoided by assuming a pacifist 
posture. Pacificism resists only killing. Revolutionary vio­
lence may be of many shades other than the destruction of hu­
man life. Nor does it make it any easier to insist upon non­
violence. As will be shown, there is always a degree of vio­
lence implicit in ostensibly non-violent activity.
The only way to come to terms with this question is to 
retrogress by analysis to its fundamental sources. This task, 
undertaken here, is not the first or only attempt to derive 
the underlying issues involved in a Christian contextualizing 
of violence. However, this effort is worthwhile if it re­
veals how far Christian theology and revolutionary aims and 
methods can unite. Subsequent divergencies ought then to be 
sufficient to put off the prospective Christian revolutionary, 
or better, to cause him to refocus his revolutionary impulse,
In dealing with the issue of violence first, we are ap­
proximating the sequence in which one becomes sensitive to a 
revolutionary potential. In the introductory chapters and in 
the conclusion, we employ the opposite sequence. There we 
deal with the nature of order first, and with the nature of 
dynamism second. This is a logical order inasmuch as (as we
or national guardsmen injure protesters. Covert institutional 
violence is found in all the social, psychological, and phys­
ical depredations that ghetto dwellers or prisoners or Indians 
or sweat-shop workers suffer at the hands of institutions they 
cannot control. Peter W, Macky, Violence Right or Wrong? 
(Waco, Texas: Word, Inc., 1973), pp. 15-17,
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will argue in this chapter) the nature of effective force 
(dynamism) is determined by the end it pursues (order). But 
the psychological sequence, the raising of revolutionary con­
sciousness, corresponds more closely to the sequence employed 
in this and the following two chapters. The person first 
awakens to the revolutionary potential for violence. The vio­
lence raises questions about the legitimacy of the establish­
ment by throwing the counterviolence of establishment oppres­
sion into relief. And finally, the issues of constituting a 
new social order emerge with complex questions about the ulti­
mate values of persons and their communities.
Drawing upon' the analysis produced in the previous chap­
ter, then, we will show how the principle of sacrifice oper­
ates., even in war, for the establishment of the divine order 
against the spirit of empire. The implication, which will be 
strengthened through the remaining chapters, is that what 
Maurice cannot condemn in war, he cannot logically condemn in 
revolution. The violence needed for a nation to cast off the 
imperial enemy is not unlike the violence needed for a revo­
lution to oppose an imperial state. Just as either establish­
ment or revolution can turn into a distortion of the divine 
order by proceeding upon the imperial spirit of domination and 
self-centeredness, so either can manifest the divine order in­
asmuch as either operates on the principle of sacrifice. And 
here we will find in Maurice a Christian context for the justi­
fication of an active participation in revolution.
The nature of revolutionary change as deliberate, funda­
mental and rapid has already been established. What requires
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emphasis is that on the conceptual level, revolution and 
Christianity coincide inasmuch as deliberate, fundamental, 
and rapid change is basic to both.
Deliberate change refers to alterations actively sought. 
In the church, this is understood as mission. Fundamental 
change refers to the amendment of one's mythic structures and 
the corresponding change in life style. In the church this 
is called repentance, conversion, and sanctification. Rapid 
change is insisted upon by both revolutionary philosophy and 
the church, who share a vocabulary of crisis, founded in each 
case upon the notion of transformation.
Perhaps the church itself is at fault if its biblical 
and historical mission to change and alter has been obscured 
by a reputation for conservatism. On the other hand, perhaps 
that reputation is a slander ill-deserved. In either case, it 
is high time to reaffirm that basic to all other Christian con­
cepts is the concept of deliberate, fundamental, and rapid 
change.
In the haste to distinguish Christian change from revo­
lutionary change, certain precipitant judgements must be 
avoided. In particular, the idea that revolution wants to 
change society while Christianity wants to change the individ­
ual is without logical foundation, and proponents of either 
would be loathe to wear such garments,^
Evangelistic Christians, in particular, have followed
2 On this subject, see Emilio Castro, "Conversion and 
Social Transformation," The Church Amid Revolution, Edited 
by Harvey Cox (New York: Association Press, 1967),
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this line, and have, at times, so individualized the Chris­
tian dynamic for change that they have obscured its social 
implications. Happily, their deeds have frequently belied 
their words and provided significant practical testimony, if 
at times mute, to the social aspects of Christian faith.^
On the other hand, liberal theology has sometimes championed 
the social dimensions of the Christian faith to the obscuring 
of its individualized application and relevance.
Any change, whether in a person or in society, as though 
one excluded the other, is clearly shunned as an example of 
Christian change by Maurice,
. , , My Lord, I believe that the religion of the
Bible is one— one entire whole— not a mere frag­
ment, I believe of this whole, the social reli­
gion I have described is a fragment, the individ­
ual religion I have described is a fragment; frag­
ments which are ever trying to be united, and the 
actual union and fellowship of which will explain 
to us the Bible better than all the commentators 
have ever explained it,^
Such dichotomous thinking about Christian change must be chal­
lenged, he says, but whoever challenges it
. , , will displease those who say that you must
reform the individual before you reform Society, 
for he declares that Christ is the reformer of 
both, and that the individual who claims any. 
relation to Him must own himself the member of a 
society, (And) he must displease those who talk 
of reforming Society as the only way of reforming 
the individual, because they understand by the 
Reformation of Society the alteration of its
^Cf. Timothy L. Smith, Revivalism and Social Reform 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1957).
^F, D, Maurice, "On Right and Wrong Methods of Support­
ing Protestantism: A Letter to Lord Ashley, Respecting a
Certain Proposed Measure for Stifling the Expression of Opin­
ion in the University of Oxford," (London: J. W, Parker, 1843),
p, 14,
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circumstances, not the assertion of a spiritual 
ground and root of it.
Equally fruitless is the attempt to delimit the influ­
ence of revolutionary philosophy to social change. In the 
first place, the very first aim of revolutionary philosophy 
must be to win adherents, an especially individualized task. 
Besides that, while the current experience of revolutionary 
philosophy is socialistic, its theme in the French Revolution 
and nineteenth-century history up to the time of Marxian in­
fluence is extremely atomistic.
Considered revolutionary philosophy, just as considered 
Christianity, may oscillate between individual and society as 
the poles of emphasis for whom or what is to be changed. The 
similar oscillation is one more evidence of a basic coinci­
dence upon the fundamental matter of change.
If the call of the Christian church to effect change, 
whether individual or social, has stilled, revolutionary phil­
osophy bears no blame for rejecting the Christian faith as a 
straw man stuck in the soil of the status quo. If, however, 
the fundamental Christian vocation to effect change is clearly
sensed, the prospective Christian revolutionary has taken a 
first halting step toward resolving the dilemma of violence 
implicit in revolution. He will have discovered that at least 
the concept of change is as basic to Christianity as it is to 
revolutionary philosophy.
^Theological Essays (Cambridge; Macmillan, 1853), p. 212. 
Cf, also pp. 200 and 211; also The Prophets and Kings of the Old 
Testament (Cambridge: Macmillan, 1853. Cit. Prophets and Kings)
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But that is not to say that the change pursued by the 
Christian is automatically identical with the change sought 
by the revolution. For change to be justified on Christian 
grounds, it must reflect the attainment of Christian purposes. 
And when we enquire about what those Christian purposes might 
be, we encounter another formal similarity between Christian 
faith and revolutionary philosophy. In both cases, the re­
ality of common experience is believed to be reality distorted 
Appearances becloud reality. For a vision of reality, one 
requires, in the case of revolutionary philosophy, the exer­
cise of the reason, and in the case of Christian theology, the 
entrance of revelation. Divergence, then, first occurs in 
the conception of reality held by each.
Reality in Christian theology cannot be separated from 
God. It is understood as the kingdom of God. Millenial theol­
ogies conceive of the kingdom as future. Its present reality 
is perceived only in the hope which springs from faith.
But Maurice, while not rejecting the idea of a final con­
summation of the kingdom, insists upon its immediate presence. 
For him it is no shadowy parallel sharing reality alongside 
the kingdoms of men. It is the only real kingdom, the only 
possibility for human participation in reality. It is the 
divine order.
God has established a real kingdom upon earth and 
it is a real kingdom, based upon principles which 
cannot be effected or undermined by the inconsist­
encies of those who belong to it, or the unwilling­
ness of any to partake of its privileges.^
^Kingdom of Christ, Vol. I, p. 57.
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Our sin consists in the attempt to live apart from the 
kingdom in one of our own devising. Such "contrived" king­
doms are the shadowy parallels, Their ground is idolatrous 
because unreality substitutes for reality which has its ground 
in God. The manward consequences of sin produce isolation 
for the'individual and thereby undermine the only real soci­
ety for men, i.e. society in which the divine order is fully
n
established and fully operational. The purpose of change in 
Christian theology, then, is the transformation of men and 
societies to conform to the reality expressed with the phrase 
"the kingdom of God,"
In the same manner, revolutionary philosophy rejects 
appearances as reality. Real society, for example, is found 
first in the reason, and not in the world. Alienation is 
most precisely alienation from reality.
In certain cases, normalizing a society may include 
only a few immediate aims, for example, the overthrow of an 
oppressive monarch or social group. Beneath these aims, how­
ever, lies an elaborate conceptualizing of reality. This 
governs the revolution. This constitutes the "myth" upon which 
the revolution intends to prosecute its immediate and specific 
aims. Reality, however violated and distorted just now, can 
be actualized as revolutionary activity functions, by the guid­
ance of reason, to provoke, change.
For this much at least, an exposition of Hegel is, 
at the same time, an elucidation of the philosophy of
^Theological Essays, pp. 20-3 0,
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revolution, Herbert Marcuse, interpreting Hegel in Reason
and Revolution, writes;
As long as there is any gap between real and poten­
tial, the former must be acted upon and changed un­
til it is brought into line with reason. As long 
as reality is not shaped by reason, it remains no 
reality at all, in the emphatic sense of the word.
Thus reality changes its meaning within the con­
ceptual structure of Hegel's system. "Real" comes 
to mean not everything that actually exists (this 
should rather be called appearance), but that which 
exists in a form concordant with the standards of 
reason. "Real" is the reasonable (rational), and 
that alone. For example, the state becomes a real­
ity only when it corresponds to the given potenti­
alities of men and permits their full development.
Any preliminary form of the state is not yet rea­
sonable, and, therefore, not yet real.8
Uniform notional reality is a factor in all revolution­
ary philosophy. By its presence a distinction can be drawn 
between revolution and anarchy. Anarchy is reactionary and 
negative in essence, striving to escape the impositions of 
any social uniformity. The Marxist prospect of the wither­
ing away of the state, on the other hand, only applies in a 
society where centralization is not so much resented as un­
necessary, Revolution in its move toward decentralization, 
is progressive and positive in essence, governed by a liberal 
view of human social potential.
Similarity between Christian faith and revolutionary 
philosophy still prevails, then, in that both accept that re­
ality may be unsensed and unseen except in the spiritual data 
of human experience. Both systems, therefore, affirm that 
fundamental change is understood as movement toward reality.^
^(London: Routledge and Regan Paul, 1955), p. 11,
^"For no mere change can ever be reformation; reformation
102
The divergence between Christian faith and revolution­
ary philosophy appears in apprehensions of reality, and thus, 
in terms of the purposes pursued. Christian theology holds 
that fundamental change is movement toward the realization of 
the kingdom of God, whether the presence of that kingdom is 
anticipated or proclaimed. Revolutionary philosophy, on the 
other hand, understands fundamental change to be anything 
that furthers the emergence of a society made thoroughly hu­
mane through the exercise of man's rational power.
Here the crux of the issue raised for the prospective 
Christian revolutionary by the possibility of violence can 
begin to emerge. It is simply that we know nothing of change 
apart from force. Evolutionary change, which we have distin­
guished from revolutionary change in terms of the lack of de­
liberation,^^ is yet seen retrospectively as progressing in 
nature through the influence of cosmic radiation, environmental 
trauma or some other force effective for change. If force is 
obviously a factor in non-deliterate change, it can only be 
more so in change pursued with deliberation.
With regard to revolution, force is so obviously a fac­
tor that it would be judged gratuitous to say much more about 
its consistent presence. It is mentioned in passing, however, 
as complying with the method of this chapter, i.e., to establish
always has meant, always must mean the recovery of a form which 
has been lost, the pursuit of ends which are marked out for us 
and which we have forgotten--the return to a real belief of that 
which we profess in words." Maurice, "Baron Bunsen," Macmillan's 
Magazine, Vol, III, No. 17 (March, 1961), pp. 372-382.
^^Supra, p, 25,
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the coincidence of Christian faith and revolutionary philos­
ophy in order to throw into clearer relief what there might 
be of divergence.
And there is, in fact, a coincidence between the two, 
even as regards the element of force. While it seems quite 
at home in a discussion of revolution, force as a means of 
giving birth to Christian faith and practice appears at 
first a strange midwife indeed. If that force is renamed 
coercion, it seems stranger still. However, Reinhold Niebuhr 
presumably includes the church when he insists that "all 
social co-operation on a larger scale than the most intimate 
social group requires a measure of coercion,
But force is more readily admitted into a Christian con­
text when it is understood as grace. Its coercive edge is 
thus sublimated in the orthodox admission that the fundamental 
changes necessary for the birth and revival of Christian faith 
are inconceivable apart from grace.
Theologically interpreted, grace is always more than 
the dictionary definition of "unmerited favor." Its most 
general synonym in theological literature is "power." Paul 
Tillich says that grace is the infusion of love, and describes 
it thus as "the power which overcomes estrangement."^^ Rein­
hold Niebuhr follows a similar line, defining grace as God's 
power in man "completing his incompleteness" and over man
11
-^Moral Man and Immoral Society (New York; Scribners, 
I960, first published 1932) , p. 3,
^^Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, (3 v o l s Welwyn, 
Herts.: James Nisbet and Co,, 1968), Vol. II, p. 55.
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"whereby sin is overcome by God's mercy, but not by human good­
ness. Karl Barth says that "Grace is and remains always the
Power of God."^'^ He follows this basic understanding with a 
wide variety of amplifications. ■ Luther's dictum that "grace 
is opposed to sin and devours it," Barth complements with his 
own graphic description: "Grace digs up sin by its roots."
Then comes, "grace is the royal and sovereign power of God. . .
the real freedom of the -will of God in men. . . Grace is the
power of obedience. . . and grace is the power of the resur­
rection."^^ And finally, grace appears in Barth's Romans, as 
the "freedom of God by which men are seized.
These proof texts are provided in no way to exude a 
precise definition of grace. Rather, they show that Christian 
change is commonly understood to require extraordinary power. 
There is a proper element of force. To call- it grace does 
nothing to render it passive. For change in Christian faith, 
like change in revolutionary philosophy, requires an effective 
force, i.e., the exercise of power in the spirit and by the 
principles of the end to be obtained.
^^Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man (2 vols.; 
London: Nisbet and Co., 1943), Vol. II, p. 64.
^"^Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, Translated by 
Edwyn C. Hoskyns. (6th ed.; London: Oxford University Press,
1968), p.103.
15Ibid., p. 213
l^Ibid., p. 240.
^"^"It is not compulsion which is bad, but a compulsion 
which does not express the power of being in the name of 
which it is applied." ' Paul Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice 
Ontological Analyses and Ethical Application (London: Oxford
University Press, 1954), p. 48.
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The human experience of the world, usually described in 
static terms, encompasses change as well as stability. And 
the experience of change suggests to secular and religious 
consciousness alike that reality is, therefore, dynamic as 
well as static. That is to say, reality is itself generative 
of change. Perhaps because language is static in contempora­
neity, the attempt to include the dynamic factor in philosoph­
ical systems from Heraclitus to Hegel achieves at best, para­
dox, and at worst, incredulity. The most cogent impulse of 
genuine revolutionary philosophy is its maintenance of this 
dynamic quality of reality.
If change constitutes a real constant, and if change 
cannot be divested of some degree of force, it must follow 
that force constitutes a real constant also.' Our experience 
of force, however, makes us cautious because not all force 
leads to real change. Sometimes the change achieved through 
the application of force proves to be apparent change only. 
That is, such change may obscure rather than elucidate real­
ity. The form of the force itself may be to blame for this 
state of affairs. When it is, it cannot be regarded as ef­
fective force at all, for effective force implies change in 
favor of reality.
The principle here may be illustrated by the parent who 
beats big brother for bullying little sister. His purpose 
may be to change the boy’s juvenile notion that superior 
strength yields the right to rule. But the force chosen to 
effect the change might easily reinforce rather than under­
mine that notion. Any change accruing from such force is
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bound to be more apparent than real. The basic issue remains 
unchallenged and unchanged. A common social application of 
the direct dependence of effective force and real change may 
be seen in the sociological maxim that a society maintained 
by violence cannot at the same time absorb a true sense of 
tranquility and a love for peace.
Harry Eckstein confirms the maxim.
In some societies, the most manifest cause of in­
ternal war seems to be internal war itself, one 
instance following another, often without a re­
currence of the conditions that led to the origi­
nal event. This means that political disorienta­
tion may be followed by the formation of a new set 
of orientations, establishing a predisposition 
toward violence that is inculcated by the exper­
ience of violence itself. In such cases, internal 
wars result not from specifiable objective con­
ditions, and not even from the loss of legitimacy 
by a particular regime, but from a general lack of 
receptivity to legitimacy of any kind, Violence 
becomes a political style that is self-perpetu­
ating, unless itself "disoriented,
It should be. plain by now that the dilemma posed for 
the Christian conscience by the prospect of violence resolves 
itself into the question of effective fOrce. It can never be 
a debate between force and no force, nor, as we shall see, is 
it a search for non-violent force. For, as Reinhold Niebuhr 
notes :
Once we admit the factor of coercion as ethically 
justified, though we concede that it is always
ISHarry Eckstein, "On the Etiology of Internal Wars," 
History and Theory, Vol, IV, No, 2, 1965, Wesleyan University 
Press, Cited in Paynton and Blackey, op. cit., p. 137. Maur­
ice suggested this to be the case in post-1848 France. "It 
is not likely that sixty years of revolution have passed over 
a nation without leaving the seeds of wildness, fanaticism, 
violence, in the heart of all classes, the highest as well 
as the lowest." "Reasons for Cooperation" (London; John W. 
Parker, 1851), p, 13.
107
morally dangerous, we cannot draw any absolute 
line of demarcation between violent and non­
violent coercion,
The substance for this resolution of the problem be­
comes still more visible if one analyzes the unmanageable 
relativity of violence as it may be present in the whole of 
the revolutionary context.
Generally, revolutionary violence is of a degree de­
structive of human life. While destruction of human life is 
certainly no truly revolutionary objective, it only occasion­
ally escapes being a consequence of the revolution. Involve­
ment in revolution, therefore, generally implies involvement 
in the destruction of human life.
Less radical is violence which stops short of actual 
killing, Rigorous intimidation is an example of this kind of 
violence. At this point the arguments of pacifism are already 
beginning to dim into irrelevance. The inevitability of vio­
lence seems more firmly established.
It continues when one considers passive resistance.
To speak of this as non-violent protest may obscure the fact 
that passive resistance may be experienced as violence, some­
times by those against whom it is not specifically directed, 
i.e., the innocent. Reinhold Niebuhr argues that the only 
mitigating circumstances for the violence caused by non-violent
l^Moral Man and Immoral Society, p. 172. Cf. Maurice’s 
comments on the state of tension between capital and labor 
in England, "It was clear that the war had begun, and was 
becoming a war of extermination. Whether the mere money 
force, or the physical force of numbers prevailed in it, the 
result must be equally terrible." "Reasons for Cooperation,"
p. 12,
108
methods is determined by intent, and not effect. Even in 
intent, however, passive resistance is not altogether non­
violent inasmuch as it aims at the development of stress and 
anxiety to a point which may be politically e x p l o i t e d . 20
According to this analysis of violence, then, involve­
ment in revolution implies on one level or another, involve­
ment in violence, Chalmers Johnson would be correct when he 
insists that change brought about without violence is some
2 9"The chief distinction in the problem of coercion, usu­
ally made by moralists, is that between violent and non-violent 
coercion. The impossibility of making this distinction abso­
lute has been previously considered. It is nevertheless im­
portant to make a more careful analysis of the issues involved 
in the choice of methods of coercion in the social process.
The distinguishing marks of violent coercion and conflict are 
usually held to be its intent to destroy either life or prop­
erty. This distinction is correct if consequences are not con­
fused with intent. Non-violent conflict and coercion may also 
result in the destruction of life or property and they usually 
do. The difference is that destruction is not the intended 
but the inevitable consequence of non-violent coercion. The 
chief difference between violence and non-violence is not in 
the degree of destruction which they cause, though the differ­
ence is usually considerable, but in the aggressive character 
of the one and the negative character of the other. Non-vio­
lence is essentially non-co-operation. It expresses itself 
in the refusal to participate in the ordinary processes of 
society. It may mean the refusal to pay taxes to the govern­
ment (civil disobedience), or to trade with the social group 
which is to be coerced (boycott) or to render customary ser­
vices (strike). While it represents a passive and negative 
form of resistance, its consequences may be very positive.
It certainly places restraints upon the freedom of the ob­
jects of its discipline and prevents them from doing what they 
desire to do. Furthermore it destroys property values, and 
it may destroy life; though it is not generally as destructive 
of life as violence. Yet a boycott may rob a whole community 
of its livelihood and, if maintained long enough, it will cer­
tainly destroy life. A strike may destroy the property values 
inherent in the industrial process which it brings to a halt, 
and it may imperil the life of a whole community which depends 
upon some vital service with which the strike interferes. Nor 
can it be maintained that it isolates the guilty from the in­
nocent more successfully than violent coercion. The innocent 
are involved with the guilty in conflicts between groups, not
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other form of change than revolutionary c h a n g e .21 It is pos­
sible so to extend the continuum of violence that it includes 
almost any form of agitation for change, (a fact readily 
seized upon by establishment interests for propaganda purposes).
Further consideration reveals that it is not possible 
to reject categorically involvement in violence anyway. Even 
if one is successful in avoiding entanglement in violence in 
any of its revolutionary manifestations, his imagined passiv­
ity may itself be tacit approval of violence. From at least 
the time of Augustine, Christians have justified involvement 
in violent activities when that involvement is aimed at dimin­
ishing oppression. The cogency of this thinking comes in the 
identification of oppression itself as a form of violence.
The ability to alleviate oppressive conditions willfully kept
because of any particular type of coercion used in the conflict 
but by the very group character of the conflict. No community 
can be disciplined without affecting all its members who are 
dependent upon, even though they are not responsible for, its 
policies. The cotton spinners of Lancashire’are impoverished 
by Gandhi's boycott of English cotton, though they can hardly 
be regarded as the authors of British imperialism. If the League 
of Nations should"use economic "sanctions against Japan, or any 
other nation, workmen who have the least to do with Japanese 
imperialism would be bound to suffer most from such, a disci­
pline." (Moral Man and Immoral Society, pp. 240-241), A more 
contemporary consideration is that any strike by medical per­
sonnel, firemen., or police would only shortly be considered a 
non-violent action.
^^Op, cit., p. 6. And Philip Berrigan could be accused 
of holding forth a false hope by maintaining a facile dis­
tinction between "the revolution of blood" and nonviolent 
revolution. For example— "The people who say that it (the 
revolution of blood) is not inevitable are the only ones who, 
to my mindunderstand revolution. In other words, the only 
ones who understand revolution are the ones who say that a non­
violent revolution is possible." "A Priest in the Resistance;
An Interview," Revolution and the Rule of Law.
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in check through fear or selfish conservatism, is tantamount
to the approbation of those conditions. On this basis, Karl
Rahner argues that
. . . blanket renunciation of any kind of physical
force is not merely impracticable but also immoral, 
because it is, in effect, an abdication of respon­
sibility under G o d . 22
Such silent partners share in the guilt of the more active
oppressors. To become involved, therefore, in securing thé
end of oppression, even through violence, has more to do with
expunging guilt than with incurring it.
To set the problems raised by violence as the choice 
between violence and no violence is nonsense. It is to ig­
nore completely the prior question about the place and use of 
force and constitutes an attempt, to escape the responsible use 
of power against its perverted use. Even the sincere paci­
fist considers his particular form of passivity not as an 
escape from coercing, but as the strongest and only effective 
force, the most responsible use of p o w e r . ^2 The fact remains 
that the only relevant question has to do with the discovery 
and utilization of effective force, i.e., force which effects
change in favor of reality.
22George Celestin, "A Christian Looks at Revolution," 
Listening, Vol. Ill (Spring, 1968), p. 141.
. . in recent years nonviolence has become selec­
tive, that is, politicized. In France, for instance, paci­
fists have taken à stand in relation to political affairs.
They protested nonviOlently against the French war in Algeria, 
but ignored the violences committed by the National Liberation 
Front. . . . In‘other words, if the pacifist becomes involved
without being partisan, his nonviolence remains authentic; in 
the contrary case, nonviolence becomes a means of propaganda." 
Jacques Ellul, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
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If we speak of violence, non-violence and pacifism all 
as manifestations of coercion formed differently, the false 
hope may arise that the problem of violence is simply one of 
degrees. A person sets for himself a level or degree of vio­
lence beyond which he will not go. But this is not the solu­
tion for the problem of violence. It is rather to despair 
of that solution. It is to capitulate to violence as not 
only the form but the principle of effective force.
This would mean that any change achieved by violence, 
of whatever degree, so long as it did not exceed the self-im­
posed limit of a particular person, should be considered real 
change. Such a situation, is analagous to determining ahead 
of time that one will limit the service to his automobile 
to keeping the radiator topped up. Commendable and necessary 
as that service may be, the limit does not accord with reality, 
as shall most surely be demonstrated when the engine sputters 
to a halt with an empty petrol tank. Although violence, how­
ever limited, may be unavoidable, it cannot possibly be it­
self the principle of effective force. Upon the discovery 
of that principle the proper limitation of violence depends.
Defining the principle of effective force makes most 
manifest the potential divergence between Christian faith and 
revolutionary philosophy. And it is upon this point that the 
question of violence must finally devolve for the prospective 
Christian revolutionary. He is bound to ask what principle 
governs the form and extent of the force employed.
Since the concept of effective force draws its
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significance from the reality toward which it moves, it is 
necessary to describe generally both the revolutionary and 
Christian concepts of reality. For the latter we will draw 
chiefly from Maurice,
According to Marxist philosophy, the broad outlines 
of which are characteristic of most current revolutionary 
philosophy, the goal of history is the achievement of a uni­
versal society maintained by individual consent in which all 
class distinctions are submerged .in an all-consuming human­
istic consciousness. To this vision attaches a chiliastic 
fervor. It is the consummation of human history. It is 
anticipated not as a possible end Ctelos), but as the only 
possible end of human history. This destiny is percept­
ible now to human reason. As reason is brought to bear upon 
the course of human events, all.appearances will gradually 
be exposed and the genuinely historical will emerge as only 
that which had contributed and does contribute to the achieve­
ment of this ultimate reality.
But there is first much to be done. Human society 
must be completely reconditioned. Chiefly, it must be purged 
from the vestiges of feudalism and degenerative capitalism. 
This requires social surgery of a radical kind. Sources of 
production must pass from private hands to become public prop­
erty. In so doing, the bourgeois concepts and values will 
disappear and the bourgeoisie along with them. Imperialism, 
which is the only form of capitalist internationalism, will 
fade, along with the feelings of nationalism. Family life
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will be redefined so that it will receive its true signifi­
cance for humanity and be liberated from its constitution as 
an economic unit subject to exploitation,
Marxism does nothing to obscure the convulsive effects 
of these changes. They are received as the welcome evidences 
of history's healing from the long fever of class exploita­
tions. Sensing the course of history, the revolutionary 
feels specifically charged to induce these convulsions by ap­
plying the poultice of revolution. The Communist Manifesto 
avows that, "They (the communists) declare that their ends 
can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all exist­
ing social conditions
Happily, for our purposes, the Manifesto also specifies 
the principle of that force by discounting its contemporary 
champions. Onto the index go reactionary socialism, conser­
vative socialisitv and critical-utopian socialism. The first 
of these is rejected as manipulated by the aristocracy, the 
second as manipulated by the bourgeoisie,and the third as the 
product of well-meaning and critically-aware socialists who 
are misguided as to the conclusions which will finally stand 
upon their premises. Overall, the objection is that these 
forms of socialism are, in fact, capitulations to a faulty 
view of reality in which capitalism remains a factor. They 
evidence all the marks of the cardinal error of taking ap­
pearance for reality. Even the critical-utopian socialism
2^Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, In Essential Works 
of Marxism (New York: Bantam Books, 1961), p. 43.
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of St. Simon, Fourier and Owen fails to grasp the dynamic pro­
cess of history so that iis appreciation of the working class 
is confined to its sufferings, and its active intention is 
the production, not of a universal proletariat, but of the 
social conditions in which the working class can be fit to 
care for its own needs inside the existing economic system, 
with its class-ridden superstructure.
The fault with these systems, according to the Mani­
festo , is that, although they are sincerely intent upon eas­
ing the lot of the working class, they are ignorant of the 
inevitable processes of history. Working-class power is vir­
tually unknown to them, at least on the scale that Marx en­
visions it. Although they seek the liberation of the working 
class to a degree, they have so limited themselves conceptually 
as to rule out the very role, mighty in prospect, toward which 
history unerringly impels the very people they champion. Per­
haps their political sway will produce occasional sops of sym­
pathy and stop-gap consideration for the workers. But that 
is not enough,
The interim condition for the eventual advent of soci­
ety on the Marxist model is the establishment of proletarian 
rule. Reality declares this to be the rightful place and 
function of the worker. The dawn of socialism awaits the beam­
ing of this morning star. Once grasp this tremendous truth 
rationally and the future opens to receive the enlightened. 
Reason will proceed through appearances directly to reality. 
Nothing then will stop the determined march of an increasingly 
self-conscious proletariat. When that happens, hostile
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political maneuver, however astute, will most certainly prove 
impotent. Classes possessing power will refuse to relinquish 
their hold on it without a struggle. And the revolution will 
be forced to proceed through, blood and smoke until the old 
appearances, like bleached bones, are calcined to dust in the 
chemical purity of a socialist society.
The feature which distinguished effective force as it 
was envisioned by the earlier socialists from that which is 
called for by the Manifesto centers upon the concept of the 
ruling proletariat. It has nothing to do with the radical 
nature of the Manifesto ' s immediate and subordinate aims (the 
overthrow of the Bourgeoisie, the abolition of private prop­
erty, etc.). These had all appeared before. Nor is it to be 
found in the forthrightness with which the Manifesto exhorts 
the workers to radical force, We have already argued that 
change of any kind involves the employment of force which is 
bound to seem radical (violent) to some, The real distinction 
comes with the conviction that "the proletarians have nothing 
to lose but their chains. They have a world to win."25
The emergence of a universal proletariat makes possible 
the. exposure of reality, Class is the distortion of that real­
ity, and will be exposed as such with the enlarged activity 
of the proletariat. Whatever action the proletariat pursues 
that purges class consciousness from human experience conforms 
with reality. That such action will often be violent is due 
to the fact that the existence of class consciousness implies
^^Ibid., p. 44.
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the inevitability of class antagonisms. But, so long as the 
thrust of human history is toward the greater prominence of 
the proletariat in power, no conflict or struggle is to be 
avoided. Whatever degree of force must be brought to bear in 
the "forceful overthrow" of antagonistic elements must be en­
gaged as not only necessary, but proper.
Amidst the paragraphs of much that is clearly propa­
ganda, the important Maoist article "Long Live Leninism" in­
cludes a definitive expression of this Marxist fact,
Lenin tells us that we must draw a distinction be­
tween two types of states different in nature, the 
state of bourgeois dictatorship and the state of 
proletarian dictatorship, and between two types of 
violence different in nature, counterrevolutionary 
violence and revolutionary violence; as long as 
there is counterrevolutionary violence, there is 
bound to revolutionary violence to oppose it.
It would be impossible to wipe out counterrevolu­
tionary violence without revolutionary violence,
The state in which the exploiting classes are in 
power is counterrevolutionary violence, a special 
force for suppressing the exploited classes in the 
interest of the exploiting classes. Both before the 
imperialists had atomic bombs and rocket weapons, 
and since they have had these new weapons, the im­
perialist state has always been a special force for 
suppressing the proletariat at home and the people 
of its colonies and semi-colonies abroad, has al­
ways been such an institution of violence; even if 
it is compelled not to use these new weapons, the 
imperialist state will of course still remain an 
imperialist institution of violence until it is 
overthrown and replaced by the people's state, the 
state of the dictatorship of the proletariat of that 
country,26
From this ground,the writers of the article go on to 
criticize the "revisionists of Yugoslavia who ", , , deny 
the inherent class character of violence and thereby
26ibid., p. 535.
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obliterate the fundamental difference between revolutionary 
violence and counterrevolutionary violence."
The significance of this judgment is that the "funda­
mental difference" spoken of is obliterated by the denial of 
the "class character of violence," That is to say, violence 
cannot be condemned by reference to the number of heads that 
may roll, but by the principle for which those heads are set 
arolling. If the principle is the establishment of a univer­
sal proletariat, violence may be justified. Then it is revo­
lutionary violence. Any other principle must be inadequate 
and is most likely a manifestation of counterrevolution. No 
other principle will produce the changes necessary for the ex­
posure of reality than the principle of proletarian rule, For 
the revolution, this is the principle of effective force.
Changed circumstances since the days of the early ^^arx 
have not sufficed to create a need for change in the form of 
this system although the contents have been altered to corre­
spond to more recent conditions. This may be illustrated from 
the modern experience of how industrial workers are increas­
ingly integrated into the capitalist system, Robert C, Tucker 
describes how Marxist theory has to be restated.
Classical Marxism envisaged the communist revolu­
tion as a revolution of capitalist breakdown oc­
curring in,the most advanced stage of development 
of the capitalist system, . . (however) capitalist
societies, instead of suffering self-destruction 
in a proletarian upheaval, have gone through a 
process of self-modification that Marx would not
2'^Ibid, , p. 541
J .J -d
have thought possible and for which his theory in 
any event made no provision.
The result has been that
, , , the industrial worker has won improved con­
ditions and has tended to grow more integrated 
into the society rather than more alienated from 
it. Capitalist economies have evolved into post­
capitalist mixed economies with self-stabilising 
tools of fiscal regulation and p l a n n i n g , 28
Whether one would agree with Tucker that these develop­
ments are not provided for in Marxist theory might depend upon 
the discernment that what is at stake is not the whole of 
Marxist theory, but only the identity of the proletariat. If 
the incorporation into bourgeois society of industrial work­
ers is thorough, then either there is no longer any proletar­
iat, or else one must look for another group, similarly alien­
ated. If, on the other hand, one argues that this incorpora­
tion is only apparent, he will probably find himself agreeing 
with Herbert Marcuse,
Marcuse argues that the incorporation of industrial 
workers is a superficial one, created by the abundance of a 
plastic, materialistic society in which "former luxuries be­
come basic needs, a normal development which, under corpo­
rate capitalism, extends the competitive business of living 
to newly created needs and satisfactions,"'^^ Thus, technoc­
racy, no matter how "pure," sustains and streamlines the con­
tinuation of domination. The, revolution required then, is one
28Kumar, op, cit,, pp, 313-314, 
29xb±d,, p, 321.
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"which makes technology and technique subservient to the 
needs and goals of free-, men. "20
According to Marcuse, this revolution is not likely 
to spring from the traditional working class whose number 
and power are diminishing and being replaced by the "instru­
mentalist intelligentsia" i.e., the white-collared operators 
of the machinery of technology. These latter workers, in 
turn, are not likely to precipitate a revolution because 
they are well-integrated and well-rewarded. They now have 
a great deal more to lose than- their chains. This is not 
to disown them as members of the working class. But the ex­
tent and subtlety of their materialistic bondage incapacitates 
them to serve as the activist basis required for the revo­
lution.
For this basis (and it must be recalled that Marcuse 
is here referring to the United States in the late nineteen- 
sixties) , Marcuse looks to a combination of the black popula­
tion— "the 'most natural' force for rebellion"--and the young 
middle-class opposition constitutive of the student movement. 
For the time being, however, Marcuse admits that this combi­
nation is unlikely. "The common ground: the total rejection
of the existing society, of its entire value system, is ob­
scured by the obvious class difference.
Notwithstanding the difficulty encountered in identify­
ing the contemporary proletariat and creating a proletarian
30Ibid., p. 325.
31lbid., pp. 326-3,27.
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consciousness, Marcuse is convinced that the element of con­
flict is no whit diminished as essential to the revolution.
The powers that be will not tolerate a repetition 
of the Cuban example; they will employ ever more 
effective means and weapons of suppression, and the 
indigenous dictatorships will be strengthened with 
the ever more active aid from the imperialist mé­
tropoles, It would be romanticism to underrate 
the strength of this deadly alliance and its reso­
lution to contain subversion.22
He suggests that nuclear stalemate, and not humanitar­
ian considerations, lie behind the present prohibition of the 
employment of nuclear force by the oppressors. Against this 
veiled threat, and against an increasing strength on the part 
of the oppressors, the revolution proceeds. Small bands of 
guerrillas practice a sort of military jiujitsu, directing 
their maximum strength at the enemy’s maximum weakness. In 
Cuba and Viet Nam, the effectiveness of these groups, accord­
ing to Marcuse, is demonstrated by the changes effected, ideo­
logically as well as materially. These changes have been paid 
for in the currency of violence. But far from condemning it, 
Marcuse extols " . . .  this violent solidarity in defense, this 
socialism in action" as more than anything else, giving "-form 
and substance to the radicalism of the New Left,
This brief account of the contemporary philosophy of 
Marcuse ought to be sufficient to suggest that, in spite of 
inaccurate historical predictions, the general outlines of 
Marxist theory have not been changed significantly. Through­
out, socio-politico facts as they are in capitalist societies,
32ibid., p. 329.
33ibid., p. 330,
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are held to be distortions of reality. They are remnants 
preserved and protected by classes possessing power. Only 
force directed by reason is adequate for the shattering of 
appearances and the emergence of reality. And this force is 
the prerogative of the proletariat.
In the name of proletarian rule, therefore, modern revo­
lutionary movements have prosecuted the intermediate and sub­
ordinate aims of the revolution. When these aims imply vio­
lence, the principle of proletarian rule both permits and 
limits the violence. Revolutionary philosophy, therefore ^ 
still considers the rule of the proletariat to be the princi­
ple of effective force. Whatever action contributes to the 
seizure of power by the proletariat is proper, irrespective 
of violence.
For Maurice, as for revolutionary philosophy^ the ques­
tion of effective force is cruoialt He is gufte uware that 
the kingdom of God can be obscured as easily as it can be 
exposed, conditional upon the force employed, For the revo­
lutionary, the principle of force is the seizure of power by 
the proletariat. Any activities must be justified in the 
light of that principle. If they cannot be, they are declared 
counterrevolutionary, proscribed, and possibly punished, Just 
so, the Christian activist requires some principle by which 
he can justify his activities. It is a consistent theme in 
Maurice that there is only one effective force at the disposal 
of the Christian, indeed at the disposal of anyone. That is 
sacrifice.
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When St, Paul preached Jesus Christ, and Him cruci­
fied, he preached that in obedience, humiliation, 
sacrifice, dwelt the mighty conquering power— that 
power against which no other in earth or heaven 
could measure i t s e l f . 24
Isaiah, with every prophet and apostle, comes at last
, , , not only to reconcile the characters of the 
sufferers, the despised and rejected, with the war­
rior and the conqueror, but to feel that every 
great battle must be fought by self-sacrifice, that 
the greatest conquest must come through the great­
est humiliation. .
In the Dialogues on Family Worship Maurice testifies,
I have found that the Spirit of sacrifice who pro­
ceeds from the Father and the Son, must come to men 
that they may be able to fulfil their duties one 
towards another, each in his own place; none inter­
fering with the other more than the earth inter­
feres with the sun.
He continues further on;
Sacrifice was the power in the old world as it is 
the power in the new that struggled with indolence, 
cowardice, tyranny, that made families and nations 
civilized and free,
This principle is not passive. Neither is it pacifis-
tic. In 1857, Maurice took for a sermon text the words from
Psalm 144, "Blessed is the Lord God of Israel, Who teacheth
my hands to war, and my fingers to fight." He makes it clear
that the wars to which a man may be moved by the principle
of sacrifice are not just spiritual struggles.
I am far from thinking that this sentence applies 
exclusively to what we designate spiritual con­
flicts, I should suppose that David, or whoever 
the writer of the Psalm was, gave thanks that he 
had been able to fight with the Philistines, and
^‘^fbe Doctrine of Sacrifice, p . 219, 
25p-rophets and Kings, p, 315.,
26pp. 108-109,
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Ammonites, Nay, I should think he gave thanks that 
he had been obliged to fight with them; that he had 
not been allowed to rust in the ease which he would 
have chosen for himself. It was in strict harmony 
with all the teachings he had been most familiar 
with to speak thus.  ^^
Sacrifice and not slaughter is the touchstone of the 
true soldier. "There is a brutal appetite for slaughter," 
writes Maurice, "which is in the nature of every soldier be­
cause of every man, . . (But) it will in all cases be the
readiness to endure, not the wish to inflict misery which 
will extort from us either sympathy or honour."28 .
Because Maurice understands sacrifice as an active prin­
ciple, he is constantly using it to imply not the repudiation 
of force, but its proper appropriation. Only this way of un­
derstanding sacrifice makes the Apocalypse intelligible.
That is a book, says Maurice, "full of trumpets of doom.
Vials of Wrath, of earthquakes and revolution." Yet it bears 
the instruction that "they who followed Christ must conquer 
as he did, by giving up themselves to die, not by seeking 
power to kill."
If, as this interpretation of the Apocalypse seems to 
imply, the judgment is to be between seizure of power and 
self-sacrifice, the Christian cannot help but sense that the 
verdict has already been sealed in favor of self-sacrifice.
The basis for this verdict is the cross.
3 7Sermons Preached in Lincoln Inn Chapel (6 vols.; London: 
John E. Taylor, 1856-1859), Vol. I, pp. 282-284. Cit. Lincoln 
Inn Sermons.
2Qsocial Morality, p. 186.
39lbld., p. 249.
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The will that rules the universe, the Will that has 
triumphed and does triumph, is all expressed and 
gathered up in the Lamb that was slain. Beholding 
Him, you see whence come the peace and order of the 
world, whence comes its confusion. The principle 
of sacrifice has been ascertained once and forever 
to be the principle, the divine principle, that in 
which God can alone fully manifest His own eternal 
Being, His inmost character, the order which He has 
appointed all creatures voluntary and involuntary 
to obey.
By drawing the contrast between the death of Abel and 
the death of Christ, Maurice is able to suggest powerfully 
the vindication of sacrifice as the only principle of effec­
tive force.
The taking away of the life of a brother was proved,
by the earliest experience of the world, to be the
result of departure from the law on which God had 
formed his world. The laying down a life for oth­
ers is proved by the latest experience in the his­
tory of the world, to be the principle, the essence 
of that law.
To emphasize the critical significance Maurice discov­
ers in sacrifice makes it necessary to expose, as precisely
as possible, what he means by sacrifice. It is relatively
easy to justify much that is exploitation in the name of sac­
rifice. Furthermore, sacrifice is not a concept known to the 
Christian faith alone since it is quite as often revered and 
called for by purely secular and even revolutionary movements. 
Finally, undefined sacrifice is of little use for putting into 
a Christian context the possible involvement in violence faced 
by the prospective Christian revolutionary. What Maurice must
40The Doctrine of Sacrifice, pp. 220-221.
^^The Epistles of St. John, a Series of Lectures on 
Christian Ethics (London: Macmillan, 1857), p. 208.
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do, then, is provide a definition for sacrifice that is rele­
vant to situations in which moral evil is at work, and, at 
the same time, capable of differentiation from sacrifice as it 
might occur in a non-Christian context.
This latter usage of the word "sacrifice" we may refer 
to as general, or non-specific. A little observation will re­
veal that such sacrifice is closely related to calculation. 
Sacrifice is the foregoing of some benefit in the interest 
of obtaining another and greater. A child, for example, 
learns that by "sacrificing" sweeties for a few weeks he can 
accumulate the price of a football. Workingmen discover that 
by "sacrificing" the remuneration for their labour during a 
short strike, they can secure a larger remuneration over a 
long period.
Sacrifice as calculation is dressed in "Sunday clothes"
by Paul Tillich:
For the sake of my present reality, I must keep 
many possibilities outside of my centred self, 
or I must give up something of what I now am for 
the sake of something possible which may enlarge 
and strengthen my centred self. So my life pro­
cess oscillates between the possible and the real^ 
and requires the surrender of the one for the 
other— the sacrificial character of all life,'^^
The trouble with, a notion of sacrifice which, implies - 
calculation is that it is basically self-centered (as Tillich 
makes so abundantly clear) and, therefore, open, to all the 
distortions of selfishness. For example, a mother works her 
fingers to the bone, ostensibly in the interests of her chil­
dren. Whenever disagreement arises, she defends herself by
^^Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. Ill, pp. 44f.
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reference to her "sacrifices'* on their behalf. While genuine 
sacrifice is certainly possible— indeed, requisite--to genu­
ine motherhood, it would be incredibly obscurantist to deny 
the character of such maternal "sacrifices" as moral truncheons
Maurice persistently tracks down and exposes the insinu­
ation of the calculating self into sacrifice.
He (the Christian) cannot permit it (self-sacrifice) 
to assume a self-conscious and therefore contradic­
tory character by regarding it as a means of procur­
ing a blessing, when it is in fact the fruit and 
fruition of a blessing already procured. He must 
consider every Christian obliged to mortify his 
selfish nature, in order that he may offer an ac­
ceptable sacrifice to. G o d .  ^2
In t h e o r y t h e  Christian ought to be better able to
grasp sacrifice in this sense than other men. Unhappily, the
evidence of history will not so attest. The sublimation of
self has not always characterized the sacrifices of Christians
Indeed, according to Maurice
. . . the fearful contradictions which have gath- .
ered about the idea of Sacrifice, and have made 
the giving up of S.elf the plea for the most in­
tense and calculating Selfishness, have received 
their fullest illustration from the acts and con­
ceptions of Christian men.
For this state of affairs Maurice blames a faulty doc- , 
trine of atonement. The half-lights of sacrifice as calcula­
tion, when applied to the death of Christ, produce a hideous 
anomaly. The atonement
is changed into a cold formal arrangement for deliv­
ering certain men from the punishment of a sin which
"^ T^he Kingdom of Christ, Vol. II, p. 71.
^^Theological Essays, p. 315.
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has itself not been purged away. . . Nay, the cross 
of Christ— of Him who gave up Himself--is actually 
so presented to men, that they suppose it is the 
instrument by which self-seeking men may secure 
the greatest amount of selfish rewards.
When men set about to pattern their own sacrifices after
the atonement so understood, the result is equally calculating,
equally self-interested. In the preface to the Doctrine of
Sacrifice Maurice protests that
Instead of giving himself up to God, man seeks to 
make his God or gods, give up to him; he offers 
sacrifices, that he may persuade the power which 
he thinks he has wronged, to exempt him from the 
punishment of this wrong. This is man's theology; 
this is what has produced all the hateful super- 
stitutions under which the world groans.
For the propagation of the calculating notion of sacri­
fice, Maurice calls theologians and the clergy to account.
Whenever we represent the great atoning Sacri­
fice in the language of heathenism, and not in the 
language of the Gospel,--as an pffering to make. God 
loving, and not as the fruit of His love, as an 
effort of Christ to obtain that which the Father 
was unwilling to grant, not as the perfect surren­
der and submission to the Will of the. Father,— we 
make the very principle of sacrifice to be ab­
horred; we destroy all apprehension of its true 
nature in the creature, because we have denied 
the ground and original of it in the Creator.
Little wonder that Robert S. Candlish, James H. Rigg,^^ 
and a host of reviewers took great offense at such outspoken
45The Gospel of St. John (London: Macmillan, 1857), p. 338
^^Pp. xliii-xliv.
^’^Patriarchs and Lawgivers of the Old Testament (London: 
Macmillan, 1855), p. 345.
"^^Robert S. Candlish, Examination of Mr. Maurice ’ s 
Theological Essays (London: James Nisbet and Co., 1854). James
H. Rigg, Modern Anglican Theology (London: Alexander Heylin,
1857) .
criticism of their own attempts to do the very thing Maurice 
set himself to undermine. Proponents of propitiatory concepts 
of the atonement, which represented God more as raw power un­
der the Calvinistic emphasis upon sovereignty than as either 
justice or love, could not help but feel the sting. Happily, 
the debate with Candlish resulted in the literary preserva­
tion of much of Maurice's often unique insight into the mean­
ing of sacrifice. His answers to the charges brought against 
him by Candlish are gathered together in the lectures and ser­
mons which constitute his book titled The Doctrine of Sacrifice
The chief ideas defended there are that the ritual sacrifices 
of the Old Testament were not in themselves expiatory, but 
rather, educational. They served to remind man of his sin 
and to point him to the One against whom he sins. They also 
lead him to enquire after the perfect sacrifice and to expect 
it to be a filial one. Reconciliation figures as secondary 
to revelation. Sacrifice is the revelation of God. As such, 
it is the revelation of the existing relation of man to God. 
Through the revelation of that relation by sacrifice, man is 
called from his alienation and isolation in sin. He is re­
minded that he alone is responsible for his isolation inasmuch 
as he alone has refused to acknowledge his relation to God.
Finally, and most important, this book scuttles the 
most persistent vestige of self-interest in sacrifice by in­
sisting that sacrifice, if it is truly sacrifice, always has 
its origin in the will of God. Thus, the aim of sacrifice 
can never be the bending of that will, but only its fulfillment
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Maurice is rightly adamant in demarcating sacrifice 
and self. Self-consciousness is not in the spirit of sacri­
fice. Self-interest cannot be the motive. Self-indulgence 
cannot be the end. In a letter dated 1861, Maurice writes, 
commending some letters of Thomas Erskine,' "all that he says 
of sacrifice as the antagonist principle and power to self­
ishness, I inwardly recognise as true and most scriptural." 
About the same time, criticizing popular theology, he wrote:
The secret that the self-will is itself.the burden . 
that that is separating us from each other and from 
God, that it must be taken away before we can offer 
ourselves, and all our energies of mind and bpdy, as 
sacrifices to God, dawns upon us at times? but how 
that burden can be thrown off, how the free heart can 
be won— this we are not told, or told in language 
the most perplexing and c o n t r a d i c t o r y .20
The contradistinction of sacrifice and self-will makes 
the positive content of Maurice's concept of sacrifice ob­
vious. Since it cannot be the bending of the will of God to 
correspond with the will of man, it must be the bending of 
the will of man to correspond to the will of God. Maurice 
says, .
Sacrifices must express the submission of the lower 
will to the true divine absolute will, they cannot 
be the means of bringing the higher will into con­
sent with the lower.
"Submission to the will of God" then constitutes what Maurice
intends by the word "sacrifice."
49Life, Vol. II, p. 383.
SOihe commandments Considered as Instruments of National 
Reformation (London: Macmillan, 1866), p. 148.
2lThe Epistle to the Hebrews (London: John W. Parker,
1866), p. 62.”
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How this principle may be illustrated in the cross
has already been suggested. But the rest of the life of
Christ is illumined by the same understanding of sacrifice.
The commemoration of the passion of Christ
, . , is the most awful protest which human acts
or divine acts can make against the notion so nat­
ural to us all, that Sacrifice consists in bring­
ing something to God, not in giving up all to Him, 
as the source of every right thought and every 
right act.
In fact, the passion and the cross are the culmination 
of a whole life of self-denial, of submission to the will of 
God. What had begun in the wilderness and continued through­
out his life was gathered up in the cross. As ". . . the
consummate surrender to the will of His Father . . .  it ex­
pressed the meaning of His life."^^
The result is that men, through the Gospel, are moved 
to view sacrifice in a radically new light. The fact that 
"sacrifice has been a part of the institutions of every peo­
ple under heaven"stands for proof of the universal seeking 
for this l i g h t . R i t u a l  sacrifices of the Jews are shown 
to be symbols. The real victim, is always he who brings the 
o f f e r i n g . E v e n  then, sacrifices are graspings after this 
light. The sacrifice of Iphigenia to save the fleet at Aulis 
is the manifestation of a lurking suspicion that real sacrifice
22x,incoln Inn Sermons, Vol. Ill, p. 256.
23ibid., Vol. IV, pp. 114-115.
^^The Doctrine of Sacrifice, p. 61.
^^Ibid., pp. 42-43.
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is always human. But men wait for the cross for the inter­
pretation of all this. Only then is it visible that "the 
cross was to be taken up each day, not as a meritorious ser­
vice, but as submission to a law which it was monstrous to
violate,"
Understanding sacrifice as submission to the will of 
God makes its connection with force considerably more compre­
hensible, To follow Maurice in his thinking, one must admit 
that sacrifice is not divested of its dynamic character. It 
is submission. But it is submission to God and, as such, 
may not appear submissive to men. To be sure, Canaanite 
idolaters would hardly have considered the Hebrew hordes sub­
missive, Yet Maurice implies that the Israelite wars were 
indeed sets of sacrifice inasmuch as they were the subjugation 
of the self-will to the will of God,
The Israelite was not merely to be tenacious of the
true worship, and watchful against any intrusion
of the false; he was to go forth against any intru­
sion of the false; he was to go forth against the 
idolatrous people of Canaan, to break in pieces 
their gods, to destroy their altars and high places 
. . . He was to feel that he had a commission to
fight, not chiefly for his own borders, though 
these would be extended, but mainly as the soldier 
of God, to put down that which exalted itself against 
Him. And not only the idol or the idol-temple was 
to be destroyed; the inhabitants of the idolatrous 
country, their wives, their children, their sheep, 
and their oxen, were to be put to death. The lead­
er of the hosts was to set his foot upon the necks 
of their kings.
The wars of the Israelites are characterized by their
^^Lincoln Inn Sermons, Vol. IV, pp. 114-115.
^^Patriarchs and Lawgivers of the Old Testament, p. 258.
0.0
indifference to dividing the spoils, a sure mark of the im­
perial mentality. So long as they fought with the sense of 
divine commission the booty was of small interest, the battle 
was everything, for they knew themselves to be the instruments 
of the living God. But,
whensoever these instruments of His become self- 
seekers , --and aim at turning the commission which 
He has given them to their own personal ends— that 
moment they are punished upon the same principles 
as all other people, and with greater severity.
The advent of Christ means that the proclamation of 
Him and not punishment of the idolater is now the better means 
of combatting idolatry. Still, idolatry is a fruitful source 
of wrong-doing and, as such, must come at last to the atten­
tion of outraged responsibility. When that happens
the evil fruits of selfishness must meet with their 
own appropriate recompense. The sword of justice, 
not words or acts of tenderness, must cut off these.
He who being entrusted with it, fails to use it 
through . any weakness or faintness of heart, yields 
to selfishness,— refuses to be God's minister, 
allows that which is hateful to God and destruc­
tive to his fellowcreatures, to live and multiply.
He who is seized with a sudden fancy that he is 
to forgive enemies when he is called upon to pun­
ish wrong, will not forgive them when they injure 
him. The judge who is too tender-hearted to sign a 
warrant for the execution of a criminal, will very 
probably end by being the head of a committee of 
safety, and will defile the land with the blood of 
innocent m e n . 29
If the sense of this duty is the inspiration for the 
warrior's deeds, we should be taught by them the meaning of 
self-sacrifice as the only effective force,
^^Ibid., p, 264.
5 9lbld., p. 266,
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It will be regarded as the true ground of all ac­
tion? that on which all the blessed relations of 
life stand; that upon which all the charities and 
sympathies of life depend; that which is at the 
same time the only impulse to and security for the 
hard and rough work of the world— for the reluctant 
but necessary blows which are inflicted upon the 
miscreants who abuse God-given power to the ser­
vice of the devil, and the injury of their fellows—  
for the wrongs which are endured by those who testi­
fy to the world that the works thereof are evil. 
Sacrifice is the common root and uniting bond and 
reasonable explanation of all those acts which 
seem in the eyes of men, often in the eyes of those 
who perform them, most hostile to each other, but 
which in due time justify themselves as proceeding 
from the same children of wisdom, though one may 
be said to have a devil because he wears camel's 
hair, and a mightier than he be called a gluttonous 
man and a wine-bibber, because He eats and drinks 
with publicans and sinners.
The lines of the dilemma with which we set out ought 
now to be retraced and bound together. Whether the pre­
suppositions be Marxist or Christian, the prospects of vio­
lence are dealt with in a remarkably similar manner. At the 
heart of each lies the recognition of the necessity for change 
Change is understood for both as movement toward reality. 
Change always depends upon an effective force. Effective 
force is always of the same essence as reality. Any other 
force obscures reality and reinforces appearance. Thus, for 
both, what is effective force becomes the critical issue. 
Haying traced the general outlines first of revolutionary phil* 
Qsophy, and then of the Christian faith of F, D, Maurice, we 
have arrived at certain relevant conclusions,
First, it has become apparent that the connection be­
tween force and violence is unavoidable. Violent activities.
60The Doctrine of Sacrifice, pp. 64-65,
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whether intentionally so or only perceived as such, are not 
alien to either system. Any attempt to resolve the dilemma 
in terms of a choice between violence or no violence begs the 
question,
We have seen in both systems that the real issue is 
the establishment of a ground upon which the justification 
of violence is to stand. This follows the thinking of Roger 
Garaudy, who has claimed that "the choice is not between vio­
lence and non-violence, but between two different kinds of 
violence. " It is echoed in the citation above from the 
article "Long Live Leninism^" where the Yugoslav "revision­
ists" are criticized for obscuring Lenin's distinction be­
tween capitalist violence and revolutionary violence in terms 
of class struggle. It is implied in all that Maurice says 
about the Hebrew-Christian protest against imperialist motions.
For revolutionary philosophy, this ground is established 
by the concept of the inevitable emergence of a self-conscious 
proletariat. Class-consciousness creates an unreal condition 
in which the proletariat is alienated from, and therefore re­
luctant to contemplate, the role history now thrusts upon it.
To seize power, in the interest of the proletariat, is the revo­
lutionary mission. Whatever action abets the seizure of power 
by the proletariat is to be allowed. It is effective force.
We have tried, through the works of Maurice, to describe 
the Christian conviction that the mere seizure of power is 
inadequate, and not an effective force at all. One must, instead,
23-According to Gabriel Bowe, op. cit. , p. 181.
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turn to power as it is manifested in the revelation of God,
It is discovered throughout all the history of that reve­
lation to be none other power than the power of sacrifice. 
Defined as "submission to the will of God," sacrifice re­
tains an active and dynamic character. And in that character, 
it represents a choice made between two kinds of violence.
How sacrifice functions as the principle of effective 
force is paralled in Gandhi's description of "ahimsa," which 
"requires deliberate self-suffering, not a deliberate injur­
ing of the supposed wrong-doer, " But it does not share 
Gandhi's pacifism. For, as Reinhold Neibuhr points out, this 
is not to empty sacrifice of its aggressive content of power. 
If we were to replace Niebuhr's term "non-violence" with 
Maurice's term "sacrifice," the place of sacrifice as the 
principle of effective change would become more apparent, 
Niebuhr writes,
If justice should be achieved by social conflicts 
which lack the spiritual elements of non-violence 
(.sacrifice) , something will be lacking in the char­
acter of the society so c o n s t r u c t e d , 23
This is not to admit that the idea of sacrifice as the 
principle of effective force implies a purely subjective in­
vestigation into motives and intent, Against such subjectiv­
ity the Christian no less than the revolutionary is bound to 
object. The revolutionary- will point out the movement of 
history, the inevitable emergence of the universal proletariat
2^Moral Man and Immoral Society, p , 2 48, 
®3ibid,, p. 256.
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and the obscured reality to which present appearances are 
both thesis and antithesis,
The Christian, challenged to designate the objectivity 
of the principle of sacrifice points to the will of God as 
the only source of sacrifice. His will is not only separate 
from man, it is in the truest sense distinct. Indeed, it is 
often the very opposite. And as such, it delivers the one 
who submits to it from the tyranny of simple subjectivity.
The question may fairly be put, therefore, whether 
discerning the will of God is any less subjective than dis­
cerning the movement of history, and conversely, whether dis­
cerning the movement of history is any more objective than 
discerning the will of God? Fresh memories of oppression in 
the name of the revolution cast shadows of doubt every bit 
as gloomy as the stale memories of oppression in the name of 
the church. One could think of the despair of one N. S. Ruba- 
shov, the main character in Arthur Koestler's novel, Darkness 
at Noon, who, from his Stalinist death cell concludes on be­
half of the revolutionary cause to which his life had been 
devoted, "We are doing the work of prophets without their 
gifts."
Here, then, are the outlines of the not inconsiderable 
dilemma posed by violence for the prospective Christian revo­
lutionary. He cannot, in good faith, join in prosecuting 
change upon an interim principle of seizure of power. On the 
other hand, he cannot, in good faith, avoid any activities, 
even violent ones, toward which he is activated in the spirit
of sacrifice. Where the mutual obligations cross, he is 
still free to engage himself with revolutionaries only to 
the extent and in a manner urged upon him by the will of God 
to whom he submits. To refuse to submit is to lapse into 
self-will, the most certain precursor of greater violence, of 
no real change, and of impossible situations for the exposure 
of the only real society, men united in the divine order, the 
kingdom of God.
CHAPTER 7
REVOLUTION AND REBELLION—
ORDER AND THE ESTABLISHMENT
How the church is to be related to the establishment 
is a controversial issue at all times. When a revolutionary 
potential is introduced into such considerations, an already 
complex problem becomes still more acute. It raises the is­
sue of state or order. And the answer must be correct and 
it must be immediate.
Richard Shaull, whose critique of the churches was cited 
earlier, bears a second hearing. "Usually, some decades af­
ter the success of the revolution, the churches have reluc­
tantly entered into dialog or established a modus vivendi with 
the revolutionaries."1
This indictment is useful because it reveals clearly 
that the problem of the response of the Christian to revolu­
tion involves, at its root, the problem of the response of 
the Christian to the establishment. As Shaull points out, 
a modus vivendi for the church and establishment is of para­
mount importance whether the particular establishment is the 
"old order" or that of the "revolutionaries."
"Deliberate" change, characteristic of true revolution,
^Loc. cit.
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is change that can be criticized and evaluated. The appar­
ent "givenness" of the establishment and the deliberate chal­
lenge to it by the revolution make such criticism imperative 
and urgent. What is the legitimate link between order and 
the establishment? A creative job of responding, to the chal­
lenge of revolution requires something more virile than a 
mute acquiescence to the establishment because it the estab­
lishment, or to whichever side emerges victorious (which is 
even more irresponsible, according to Shaull),
The concept of "the establishment" suggests a complex 
of social, political, and economic structures that gives the 
appearance of a menacing monolith to its opponents even 
though interaction within the establishment may enjoy a large 
degree of freedom^ The stability of an establishment depends 
upon a balancing of inter-dependencies among these structures. 
Thus an. establishment produces order.
This order, required for any establishment to thrive, can 
contain also the seeds of its own destruction. As the frame­
work of the establishment becomes more complex, the sense of 
balance with regard to just which structures are necessary 
and what shall be their privileges becomes impaired. Con­
flicts of status and privilege are bound to occur. When, 
through the efforts of some group with elite standing within 
the establishment, these conflicts are resolved unsatisfactor­
ily, social dysfunction is the result. Alienation produces 
a devaluing of all social ties so that they may, whether in 
fact, or in perception, become the links of oppression. The
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disorder of society thus gives occasion for the disorder of 
revolution.
It may be that the church is guilty of settling its 
loyalties on purely pragmatic grounds. Then the church mere­
ly chooses the likely victor and sides with it. And that is 
a serious accusation not only for its face value, but also 
because for the church to do so, it must turn its back on 
a long and productive tradition of thought about its relation 
to the establishment. For there is a long history of the 
theological interest in zthe structures of societies and the 
way they function-
Buried within the ancient soil of Judeo-Christian sources 
the roots of this history are still vital. They may be dor­
mant. They are not dead, Stir the dust of the creation ac­
count and they may be seen as Emil Brunner demonstrates.
Men may be commanded to love, but institutions, accord­
ing to Brunner, are regarded in terms of justice. The ques­
tion of justice, says Brunner, is the question of giving every 
man his due. This implies equality and the ground of equality 
in Christian thought is creation in the imago dei. But, says 
Brunner,
In the biblical story of creation, the same pass­
age, the very same sentence, which speaks of man 
as God's image expressly includes one of the most 
cardinal of inequalities, the difference of sex,
in the act of creation,2
That fact, disastrous for consistent attempts to consider jus­
tice in terms of equality, is just the fact that makes
p
Justice and the Social Order (.London ; Lutterworth 
Press, 1945), p. 42.
community, and therefore, justice, possible. For inequality 
as it springs from creation is inequality that requires com­
plement and thus (as in marriage, the most primordial of hu­
man communities), leads to community, Thus, Brunner is con­
vinced that justice relates more closely to creation than to 
the moral commands of God and, therefore, more closely to the 
structure of society as divinely given.
The later history of the Old Testament makes the reli­
gious significance of social structures explicit. The time­
liness of the prophetic daber Elohim was conditioned by a 
number of facts. Most important for our purposes was the 
dissolution of the theocratic ideal-. This was inevitable as 
the compass of the sovereignty of Jahweh was increased by the 
proclamation of an universal dominion, and a greater emphasis 
upon the responsibility of the individual instead of the na­
tion, The idea of foreign kings as the chastening instrument 
of Israel's God was a radical departure, That even the most 
wicked of them receive their thrones from the God of Israel 
came very late indeed, to find a place in the religious 
thought of the Jew CDaniel 4:17), But it did come. Thus, the 
post-exilic Jewish establishment was markedly different from 
what had gone before. And the. ideas which precipitated that 
difference--the universal authority of God, the responsibility 
of the individual, the "divine right" of all kings— still bear 
close scrutiny in our evaluations of an "establishment,"
New Testament history reveals a very different situation 
from that complained of by Shaull, Many commentators agree
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that the writings of Lnke had a primary interest in asserting 
that the church was not of necessity^ inimical to the State, 
Romans 13 presses for the loyalty of citizens to their state. 
But history records how the state failed to get the message,
Its oppression of the young movement occurred with a dreadful 
inconsistency almost from Pentecost^ of Acts, chapter two.
As the oppressed, Christians gave serious attention to the re­
lationship of the church to the establishment, particularly 
the state. If today the church shares apathetically with an 
oppressive state, it has indeed a great deal to answer for.
The close of the îsiew Testament era and the ante-Nicene 
age did not mark the end of theological interpretation of the 
place and privileges of the establishment. Since the Edict 
of Milan, when the church first found a place within the estab­
lishment, a quantity of literature has appeared, inspired by 
Christian experience and indispensable for understanding the 
advance of social thinking in the western world. Augustine, 
Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, Arminius are names in themselves 
suggestive of the fruitfulness of Christian thought about so­
cial structures, and the meaning of social order.
To complete this sketchy and intentionally suggestive 
survey of theological concern with social structures, mention 
ought to be made of the chiliastic movements that spanned the - 
history and geography of medieval Europe, A quasi-Christian 
eschatology gave substance to the discontent and daydreams of 
the peasant populations of entire villages and even regions. 
Large bands of people, charged with enthusiasm by leaders
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characterized by imagination as much as charisma, kicked over 
the traces of the establishment and set about the creation of 
a new order. Names such as "Cathari," "Diggers" or "Levelers" 
are familiar because certain of their revolutionary eccentrici' 
ties have been incorporated as normal facts of contemporary 
establishments.
Thus it emerges that if modern Christianity adopts a 
posture of indifference toward social structures it does so 
only by turning its back, on a precedent of great antiquity 
and potential fruitfulness.
But tradition is neither the only nor the most impor­
tant means of legitimating Christian concern for the social 
structures of the establishment. To abide faithful to the 
Christian revelation, faith and experience demand a critical 
appreciation of the structures of society. How one conceives 
of his relations to other men is both determined by, and deter­
minative o:^  the kind of social structures one is willing to 
advance, or at least to tolerate. Given this appreciation, 
the stress one senses when social structures are contrived or 
prostituted for dubious ends is a legitimate area for Christian 
concern.
The element of human relationship implicit in any social 
structure, therefore, guarantees that its significance for 
Christian consideration always obtains. This is so even when 
the particular structure is allowed only a negative value. In 
the Thomistic notion of the state, for example, its existence 
was meaningful only because of man^s inherited sinful nature.
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The state was charged with keeping depravity in check. This 
negative evaluation of the state retains currency, Geneva 
enforced it among Protestants. Thus it is not surprising 
that the American clergyman-constitutionalist, James Madison, 
held that if people were virtuous there would be no need for 
governments. Even so, this position must surely be brought 
at last to the admission that although the state itself may 
be an artificially constituted relationship, its existence is 
justified inasmuch as it safeguards whatever real relation­
ships there are among men which ought to be protected. For 
Madison, as for other framers of the American constitution, 
this was a matter primarily of securing individual rights not 
only against capricious monarchs, but also against the grasp- 
ings of depraved humanity. Thus, the state is a product of 
grace rather than nature, of redemption rather than creation. 
Concern for the structures of a society can only be en­
hanced, therefore, when it is based upon a theological appre­
ciation of those structures, which yields to them a positive 
function, And this is unreservedly the position taken by 
F, D, Maurice toward the structures which he deemed necessary 
to social existence which include the family, the nation, and 
the universal society.
No attempt can finally succeed, and therefore none should 
be made, to sublimate such necessary social structures to the 
whim or disposal of men, according to Maurice. They exist for 
the benefit and development of true humanity. They comprise 
the order of the world as created by God. Apart from them,
JL4 3
human life as God has willed it becomes impossible. Further­
more, the revelation of God himself is most manifest in the 
human relationships which these structures are ordained to 
guarantee. Thus, to tamper with the structures ordained by 
God befogs the revelation..
It is the twofold benefit of truly human life arid the 
knowledge of God that gives to Maurice's estimation of the 
divine order its immense positive value. Not for him are any 
ideas of the state as primarily the check against depravity.
A man dwells in a state not just for purposes of safety and 
protection, "but in order that his moral and spiritual being 
may be properly developed."  ^ (Maurice never attempts to sepa­
rate the banality of the state from the glory of the "nation.")
So it is with the family. Perhaps because of his own 
family relationships, Maurice projected on the family' an im­
portance bordering on the s a c r e d .  ^ To the relations within 
the family, Maurice ascribes the first stirrings toward God.
Not the thaumaturgia of the natural world, but the wonderful 
feeling of relationship within the family accounts for the ear­
liest rays of religious light. Thus, the earliest sense of
'^ The Kingdom of Christ, 1838,, Vol:. Ill, p. 319.
^On this point, see F . M. McClain, op. cit., where the
thesis is defended that "The principal formative influence on 
Maurice's ethical teaching came from his' own personal relation­
ships. More subtle perhaps than the intellectual sources of 
his thought, they were far more important for a man for whom 
theology and ethics were primarily a matter of relations, es­
sentially personal." McClain's exposition of much unpublished 
material, especially.Maurice’s letters, provides substantial 
documentation for his thesis alongside a perceptive definition 
of each of the familial relations according to Maurice's anal­
ysis in his lectures on Social Morality.
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natural and revealed religion is bonded in a fundamental 
unity, a unity of surpassing positive significance to human 
society. And thus the family is shown to be the basic re­
pository of human relations as well as the source of much of 
the divine revelation.
The same twofold benefit is most obvious in Maurice's 
exposition of the nature and significance of the universal 
society. The choice between two kinds of societies, which 
might aptly be called universal, comes at last to be between 
that society represented by the church and that pursued in 
the spirit of empire. The empire is idolatrous in worship 
and acquisitive and selfish in dealings with men. Only the 
church, dependent upon God, and sacrificial in spirit, 
can provide a basis for a truly universal society. Only 
the church's message of man's unity in Christ, "the head 
and king of the race," is adequate to found a universal 
society in which are preserved the full scope of human re­
lations with heaven and on earth.
In speaking of Maurice's great respect for social 
structures however, it must be stressed that this reveren­
tial attitude extends only to the three institutions just 
mentioned, the family, the nation, and the universal society 
These Maurice considered to be necessary social structures. 
As evidence, Maurice points to two facts. The first is that 
in the sequence listed, these three institutions trace the 
progress of the development of every individual human life 
in terms of one's growing consciousness of relationships,^
^Social Morality, p , 37,
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The other fact is that the biblical record of human society 
in general, traces its development as springing first from 
a family, then emerging into a nation, and finally pointing 
to the realization of a universal society,^
Against these necessary, elemental social institutions, 
Maurice ranges the artificial and concocted structures of 
men's wills. To the former we must belong. To the latter 
we may belong. Joseph, for example, outcast and maligned, 
had both reason and opportunity to sever the family ties 
that bound him to his brothers. But to have done so, ar­
gues Maurice, would have been to act upon another principle 
than that which directed the Patriarchs, In spite of his 
brother's actions, Joseph could not feel free before God, 
in the light of the covenant that in Abraham's family all the 
world would be blessed,
to separate himself from his godless brethren and 
establish, a new and distinct fellowship. Had he 
done so , . , he would have founded a society which
was built upon choice not upon relationship.^
Societies built upon choice must suffer to some degree 
from their artificiality. An opposing choice is sufficient 
cause to call into question the right of any "elected" soci­
ety to existence. If the challenge is strong, the alterna­
tives are dissolution, or resort to force, "Hobbes," says 
Maurice,
has convinced me that if Society is a merely
^Ibxd., p. 20.
^The jy.ngdoin of Christ, Vol. I, p. 275.
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artificial institution it must be what he supposed 
it to be, dependent altogether upon Force, disturbed 
and shaken whenever the thought of right mingles with 
that of Force,^
Resort to force is only one, and perhaps a more remote,
danger implied in societies of choice. More immediate and
certainly more insidious for the preservation of the bonds
of human society a^e two other dangers related as two sides
of the same coin. The first is that an inappropriate loyalty
may be committed to an artificial social structure. The
second is that social structures, will come to be the victims
of an unworthy indifference or even cynicism. That state of
affairs portends a sad day for social order.
It is a sad day for churches, yes, and for nations, 
when men begin to regard themselves chiefly as sent 
forth by some centrât government to do its jobs, and 
not as men who are bound by sacred affinities and 
actual relations to those whom they preside oyer.. ^
Genuine human relations are thus submerged beneath re­
lations that are concocted and artificial. Granted that a 
certain amount of artificial relations is inevitable in even 
a relatively simple society, it must not therefore be to the 
existence of these relations that genuine human society is 
referred. The cash nexus, for example, is an inevitable re­
lation in money economies, but left to itself, it will 
shortly consume the true relations for which it can never 
provide more in a positive way than a convenience. The case 
is the same with affinity groups. Interests and opinions 
may play a large and positive, role in a society. An agreed
^Social Morality, p. 32 9,
^The Epistles of St. John, p. 54,
ideology may achieve the similitude of a deep social relation,
But, Maurice, insists, "Men are not united in opinions; they
are not bound together under sophistries. Hence, ' Maurice
protests in the fourth.of his lectures on social morality,
"It is of relations as the core of human society that I
speak, as implied not only in its well-being but in its very
being." He follows this with a warning that is definitive
for virtually all of his social analysis:
If we do not take account of those societies in 
which we must exist, we shall atta,ch a very dis­
proportionate value to those in which we may 
exist. The.Class and the Club will be superlatively 
precious and dear as- the Family is lost, out of sight. 
Men will recognise themselves more and more by 
their badges and colours when they cease to care 
about ties of blood.
The distinction between social structures to which we 
must belong and those to which we may belong is not frequently 
explicit in Maurice. But it is implicit everywhere. To over­
look this distinction which is basic to all of Maurice's so­
cial analysis is to invite a host of exegetical problems in
The Conflict of Good and Evil in Our Day; Twelve 
Letters to a Missionary (London: Smith, Elder, and Co., 1865. 
Cit. Conflict of Good and Evil), p. 132. Cf. "A Society 
merely united in opinion had-, it seemed to me, no real cohe­
sion; it must exalt that which a man or a multitude troweth, 
above the truth, or must suppose them to be identical. It 
will be very positive, yet it will have no permanent resting- 
place. It will be always changing; never growing. It will 
be alternately persecuting and latitudinarian; it will be 
equally far from steady belief and genuine tolerance."
"Address of Congratulation to the Rev. F . D. Maurice., on His 
Nomination to St. Peter's, Vere Street; with His Reply 
Thereto," (__________:  , 1860), p. 4.
Social Morality, p. 59. Cf. The Conscience, p. 49— "As 
long as we like a person we shall suppose we are bound to him; 
our dislike will dissolve the tie. We shall live in a cir­
cle of what are called in the cant of our day elective
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the interpretation of not only Maurice's writings, but his 
life work as well.
In the interest of interpreting Maurice's confidence 
in the divine order, it is possible to paint his portrait as 
that of a social quietist, one who fears to interfere in the 
affairs of men lest he upset the order of God. But this is 
caricature and not a portrait. It overdraws the lines of 
Maurice's idealism and emphasizes the, obvious conservative 
shading in his political thought.
What it cannot show is the reason for Maurice ^ s involve­
ment (however reluctant) in radical approaches to the prob­
lems of the society of which he was cognizant. The conserva­
tive idealist commonly scorns the world of sense and sorrow 
for the loftier ethers of some reality not immediately percept­
ible to other men. Not even his confidence in the divine order, 
however, turned Maurice's eyes away from the world known to 
every man. One did not, according to him, see the Kingdom of 
Christ better by withdrawing from the world but by immersing 
oneself in it. Real human relations were not to be shunned in 
search of ideal and heavenly ones. They were to be entered 
into and cherished as the evidences and exemplifications of 
the relation between man and God,
But here was the vital point. Societies to which one
affinities; the grand old name of Relations will be treated 
as obsolete. That you may escape this danger, I dwell upon 
this fact— that we are in an order; that relations abide 
whether we are faithful to them or neglect them; and that the 
Conscience in each of us affirms "I am in this order, I ought 
to act consistently with it, let my fancies say what they 
please."
151
might belong do not share the. ultimacy accorded to societies 
to which we must belong,
Only a firm grasp on this fact can explain Maurice's 
activism. And it is easy to overlook because it is seldom 
explicit. The magnificent study of Professor Torben Christen­
sen on the Origins and History of Christian Socialism is weak­
est just at this point. From a perfectly acceptable premise 
Professor Christensen is forced to draw a faulty conclusion.
He cannot logically account for Maurice's activism without 
the distinction Maurice makes between societies of choice and 
the divine order with its necessary structures.
To Maurice the Divine Order, or synonymously with 
it "The Kingdom of Christ," was an existing real­
ity in which man was already living. Therefore it 
was not the task of man to create forms of organi­
zation in which true brotherhood of love and fellow­
ship could be expressed, God Himself had already 
placed man in a "Human Order" with "human relation­
ships .
Granted that for Maurice the divine order is a present 
reality. Granted that God had placed man within it. That cer­
tainly does not rule out for Maurice the responsibility "to 
create forms of organization in which true brotherhood of love 
and fellowship could be expressed," V7hen Maurice cast about 
for a definition of Christian socialism he settled upon words 
remarkably similar to the very one Professor Christensen im­
plies he could not have used with consistency. Socialism, says 
Maurice, means the "acknowledgement of brotherhood of heart
^2«porben Christensen, Origin and History of Christian 
Socialism 1848-54 (Copenhagen; Universitetsforlaget I 
Aarhus, 1962), p. 24.
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13and fellowship in work." To the forming of workers’ cooper­
atives, Maurice committed himself because he was finally con­
vinced that such an acknowledgement was.forthcoming in no 
other way. It is entirely consistent/ therefore, to insist 
that Maurice's concept of the divine order was not such an 
one as would preclude in practice the creation of forms of 
organization, i.e., social structures to promote the sense of 
relationships and thus of the divine order itself.
Nor, on the other hand does it preclude the destruction 
of social structures when those structures obscure the rela­
tionships of the divine order within which men are placed. 
Again, Professor Christensen succumbs to the social quietist 
interpretation of Maurice's concept of the social structures. 
"He did not deny that political and social anomalies did ex­
ist, but this did not entail the doing away with the existing 
society and its institutions and substituting it with a new 
order of society." Rather, continues Christensen, "the only 
concern of the church in respect to the nation and the anoma­
lies of its political and social life must be education
That is surely to beg the question, "Education for what?"
Vol. II, p. 128.
Martin Buber perceives this well. "As distinct from
the latter (proper political movements such as Chartism), 
which wanted to alter the whole hierarchy of power, the Coop­
erative Movements wanted to begin with the creation of social 
reality, without which no amount of tinkering with legal 
relationships can ever lead to socialism." Paths in Utopia, 
Translated by R. F. C. Hull. (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1949), p. 58.
15Op. cit., p. 26.
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Education is defined, finally, by a change of behavior and 
of attitude, In social terms this implies an amended apprecia­
tion of society in general and of its various social structures 
in particular. Such conceptual changes will inevitably entail 
the doing away with certain institutions of any society. And 
Maurice, neither in theory nor practice, held himself aloof 
from that.
Wonderful as the prophetic institution of Israel was, for
example, it had its false prophets, its utter hypocrites and
blasphemers, Which goes to show, according to Maurice, that
There is no charm in any ordinance whatever, in the 
succession of son to father, or of pupil to teacher, 
to prevent such results as these. If there were, 
we should fall down and worship institutions and 
arrangements instead of God, He pours contempt 
upon the best devices, upon those which bear most 
of the stamp of His own wisdom, when they exalt 
themselves against Him,^^
Because the interpretation of Maurice as conservative tp 
the point of quietism prevails generally, it will be instructive 
to see how Maurice's appreciation of the divine order, as op­
posed to the artificial structures of man's designing, led him
-^ F^rophets and Kings, p, 13, Of Robert Southey, Maurice 
mourned that he has succumbed to the belief that "political 
perfection was confined to our own Constitution, and that 
Christianity was identical with the English Church Establish­
ment, He is, indeed, a mournful example of the ruin which may 
be wrought upon the fairest minds, by attaching universal feel­
ing to particular institutions, and by professing to find all 
truth in the creed of one establishment." Cited in Olive Brose, 
op.cit., pp. 19-20, Cf, Maurice's words, "I must repeat the 
warning I have given you already, that all Institutions— the 
very best that have ever existed in nations— the very best 
that can exist in particular neighbourhoods— are liable to de­
cay, and to be turned to other purposes than those for which 
they are founded. The best arrangements give no sufficient 
security for their continuance; no, not even the best princi­
ples. There is a proverb, and a true one, which says 'that the
both to create and to destroy in the interests of its procla­
mation, No area with, which, he concerned himself escaped these 
two pans of his balance.
Such was the case with regard tp the economic system. 
Prevailing as it did upon a basis of competition, Maurice was 
not in the least hesitant to express his misgivings about that 
institution in word and deed,.
To Kingsley he wrote,
Competition is put forth as the. law of the universe.
That is a lie. The time is come for us to declare 
that it is a lie by word and deed, I see no way 
but associating for work instead of for strikes, ^
To a Mrs, Rich, he wrote in the same vein.
At present it [competition] boasts to be the one 
governing motive of human beings. Reason de­
clares, the most painful experience proves, that 
if it does govern it is destructive of Society—  
that it sets every individual against his neighbor, °
The whole motive of Maurice's involvement with the 
Christian. Socialists was the creation of a social structure 
by which cooperation and association could be declared by 
acts and deeds to be the antagonist principle to that of 
competition. Socialism for Maurice was no superior system of 
economics, no abolition of private property, no complex vision
corruption of that which is best is the worst of all,' So I 
say, we must not confide in our English Institutions, You must 
not confide in your Norwood Institute. You must remember that 
Institutions are composed of men,■and..that situations are ad­
ministered by men." "A Lecture Delivered at the Opening of 
the Lower Norwood Working Men's Institute," pp. 19-2 0,
^^Life, Vol.'ll, p. 32.
^^Life, II, p. 47, For the most lucid and comprehensive 
complaint by Maurice against the principle of competition, see 
his lecture "Reasons for Cooperation" (London: John W. Parker,
1851).
of a well-managed balance between production and consumption.
That kind of socialism Maurice was content to leave to the likes
of Robert Owen, whose efforts he criticized as leading finally
not to the reassertion and revaluing of human relationships but
"to the doctrine that men are mere creatures of circumstances,
and that by a readjustment of circumstances their condition
may be completely r e f o r m e d . S o c i a l i s m ,  said Maurice,
". , , means nothing of itself but the science of making men
partners, the science of partnership,"^^ Thus,
anyone who recognises the principle of co-operation 
as a stronger and truer principle than that of com­
petition has a right to the. honour or the disgrace 
of being called a socialist.
It is apparent, then, that however cautiously Maurice 
moved, however reticent he sometimes was to cast his lot with 
the decisions of the other Christian Socialists, however ob- 
scutG and forced his "principled" reasons for abstaining on 
occasions from joining with them, there was nothing in his 
yiew of the divine order that precluded active interference 
with particular structures whether to create or to destroy.
Indeed, there were the highest and best reasons for 
just such interference if at last it appeared the only course.
In other words, attitudes are not the only paints for Maurice's 
portrait. Actions are on the pallett, too. Other issues 
substantiate the claim that Maurice was far from being a 
quietist. They reveal a propensity toward activism when
^^ -The Kingdom of Christ, Vol. I, p, 28 6,
2OAlec Vidler, The Church in an Age of Revolution 
(Harmondsworth Penguin Books, 1971), p, 97.
21'»Tracts on Christian Socialism," No. 1, p. 1 , 1850.
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he could feel his immediate duty correspond to his voca­
tion of proclaiming the divine o r d e r ,
In regard to the Working Men '^s College and Queen' s 
College, it was a creative activism. In regard to news-r
papers and party interests and loyalties it was earnestly
destructive.
Newspapers provide an especially good example. Be­
cause Maurice felt his vocation to be the proclamation of the 
divine order he was immediately faced with a problem. By 
its very nature, the proclamation implies the urgency of the 
widest possible dissemination. It is to Maurice's credit that 
he early recognized the value of extra-ecclesiastical insti­
tutions for this purpose. The formation of the Working Men's
College and Queen's College provide substantial evidence of
this recognition. In, the case of the latter, Maurice viewed 
its value as indirect as well as direct. Governesses would 
themselves profit inasmuch as they would be better equipped 
for their teaching duties. But they doubtlessly would pass 
on the message of the divine order as they had imbibed it 
from their own sympathetic instructors. Thus, to instuct 
the governesses was to instruct the generations that should 
fall to their charge. This was the indirect benefit.
But these institutions, though simple enough, were
am joined on this position by Frank M, McClain.
"Some critics maintain that Maurice was reluctant to take a 
decided stand on social issues lest he tamper with the under­
lying divine order. On the contrary, his belief in an order 
founded upon relations between persons frequently compelled 
him to break with his conservative support of the status quo." 
Maurice, Man and Moralist, p, 113,
J - 3  /
yet too elaborate and localized to create the broadest possi­
ble dissemination. The most obvious alternative was something 
in printed form. Why not a religious newspaper? Less to his 
credit, Maurice, who so frequently entered the lists for ver­
bal battle in Macmillan's and other periodicals as well as 
in series of tracts and letters ^ let his own personal pique 
toward newspapers blind him to their potential for doing the 
very thing he professed to be called to do.
When in 1848, Ludlow, one of Maurice's associates in 
Christian Socialism, suggested the establishment of a Chris­
tian newspaper along the lines of Cobbett's "Political Reg­
ister" addressed to the working classes, Maurice countered 
with his own suggestion of a series of tracts meant for the 
"higher orders," In the end Maurice gave his assent to the 
newspaper project only because, according to Torben Christensen, 
his associates had declared as a body in favor of it. In the 
light of their united conviction, Maurice felt that the news­
paper must be right,
When the newspaper, "Politics for the People," failed 
after only seventeen numbers, newspapers found no new part 
in the plans of the associates until two years later. By 
the time the Society for Promoting Working Men's Association 
was established, Ludlow'had visions again of another newspaper,
, , . Ludlow felt convinced that the right thing
to do would be to publish a newspaper which should 
address the whole nation, presumably in order to 
discuss all topical questions in the light of 
Christian Socialism, Connected with it, he thought
23prigin and History of Christian Socialism, p, 73,
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a penny periodical should be issued with the workers 
and their problems especially in mind,
The response of Maurice to this plan reveals more clear­
ly how basic was his mistrust and antipathy toward newspapers. 
He. rejected the plan out of hand. Ludlow-wrote to Kingsley;
However, here is a terrible hitch. The Master ob­
jects in toto to the Newspaper, very in toto to a 
Journal, tho' at a penny, He says that the news­
paper is the "great idol-temple of the day;" that 
the theatre will be reformed sooner than journal­
ism; that all societies have gone down from the 
moment they have had journals,25
That Maurice himself had been the unwilling victim of
newspapers from time to time must explain part of his low
regard for them. But Maurice's son makes it clear that
victimization was not the major explanation, "The war on
his part was distinctly one of aggression, None of them had
attacked him at the moment when he denounced them."^^ But
his denunciation was unabated throughout his lifetime, In
his Letter to Lord Ashley, Maurice wrote,
Now. your Lordship is well aware that the great aim 
of the religious newspapers is to keep the evangelical 
clergy from co-operating with their brethren; to 
bring all persons of their body into suspicion who 
think that they are not to dwell alone upon the 
earth, but are to contribute their quota of wisdom 
to the good of it,
Maurice thought of himself as "one who should set 
himself to oppose not this or that religious newspaper or
24ibid., p, 151,
^^Ibid., n, p. 152,
26Life, Vol, I, p, 244.
2’7"On Right and Wrong Methods of Supporting Protes­
tantism," p, 17,
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party, but the whole scheme and system of religious news­
papers as a whole.
Here, then, is an apparent inconsistency in Maurice.
Convinced that his task and the task of the Church was to 
provide that education in the divine order necessary to the 
conforming of society to it, Maurice rejected altogether what 
might have proved to be the most useful form of that educa­
tion, so far as saturation was concerned. ‘ One would have 
thought that he would have leapt at the opportunities raised 
by newspapers for informing the masses. A deeper probe is 
required to - find out why he did not.
. What appears inconsistent from one direction reveals 
a clear consistency from another. Whether out of personal 
experience of their venom, or whether out of principle, 
Maurice could think of newspapers in no way except as or­
gans of party lines and interests. First, the parties are 
formed, "Immediately after that, their Newspapers and Re­
views are seen generously striving that no other party shall 
have the stigma of being more unfair and libellous than . 
their own."29
Now "the party" epitomizes for Maurice everything that 
is bad and nothing that is good about societies of choice.
In a day when parties within the church enjoyed a larger 
strength and prominence than in our own, Maurice denounced
28Life, Vol. I, p. 243.
^^The Kingdom of Christ, Vol. II, p. 414.
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ecclesiastical parties as "in principle as well as in practice, 
incompatible" with the life of the church,30
He was equally suspicious of parties in political en­
deavors , Even his admiration for Burke was moderated by Burke's 
enthusiasm for the practical necessity of political parties,
To argue for their necessity was to negate their true character 
as artificial societies. Only the consideration that Burke,
"who could justify it (the party) best in writing, was obliged 
to abandon it in fact" served to reinstate Burke in Maurice's 
favor.
The most disdain, Maurice reserved for the "anti-party" 
party. "Above all we must never be tempted to that greatest 
of all sins, the forming of a party for the sake of displacing 
or overcoming existing parties,"32 "% would rather be the
most vehement and mad partisan," he said, "than one of those 
cold contemners of all parties and of all men.
On the other hand, Maurice would not allow one to occupy 
a seat above the battle after the manner of eclecticism. Eclec­
ticism is, in Maurice's opinion "emasculating."^^ "He. who 
endeavours to substitute a Church for systems must regard with
Reasons for Not Joining a Party in the Church," pp. 7f,. 
cited in Vidler, F, D. Maurice and Co,, p, 82,
^^The Friendship of Books and Other Lectures (London: 
Macmillan, 1880), pp, 319-320,
Lincoln Inn Sermons, Vol. IV, p. 12,
23cited in Vidler, F . D. Maurice and Co,, p. 83.
^^Life, Vol.,. I, p. 339.
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most dread and suspicion the attempt at a complete all-com­
prehending system,
The only consistent position toward parties was impla­
cable opposition.
No, brethren! in this sense of attempting to com­
pete with parties, or imitate them, or supersede 
them, we must let them wholly alone. In another 
sense, we must never let them alone; we must be 
continually tormenting them.26
And as for himself, Maurice wrote, "I feel that I am
to be a man of war against all parties, that I may be a
37peacemaker between all men,"
War against parties, therefore, implied war against the 
organs of parties, newspapers. To give his consent to the 
establishment of a newspaper was, therefore, for Maurice, a 
matter of principle, And the principles required for such 
consent were those he most utterly and consistently repudiated. 
It amounted to investing the social structures of human choice 
with a disproportionate significance. It implied the danger 
of making the party everything, and real society, the divine 
order, of little value.
In each of these examples, Maurice'“s distinction between 
societies of choice and the divine order is the. operative prin­
ciple. It serves him in determining what will be his relation­
ship to any establishment structure. It is the most reasonable 
explanation for the combination of regard for the status q u o ,
^^The Kingdom of Christ, Vol. II, p. 413. 
^^Lincoln Inn Sermons, Vol. TV, p. 13. 
37Life, Vol.. I, p., 506.
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on the one hand, and a desire to see change of a radical 
nature, on the other.
With equal candor Maurice therefore can decry the folly
of either the rebel or the reactionary. For the benefit of
the former, Maurice warns:
, . , the custom of breaking through customs, be­
comes the cruellest of all necessities; it in­
volves the loss of power, weariness, poor results 
or none, till the proud libertine is ready to accept 
any ruler, provided he is formal enough, minute 
enough in his exactions; provided he will save his 
servant from the fearful privilege of deciding, in 
any matter whatsoever, for h i m s e l f . 2 8
Passing judgement on the reactionary, Maurice shows that
defending the establishment is not the same thing as defending
the divine order. The true defender of the divine order probably
, . . had no fiercer antagonists than those who
said they were not of the world, but. of the Church.
But they knew that the profession was false. They 
knew that all who worship Customs and Traditions 
instead of God must be of the world, and that the 
church against which the gates of Hell shall not 
prevail exists to withdraw men from the one worship 
and to fix them in the other.29
The implication of this distinction as it exists among 
the structures of society cannot help but bear upon one's 
attitude toward revolution, It is evidence that at its basis, 
the response to revolution is, in fact, a response to a par­
ticular establishment. The distinction Maurice draws between 
societies of choice, and social structures as part of the di­
vine order, insures that even for him, the ethical response 
to revolution, whether one joins it or opposes it, is not
2 3Lincoln Inn Sermons, Vol. VI, p. 177.
29ibid., Vol. I, pp, 287f.
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predictable on dogmatic grounds. Maurice's position demands 
Christian responsibility for every situation with revolution­
ary potential. The Christian's response is not conditioned 
by the mere fact of revolutionary potential, but by his 
appreciation of what is at stake in terms of social struc­
tures with real social value.40
When one examines Maurice's attitude to revolution, it 
is precisely this feeling of responsibility that emerges.
What gave form to the concept of revolution throughout Europe 
in the mid-nineteenth century was the French Revolution.
This was especially true in England where Karl Marx was only 
a singularly attentive scholar in the library of the British 
Museum. As to Hegelian thought, notwithstanding the efforts 
of Maurice's father-in-law, Julius Hare, it was little known.
Maurice's view of the French Revolution had apparently 
been most influenced by two sources, Carlyle’s Reflections 
on the French Revolution, and the parliamentary speeches of 
Edmund Burke. Maurice's own words confirm the guess as to 
which he felt the greater congeniality.
Although Maurice, knew Carlyle personally and could speak
^^This element of responsibility is characteristic 
of Maurice’s ethics and serves to increase its maneuvera­
bility by its implied contextualism. Certainly it distin­
guishes him from the casuistry which constituted the popu­
lar ethical methodology in his day. On this see especially 
The Conscience, lecture nine. It is noteworthy that H. 
Richard Niebuhr has acknowledged a compatibility with 
Maurice. James M. Gustafson in the introduction to Niebuhr’s 
The Responsible Self records that Niebuhr "found Maurice’s 
stance' toward his work to be a congenial one." (London: 
Harper and Row, 1963), p. 14.
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of his Reflections as uniting a "vivid sense of locality" 
with "much higher qualities" to produce a "magnificent epic 
of the French Revolution,"^ 2. be nevertheless considered that 
a great discrepancy existed between Carlyle and himself. In 
recounting an episode when the two men had come into open con­
frontation at a dinner party, Maurice shields Carlyle's iden­
tity by referring to him as "the best growler of the day, " "^2 
Maurice's references to Carlyle taken in toto produce the 
figure of a gloomy genius, one whose significance is chiefly 
negative.
I do not find that Carlyle leads us directly to a 
centre (for human society); but I do find that he 
makes us despair for want of one, and that he ex­
presses the indistinct wailings of men in search 
of it better than all the other writers of our
day,42
And again, twenty years later ;
The infinite wail for a real and not a nominal 
father, for a real and not an imaginary king, 
comes out in Carlyle more than in any man I 
know, . ,44
The problem with Carlyle's politics, as Maurice explains
to Ludlow, is that he starts from the wrong ground. Confronted
by a despotic constitution of arbitrary power, Carlyle intends
to counter it by declaring the popular sovereignty of the people
But the sovereignty of the people, in any sense, 
or form, I not only repudiate as at once the
4^Life , V o l . I, p. 55.
4^Life, Vol., I, p. 346.
4^Life, Vol..I, p, 348.
44Life, Vol. II, p. 405,
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silliest and most blasphemous of all contradic­
tions, but I look upon it as the same contradic­
tion, the same blasphemy in its fullest expan­
sion of which the kings have been guilty.
The context of this statement will reveal that it is 
no more a criticism of democracy than it is of monarchy. It 
is aimed at affirming the office of the king as ordained by 
the grace of God and constitutional government as its natural 
outgrowth. Its target is the idea that either the king or 
the people is sovereign. It is a prefiguring of Brunner's 
declaration that "soverignty belongs to God alone."46 "start­
ing then, from the primary theocratic doctrine," Maurice 
writes, "from the proclamation of Christ the everlasting Word 
as King of Kings and Lord of Lords, I am prepared for judgments 
which shall assert the truth and bring it into Light."
And this theocratic center, as we have,seen, is what 
Maurice most missed in Carlyle. Thus, for Maurice, Carlyle's 
interpretation of the French Revolution, "magnificent epic" 
notwithstanding, was only useful for the wail it raised over 
what it was afraid to mention.
Much more to his liking was what Maurice found in Edmund 
Burke. Unlike the majority of his contemporaries, Burke came 
out in opposition to the French Revolution immediately and 
consistently. Those with capitalist interests at first hailed 
the events in France as sounding the knell over the French
45Life, Vol.- I, p. 485.
46justice and the Social Order, p, 71. 
4'^Lif e , Vpl., I, p. 485.
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commercial empire. Idealists, early on, dreamed of the revo­
lution as the long-awaited cure for the ancient social ills 
of France and ultimately of all Europe. Each was destined 
for disillusionment.
Not so with Burke, whose opposition Maurice felt safe 
in ascribing to principles, perhaps because they were prin­
ciples of which Maurice highly approved. Burke, like Maurice, 
understood the perfection of human life to be contingent upon 
human relationships.
Rousseau typified for Burke the disregard of all revo­
lutionaries for human relationships as he deduced that disre­
gard. Had not Rousseau flaunted his illicit affairs with a 
succession of mistresses? Had he not abandoned his illegiti­
mate progeny as they were born, on the steps of a church? This 
story, horrifying to the ears of much of Britain, has since 
been largely discredited on the earthy skepticism about 
Rousseau's physical capability to father a child. But it 
served Burke as an effective argumentum ad hominem against, 
by implication, all French revolutionaries. He was convinced 
that no human relations were safe from such men. And, for 
Burke, as for Maurice, human perfection depends upon the per­
fection of relationships.
The fear of threatened human relationships permits Burke, 
according to Maurice, to attack the French Revolution on the 
same principles he had used to countenance the American Revo­
lution. Maurice says
. . . anyone who observes that characteristic of his
speeches respecting America which I have dwelt upon--
JLO /
I mean his assertion that there are actual relations 
existing between nations and between all orders in 
a particular nation, and that the whole happiness of 
society depends upon the acknowledgment of these re­
lations and upon the fulfillment of the mutual duties 
which they involve— will not wonder or think him in­
consistent if he complained of a revolution which 
seemed to him to set aside all relations, to reduce 
society into its original elements, and to rebuild 
it upon the assertion of individual rights, not of 
obligations.
We have seen how his high regard for human relations
inevitably loads the structures of society, including the state,
with positive significance for Maurice, The case is the same
for Edmund Burke, whose emphasis in the Reflections is, of
course, upon the structure of the state,
without. . . civil society man could not by any possi­
bility arrive at the perfection of which his nature 
is capable, nor even make a remote and faint ap­
proach to it. He who gave our nature to be perfected 
by our virtue gave also the necessary means of its 
perfection— He willed therefore, the state. , .
The destruction and creation of social structures are 
therefore tasks pregnant with significance. Even as their most 
primary function, social structures exist not so much to pro­
tect a man* s rights as to safeguard his relationships. Instant 
and wholesale innovation Burke felt sure would be most destruc­
tive. Caution was the better counsel, "It is with infinite 
caution," he wrote, "that any man should venture upon pulling 
down an edifice which has answered in any tolerable degree 
for ages the common purposes of society, or on building it
^^The Friendship of Books, p, 329f,
49Reflections on the Revolution in France, Edited by
William Todd. (New York; Rinehart and Co., 1959), p. 119
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again without having model patterns of approved utility before
his e y e s . "50
Instead of wholesale renovation, Burke recommends the
processes of trial and error in the structuring of society.
The politics of reform for him are not idealogical, but wholly
practical. In a "Letter to a noble Lord," he writes,
Reform is not change in the substance or in the 
primary modification of the object, but a dir­
ect application of a remedy to the grievance 
complained of.
Burke's cautionary approach, as Raymond Vfilliams points 
out, does not make reform, even radical reform, impossible. It 
does make it difficult.
But it is not for this that Maurice separates from Burke, 
Rather, Maurice felt that Burke failed to provide any criter­
ion for determining the relative worthiness of any social 
structure to exist. Burke had insisted upon art as man's na­
ture. Society, he held to be "wholly artificial; and made, 
like all other legal fictions, by common agreement."5^ Burke 
had managed to divest his thought of the influence of talk 
regarding the rights of man in the state, of nature. But he 
never quite succeeded in avoiding all the implications of so-
c o
cial contract thinking. And it is for this that Maurice
5QGeorge Rude, Revolutionary Europe (Glasgow: Collins,
1954), p. 182.
^^Cited in Raymond Williams, Culture and Society 1780- 
1950 (Edinburgh: Pelican, 1963), p. 27.
"Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs," cited in Ray­
mond Williams, op. cit., p. 28.
^^Charles Parkin argues that far from rejecting contract 
theory, Burke accepts it as basically correct but in need of
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faults him, Burke's problem is obvious. If, at its founda­
tions, human society is a construction of human artifice, an 
act of human will, what is to hinder that same art or will a 
few generations later from arising to overthrow and supplant 
the inherited society? Upon what ground can its structure 
be legitimated? For this question, so far as Maurice was 
concerned, Burke had no suitable answer.
The trouble is, according to Maurice, Burke does not 
go far enough. "He cannot push his own argument to its con­
sequences ."54 When Maurice wrote that Burke ", , , is the in­
dex to all modern thoughts and speculations on political sub­
jects," he followed with this advice;
. . . never read him or any of the moderns without
keeping your mind steady and hopeful by the study 
of St, Paul’s and St. John’s Epistles and the Apoca­
lypse, There we learn the sure triumph of order, 
unity, and love over confusion, division and hatred,—  
learn to expect that we shall pass through all these 
in their most dreadful manifestations,— learn to 
understand the grounds of our safety and of the 
Church’s safety when all is wreck and ruin.55
It seemed to Maurice that while Burke is eloquent in
has assertion of an ordered world, he is reluctant to identify
the ground of that order beyond human artifice, "Burke died
in the year 1797; he belongs emphatically to the last a g e , "56
interpretation. Thus his uses of "contract" terminology are 
not accidental but critical to Burke’s interests, The Moral 
Basis of Burke's Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni­
versity Press, 1956.)
5*^ Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 593.
Vol. I, pp. 2X1t.
56iphe Friendship of Books, p. 340.
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That is Maurice's way of saying that Burke is a victim of 
purely natural theology, Burke had departed from that 
meaning of the word "revelation" which imports the showing 
forth that which is deepest in the constitution of things "to 
the identification of the revealed with the adventitious."58
This provides for Maurice an explanation of why Burke 
fails to produce a satisfactory substitute for the abstraction 
of a "social contract." It illumines the failure of Burke to 
ever admit an actual dominion of God over Britain. It drives 
Burke to describe the Act of Settlement as a clever religious 
device to bridge an embarassing hiatus, an interpretation which 
prompts Maurice to accuse him of grounding the English consti­
tution upon a fiction. He cannot escape the evil tares among 
the good grain of his own consistency,
Burke was not inconsistent. The germ of all that 
was weak and insincere in him lay in his first 
book. He abandoned neither the good nor the evil 
which discovers itself there. He was stedfast 
throughout in his assertion that men cannot ignore 
their relations to each other, and try to build 
society upon an abstract foundation, without com­
mitting suicide. He was throughout unable to see 
what is the real substitute for abstract notions-- 
what is that absolute foundation which upholds 
relations, and which can preserve them even through 
the tempest of a popular revolution--even when 
priests, philosophers, and mobs, are each in their 
own way destroying them,
In his attempt to render political philosophy morally
^"^Maurice' s own opinion was "I am sure that Nature 
is a teacher, and a great teacher, if so be we have been in 
another school first." Life, Vol. I, p. 2 84.
^^Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 587.
59ibid., p. 594.
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responsible, Burke had succumbed to a Lockian reluctance upon 
nearing the ocean of Being, His determination to observe 
nothing but by induction was, alas, maintained too stringently 
and he found that the firm earth was not firm but rocked and 
reeled. "There must be something above it, or beneath it, or 
around it." What it was Burke never said.
While Burke recognised more than did Carlyle what was 
at stake in the French Revolution in terms of human relations 
and social order, neither was able to declare the ground of 
those relations and the foundations of that order to Maurice's 
satisfaction. Neither one felt as Maurice did, the presence 
of those structures of society rendered necessary by divine 
ordination, and hence neither could declare how one goes about 
living responsibly within it.
It is not surprising, therefore, to find a quite dif­
ferent attitude in Maurice toward revolution than is to be 
found in either Carlyle, or Burke. He is neither so approving 
of revolution as Carlyle, nor so fearful of revolution as Burke. 
This more moderate position can be elucidated by an examina­
tion of the more direct references by Maurice to revolution.
In the Preface to the third edition of the Life, Maurice’s 
son speaks of his father's well-known "dread of social revo- 
lution." And Maurice himself in a letter defending his assoc­
iation with, the Christian Socialists comments, "I had the 
strongest convictions, from my intimate knowledge of them. , ,
SOlbld., p. 595,
61vol, I, p. ix.
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that they abhorred revolutions as much as I did,"52 Neverthe­
less , Maurice's abhorrence of revolution was not unequivocal. 
When he thought of a revolution in the ecclesiastical estab­
lishment, he was quite in favor. "I do not think. , . any man
can prevent an ecclesiastical revolution, or ought to prevent 
it, unless by being the instrument of a religious reformation," 
And to Ludlow, Maurice enlarged upon the value of such a refor­
mation :
The necessity of an English theological reforma­
tion, as the means of averting an English politi­
cal revolution and of bringing what is good in 
foreign revolutions to know itself, has been more 
and more pressing itself upon my mind.54
What Maurice is bold to call "the good in foreign revolutions"
will be dealt with below.
It should be pointed out here, that, at least on one
occasion, Maurice's activities earned for him some small noto­
riety for being himself a revolutionary. Together with some 
works by Kingsley, one government report, and a number of French 
works, Maurice found two of his own contributions to the "Poli­
tics for the People" series included in a list of "Revolution­
ary Literature" drawn up and published by a Mr, J. Wilson Croker 
in the Quarterly Review for September, 1851. This list was fol­
lowed by a vituperative attack aimed at inflaming even the 
weakest establishment sympathy against Maurice and Kingsley 
and charging them with producing and promoting
5^Life, Vol. II, p. 94.
55bife, Vol.. I, p^ 545.
5^Life, Vol. I , p. 459.
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systems the most destructive of the peace, the hap­
piness, and the virtue, of society. , . the wildest
and most anarchical doctrines, , , in which reli­
gion and morality are perverted and scoffed at and 
every rule of conduct which experience has sanc­
tioned, and on which the very existence of society 
depends, openly assailed; while in their place are 
sought to be established doctrines as outrageous 
as the maddest ravings of furious insanity.55
Further on, the same article identifies the "outrag­
eous doctrines" as
. , . not, indeed open, undisguised Jacobinism
and jacquerie but, under the name of Christian 
SocialismI the same doctrines in a form not the 
less dangerous for being less h o n e s t .  6
That these charges, themselves of a raving nature, were 
taken by some with great seriousness may be seen from events 
subsequent to the publication of the article in the Quarterly 
Review. Refutation of Croker's charges might have appeared 
readily to anyone taking time to read "Politics for the 
People." By this time the series had been collected into a 
single volume. Happily for Croker, his article appeared at 
a time when, because of assumptions similar to Croker’s, most 
booksellers steadfastly refused to keep copies. What is more, 
newspapers turned away advertisements proffered by the Christian 
Socialists.
In November of the same year, the storm winds were at 
gale force. Concerned by the controversy aroused by Croker's 
article. Dr. Jelf, Principal of King's College wrote to Maurice 
with the implicit ultimatum that he disavow openly any con­
nection with Kingsley or else relinquish his chair.
55bife, Vol.,II, p. 73.
66ibid,
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As it turned out, Maurice refused to disavow Kingsley
f-
or to resign his chair. But the letter of ultimatum conveys 
the revolutionary impression created by the work in which 
Maurice was engaged. In it, Dr. Jelf felt constrained to draw 
Maurice's attention to his guilt by association. Kingsley 
is accused of using language that is "occasionally almost in­
surrectionary." And by becoming identified with Kingsley in 
the mind of the interested public, Maurice had brought himself 
and King's College to share as links in a chain of infidelity, 
socialism, and communism that thus separates them by only three 
links from the author of The Rights of Man.
It is noteworthy that Maurice's abhorrence of revolution 
was not so strong as to make him disavow either his associations 
or his activities, even when those associations and activities 
earned him a reputation as a revolutionary, albeit undeserved.
Still, this fact alone cannot bear the weight of evi­
dence to suggest that Maurice's abhorrence of revolution was 
not unequivocal. Stronger evidence is forthcoming from the 
interpretation of the significance of revolution which he pro­
jects upon all instances of revolution. There is a consistency 
about this interpretation that marks it out as one of the signal 
positions of Maurice and therefore one that ought not to be 
overlooked.
In brief, his interpretation of the significance of 
revolution is this ; revolution is the manifestation of the
It was two years later that Maurice was discharged, 
and then it was over his understanding of the word "eternal"—  
with reference to punishment in the Theological Essays.
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divine order asserting its reality in order to accomplish the 
destruction of its violations to secure its own reinstatement 
as an objective of the conscience.
The light of this interpretation shows that revolution
may, indeed, have good in it. For confirmation of this good,
Maurice calls to his side the Apostles.
They regarded every judgment upon their own na­
tion or upon any nation in that age, or any age, 
as a manifestation or appearing of Jesus Christ.
They believed Him to be the King of the World; 
they could not doubt that what we describe as 
crises or revolutions in the conditions of so­
ciety were, in very deed, discoveries of His 
purposes, the destruction of something which had 
interfered with them.°^
In the Lectures on the Apocalypse Maurice declares that 
the purpose of the sealed book of the fifth chapter of 
Revelation
, . . is to interpret those puzzling passages in 
human history which exhibit periods of revolution 
and anarchy. It shows them to be the necessary 
results of previous tyranny and defiance of the 
law; it shows that there is a Divine purpose in 
them, and a Divine blessing to come out of them,69
The blessing of which Maurice speaks is self-evident. 
Since the structures of human society must ultimately be 
grounded upon the structures of the divine order, men can only 
count it a blessing when their false and oppressive structures 
are done away— when the firm ground of real society is brought 
to the light of conscience.
One of the Dialogues on Family Worship makes this point
6SThe Epistles of St. John, p. 17 2.
69(London: Macmillan, 1885), p. 138.
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clearly. The discussion, is focused upon the clause from the 
Lord's Prayer, "Give us this day our daily bread." The clergy­
man testifies to his sense of the inequalities of society and 
the attempts to remedy them, including agrarian reform and revo­
lution. In themselves, neither provides the panacea for 
distributive injustice. The clergyman continues:
Yet I see that agrarian experiments and revolution 
for equality must be and will be the effect of this 
state of things; nay that great overthrows of a fic­
titious civilization have been the means by which, 
men have been taught that they cannot make laws 
their own way, that there are laws that bind them 
and to which they must submit,
Because in the final analysis, human society is, not 
secular,revolution cannot be of purely secular interest 
or benefit.
There has never been one that did not try the 
faith and worship of men as well as their pol­
icy and government; there never hqs been one 
which has not proved how inseparably these are 
connected. And I believe there never has been 
one which has not demonstrated the falsehood of 
self-will, or arbitrary will, and the truth that 
all power is centred in Him who gave up all 
power and took on Him the form of a servant,  ^^
Revolution is a terror to rulers because it illuminates
the contingent nature of their sovereignty. According to
Maurice, the Apostle John
speaks of all the terrors which the rulers of the 
earth experience at such seasons as testimonies
70p. 193.
'^On the sense given "secular" by Maurice, see Vidler,
P.P. Maurice and Co., p. 164.
72 Lectures on the Apocalypse, p. 92.
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of their conscience that God and the Lamb are come
forth to judge them as cries of deliverance from
their wrath.
By this comprehension of the significance of revolution, 
Maurice gains the position which is consistent with the rest
of his thought. Revolution is not, of necessity, against
the divine order. It can be aganst the artificial, contrived 
structures. Revolution does not undermine the divine order 
because it cannot. It can only assert it inasmuch as it is 
the manifestation of the divine order asserting itself.
On a negative ground, Maurice wants to insist that re­
volution is impotent to accomplish anything against the di­
vine order of society . Even its role as a direct means of 
changing social conditions is limited and probably nil. He 
cannot accept that, by itself, a period of rebellion is in 
any way adequate to achieve real social change.
Things can only be worsened when the intent of revo­
lution becomes solely the amelioration of oppressive social 
conditions. This is to proceed superficially. It is to fol­
low in the path marked out by Robert Owen and Maurice’s ob~ 
jections to his approach have already been cited. For Maurice, 
the social problem has not to do with rights but with rela­
tions, To raise the level of consciousness of these relations 
is the only valid aim, the only genuine accomplishment of 
revolution.
73Sermons on the Sabbath Day, On the Character of the 
Warrior, and on the Interpretation of History, (London; John 
W, Parker and Son, 1853), p, 121,
1 /»
In other words, revolution is impotent as a direct
social cure-all, the direct function is political, i.e.,
the re-ordering of the state. But when the re-ordering of
the state conforms it more fully to the divine order the
7 4effect upon the conditions of a society is salutary,
In our own time, Hannah Arendt has affirmed Maurice's 
point of view. She too has detailed the function of revo­
lution as freedom more than food,
The revolution, when it turned from the foundation 
of freedom to the liberation of man from suffering, 
broke down the barriers of endurance and liberated, 
as it were the devastating forces of misfortune and 
misery instead, , , No revolution has ever solved
the "social question" and liberated men from want.
Except for the implication that revolution actually 
founds freedom instead of disclosing its permanent founda­
tions, Maurice would agree with this.
For if revolution is really to reform, it must judge
aright the urgency of the deepest demands of human society,
A revolution that does not do this is as successful as an
attempt to clear a muddy windscreen with a dry towel It
only relocates the obscurities, Maurice writes:
It may sound very absurd to say that calculations 
of profit and loss do not affect people who are
74Thus Maurice appreciates politics as bearing di­
rectly upon one's spiritual life. In a letter to Lytton 
Strachey he speaks of politics as "the mighty impulse" to 
which he finally yielded as a deeper service to God, "I 
never was happier than when I discovered that God did not 
design me to overcome it, and that on the contrary my per­
sonal and spiritual life was deeply interested in my 
yielding to it." Life, Vol. I, p. 216.
75On Revolution, p. 10 8.
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poor, and may starye^ as much as appeals to their 
conscience and their sympathy. Young gentlemen 
who know the world are struck at once with the 
folly of such as assertion. But I suspect that 
these young gentlemen fall into the fallacy of 
confounding the stomach with reasonings about the 
stomach, which address themselves not to it, but 
to the brain. The bakers' shops had a voice for 
the hungry crowds who poured out of St. Antoine, 
which might drown discourses about liberty and the 
rights of man. But discourses about liberty and 
the rights of man were more effective upon those 
crowds, than arguments respecting the price of the 
luxuries or even the necessaries of life. In times 
of revolution, as well as in times of quiet, the 
same lesson is forced upon us. Working men--yes, 
even if they are also suffering men--demand that 
you should do homage to something in them which is 
not material, which is not selfish. When they 
claim to be adopted as part of the nation, not be 
regarded as standing outside of it, phantoms of 
pecuniary advantage or pecuniary exemption may 
float before their eyes. You may possibly be able 
to persuade them that those phantoms are all that 
they are pursuing, can pursue, ought to pursue.
But before you bring them to that conviction, you 
will have quite established another in their minds.
You will have left them in no doubt that those are 
the objects you are following after; that you iden­
tify the privilege of belonging to a nation— of 
being a living and governing part of it— with the 
outward good things which it procures for you, A^ id 
they will despise and hate you for that baseness; 
will despise and hate you the more because you 
give them credit for sharing in it,^5
The simple fact that Maurice was not faced with a 
full-scale revolution must bear some of the blame for his 
lack of explicit reference to the topic. He did, however, 
work at a time when revolution was a European experience, 
albeit to a mild degree. The threat of revolution was 
stronger. Hence, it represented a fact from which he could 
not easily turn away,
7 6"The Suffrage, Considered in Reference to the Working 
Class, and to the Professional Class," Macmillan's Magazine, 
Vol. II, No. 8 (June, 1860), p, B9f,
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Here then, are the pertinent references to revolution 
Maurice did make. Set against his convictions of the exist­
ence of a divine order incorporating the family, the state, 
and the universal society, a clear and consistent pattern of 
thought emerges in regard to revolution vis a vis the estab­
lishment.
He did not think of revolution as able to create the 
basis of society. That has been divinely done. But revolu­
tion can protect the basis of society by overthrowing the 
artificial combines of men and exposing the true foundations 
upon which such combines must be built for the good of man­
kind, Thus, in spite of his professed "abhorrence of revo­
lution," Maurice's position will not permit him to rule it 
out altogether. If revolution is aimed at the securing of 
social structures to the divine order, and if there is no less 
radical means for its accomplishment, revolution, according 
to Maurice’s position, must be indicated.
This may be established by the words of Maurice, too. 
When pressed as to where the soldier’s duty lay in time of 
civil war, Maurice, referring to the Neapolitan revolution 
replied;
When the question is presented to the Neapolitan 
soldier, "Is the service of your country the serv­
ice of the man whp upholds this state of things, 
or the service of a man who comes -to protest in 
the name of justice, law, and God, against this 
state of things? "— i can but see one answer,
Once again, therefore, the prospects of Christian
77"]v[ore Political Ethics: The Neapolitan Revolution
and the Fugitive Slave Law," Macmi1Ian’s Magazine, Vol. H I, 
No, 13 (November, 1860), pp, 66f.
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involvement in revolution gives rise to a valid tension. 
Maurice, whose estimation of the establishment was a high 
one, proves that revolution may sometimes be not so much a 
devaluing of the establishment as a revaluing of it. Revo­
lution can be the assertion of order against disorder in the 
interest of the establishment of order where chaos had pre­
viously been enforced. It is, of course, true that there 
may be no prior guarantees that such is the case with a par­
ticular revolution. But what Maurice proves is that such a 
possibility cannot be automatically ruled out.
CHAPTER 8
REVOLUTION AND HUMAN HAPPINESS—
PERSONAL AND COMMUNITY VALUES
The final definitive of revolution according to both 
reason and history is the establishment of an order conducive 
to human happiness. The presence of violence on its own is 
no more characteristic of revolution than is constitution on 
its own. Mass activities of a socio-political nature that 
fail to come to grips with the challenge of constituting the 
new order may be described as insurrectionary or rebellious. 
They may not be called revolutionary,
Heinz Lubasz says
The distinction between revolution and rebellion 
is an important one. The two processes are not 
unrelated, but they differ in crucial respects,
, . , Rebellion turns into revolution when the
demand for particular and limited changes is re­
placed by a demand for general and fundamental 
conditions; and when scattered rebellious ele­
ments join to form a more or less united revolu­
tionary force. . , When the fall of the Bastille
was reported to the royal court at Versailles,
Louis asked the Duke de la Rochefoucauld-Lian- 
court: "Is this a rebellion?" "No, Sire,"
replied the duke, "it is a revolution."^
Hannah Arendt draws a proper distinction between the 
function of rebellion as liberation from the oppression of the
^Heinz Lubasz, "What Is Revolution?" in Revolutions in 
Modern European History (New York: Macmillan, 1966), Cited
in Paynton and Blackey, op. cit., p, 256.
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old order and the function of revolution as the foundation of 
freedom. She adds, significantly, , there is nothing
more futile than rebellion and liberation unless they are fol- 
lowed by the constitution of the newly-won freedom."
Emphasis upon constitution as the final definitive of 
what is revolutionary and what is something else is gaining 
recognition. Alfred Meyer describes revolution as (1) the 
destruction of an older order, C2) a time of chaos, and (3) the 
creation of a new o r d e r ,5 Warren Molton defines it as a con­
dition of radical socio-political change, often with violence 
resulting in a new order and a new hope,^
Whether one ought to participate in any action which 
boasts intentions to constitute a new order is the issue raised 
by revolution vis-a-vis the establishment. Here the question 
is, what sort of order ought to be constituted? If constituting 
is one element in the definition of revolution, then the valid­
ity of any revolution depends upon the kind of order projected 
-to emerge from the turmoil. Since not all constitutions can 
be of equal merit, and since various revolutions may be prose­
cuted with the intent of securing an equal variety of consti­
tutions, each revolutionary movement must be called to account 
for its own particular aim in terms of constitution..
By our definition, the aim of revolution is the securing
^Op. Cit,, p. 141,
^Carl Leiden and Karl M, Schmitt, The Politics of Vio­
lence: Revolution and the Modern World (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice Hall, 1968), p, 6,
4uThe Church as Servant-Critic to Revolution," Part One,
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of human happiness understood in a broad sense. It is inten­
tionally gratuitous. Obviously there would be no revolutionary 
movement ever or anywhere that would admit to a lesser aim, if 
it took itself seriously. Generally speaking, all modern revo­
lutions have aimed at one of two conceptions of the kind of 
society necessary for human happiness. The cause celebre has 
been either the guaranteeing of individual rights, as in the 
revolution of France and America, or else it has been the reno­
vation of society, as in the Communist revolutions. .Jacques 
Maritain observes that the nineteenth century experienced the 
consequences of individualism, while the twentieth century is 
facing the consequences of a socialistic, totalitarian revo­
lution. 5 Unhappily, neither cause has proved itself indistin­
guishable from human happiness. Literature a century old (e.g., 
Charles Dickens’ novels)* abounds with images of a world care­
less of the relevance of social, i.e.', interpersonal relation­
ships. On the other hand, Ayn Rand's novel Anthem, and George 
Orwell's 1984 are chilly with the terror of a socialist con­
stitution absolutely successful. Upon some constitution which 
mediates between these two traditonal aims of revolution, de­
pends the securing bf human happiness.
In other words, worthy revolutionary movements are not 
any longer to be identified by. the traditional appeals to 
either the protection of, individual fights or the vision of 
some placid social sea. Our understanding of the situation 
has changed. And the change is clearly reflected in a
^The Person and the Common Good.(London; Geoffrey 
Bles, 1948) .
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corresponding change in the terms of reference. For the notion 
of the individual, the person has come as an enlargement. Like­
wise the notion of a holistic society has been replaced by the 
demand for community.
What has emerged more clearly through the experience of 
two centuries is the appreciation of the dialectical relation 
which links a man and his society(ies), The only clamor now 
recognized as valid in a revolutionary sense is that which 
calls for an injection of the personal into all aspects of 
human life. Against modern egalitarians with their atomistic 
analyses of society it is imperative to insist that indivi­
dualism will no longer serve. As a corrective, one must 
approve Jacques Maritain's judgment that "the social unit 
is the person" (i.e., the individual, but in the context of 
his societies),5 por the schemes of socialistic zealots one 
must counter with the wisdom of Dietrich Bonhoef f er that
every concept of community is related to a concept 
of the person. The question about what constitutes 
a community can only be answered by asking what con­
stitutes a person.^
To this question, Maurice was deeply engaged in sup­
plying an answer. For this reason his appreciation of the 
person is pursued as relevant to the issue of community as 
it is likely to confront the prospective Christian revolu­
tionary under circumstances now a century more modern.
Maurice's description of the dialectic of man and society
5%bid., p. 34,
^Sanctorum Communie CLondon: Collins, 1963), p. 22,
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is not unpolished. It ought not any. longer to be unrecog­
nizable ,
One would hardly be likely to mistake Maurice for an 
exponent of individualism. His opposition to the Utilitarians 
was early and consistent, His complaints of their reducing 
society to a group of warring atoms are frequent and expli-r 
cit. As we have seen in his evaluation of Burke^ not even 
the individualism of the French revolution meant anything 
better to him than the "dissolution of society into its con­
stituent elements,"
On the other hand, there is hardly an exception to 
an exegesis of Maurice that subjects him to the charge of 
holistic prejudices. In the dying number of The Church 
Quarterly, Hubert Cunliffe-Jones demonstrates with what 
facility Maurice can be. so interpreted. Calling for a 
critical evaluation of The Kingdom of Christ  ^ Cunliffe- 
Jones lists two assumptions wrth which he faults Maurice,
The first is clear^ just^ exasperating and, inciden­
tally, widely recognized and winked at.
On the one hand, he affirms and insists on the 
utter inadequacy- of his own notions and opinions, 
but, on the other hand, also that what he affirms 
to be the very voice in which God speaks to his 
creatures, what he affirms to be a Church, univer­
sal, not built upon human inventions or human fqitlx 
but upon the very nature of God himself, what he 
affirms to be that harmony which God created is 
without question or argument, God's ve.fy voice, 
the sign of God's very nature, and God'-s harmony, 
Maurice's own opinions are quite unimportant ^ but 
what he declares to be God's truth is above the 
clash of opinion and notions; it is very truth 
itself. Now this will not do.8 .........
^"A New Assessment of F.D, Maurice's The Kingdom of 
Christ, Vol. IV, No, 1 (July, 1971), p, 40, ' '
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The second assumption with which Cunliffe-Jones charges
Maurice is the more pertinent one, He admits that it is less
easy to pin down. Nevertheless, he says of Maurice,
His emphasis on the social nature of man, which is 
so valuable in his thinking, has done, away with 
independence, which he regards as something bad.
He does not know how to draw a distinction between 
true independence which is not antagonistic to the 
social group but a source of its vitality, and false 
independence which is a parasite on social life,^
A closer examination of Maurice, however, just will 
not bear the weight of this kind of criticism, The truth 
is that this is just the distinction which Maurice draws 
most carefully.
There is a form of individualism which must not be de-
stroyed--a form of society that must not be tolerated. As
an example, Maurice cites-the early organization of the
Jesuits. Loyola, he contends, understood his task as that
of creating a courageous, if mistaken psychology among his
followers wherein "the individual being slain the society
became all in all."
It was indeed a Society which Ignatius Loyola had 
called into existence. If a Society reaches its 
perfection when the life of the individual is 
crushed it may be called the Society of the Uni­
verse .
Whether Maurice's judgment of the Jesuits is more caricature 
than fact is beside the point here. What matters is that
^Ibid.
^Qsocial Morality, p. 306.
^^Ibid., p. 307.
for Maurice a holism which extingusihed the individual is 
socialism turned sour.
He certain that individuality is easily obscured,
but most often by some form of individualism. Society thus
constituted is lethal to genuinely individual life. This
Maurice felt was the case in his own day. In the interest
of genuine individuality, therefore, Maurice wrote to
R .  C. Trench:
I am more and more convinced that we must not. use 
personal and individual as synonymous words ; but 
in fact we shall have most sense and lively reali­
zation of our distinct personality when we cease 
to be individual and delight to contemplate our­
selves as members of one body in one Head.
His quarrel, then, was not with independence, but with 
solipsism; not with individuality, but with individualism.
If his protest seems at times to be too fervent, one must 
appreciate his concern with the sway exercised by movements 
for individual rights and egalitarianism. Jeremy Bentham, 
Maurice complains, was taken in the most simplistic and 
materialistic manner when he wrote, "It is vain to talk of 
the interest of the community without understanding what is 
the interest of the i n d i v i d u a l ."^5 Added to that, the in­
fluential "charm" of the noble savage of eighteenth-century 
egalitarianism lent a romantic credibility to the whimsical 
notion that man in solitude was somehow man fulfilled.^4
^^Richard Chevenix Trench: Letters and Memorials
(London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, and Co., 1888), Vol. I, p. 190
^^The Conscience, p. 58f,
l^Maurice reacts to this idea in his sermon "Nature and 
Grace," The Church a Family, pp. 18-33.
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Such reductionism was only naturalism, Maurice argued 
that appreciation of the individual could in no real way be 
achieved by depreciating the divinely-ordered relationships 
of society. In their fuller sense neither "social" nor 
"individual" would detract from the other. Upon the appre­
ciation of men as individuals society depends. Upon the ap­
preciation of human society, the esteem of persons depends. 
According to Maurice, the cant of individualism was to blame 
for the devaluing of society and could have no better result 
than a corresponding devaluation of the individual, too. In 
the three letters to William Palmer, this social criticism 
becomes explicit, "I believe," he wrote, , , that indi­
vidual life must perish, if we do not discover the true law 
of social life, and are not ready be it what it may, to 
submit to it,"^5
That his aim was not the destruction of the individual 
but the discovery of the person may be seen in one of 
Maurice's most fervent anti-democratic statements. In 18 60 
he published in Macmillan's Magazine an article entitled 
"The Suffrage Considered in Reference to the Working Class, 
and to the Professional Class." The thesis of this article 
is that suffrage must be extended on the basis of "manhood." 
"To get that— to get all the manhood we can into our con­
stituencies, and into our representatives— this must be
15"Three Letters to the Rev. W. Palmer, on the Name 
'Protestant'-; on the Seemingly Ambiguous Character of the 
English Church; and on the Bishopric at Jerusalem (First 
published by G. Rivington and Co., 1843), p. 13.
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our common o b j e c t . " 1 6  Suffrage based upon property Maurice
objected to. At the same time, he reveals his suspicion that
much of the impetus for a wider suffrage is motivated not out
of respect for manhood but by the slavish desire for property
but now demonstrated by the working class. For democracy
to work, it must be based upon a sense of true individuality.
And true individuality is not a function of property but of
manhood. And that is precisely what is missing from the
popular calls to establish a wider suffrage.
Let there be three 000's following a 1; you call 
that a thousand votes; let there be six 000,000's 
following a 1; you call that a million votes. But 
this is not manhood suffrage. Let 1 be a large 
proprietor, they are his votes. Let 1 be a priest, 
they are his votes. The agitator, perhaps,■ cries,
"Oh no 1 They will be mine." Yes', till the next 
agitator comes. But there will be no manhood in 
any of these cases.
It is pointless to deny that the bias in Maurice is 
generally away from understanding human life in terms of the 
individual and toward understanding human life in terms of 
society. To that extent the criticism of Cunliffe-Jones is 
correct. But that admission must be tempered with an appre­
ciation of the horror with which Maurice regarded the indi­
vidualistic vogue that had turned the industrial revolution 
into a feast of human flesh for the "enlightened self- 
interest" of capitalistic exploitation and threatened to do 
the same for the popular movements emerging almost everywhere 
Furthermore, that admission must be allowed only in the light
^6pp, cit., p. 95.
^^Ibid.
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of the great interest Maurice did take in exposing the 
meaning of what he called manhood. If he was suspicious 
of the individual, of independence, it was because he was 
aware of the facility with which these terms could be twisted 
in the interest of only certain individuals and special li­
berties ,
But his suspicions of false forms did nothing to abate 
his interest to discover true ones, Thus he set about pre­
paring his lectures on the conscience with an epistolary 
confession to Thomas Erskine of Linlathen which explicitly 
unites the significance of both the individual and the 
society, properly understood. "I think," he wrote,
I have dwelt too exclusively on the social aspect 
of truth, I have been so much startled at some 
prevalent denials, especially by Bain, of indi­
vidual responsibilities and freedom, that I have 
gone to that and made it the starting-point of 
my moral instruction. At the same time I know 
you will, more than ever, recognise with me 
the permanence and divinity of all human r e l a t i o n s .
These Lectures on the Conscience, are collected under 
the subtitle Lectures on Casuistry Delivered in the Univer­
sity of Cambridge. They constitute the first of a series of 
courses on moral philosophy. They represent the first class­
room productions for Maurice in his post as Knightbridge Pro­
fessor of Casuistry and Moral Philosophy. And they are 
the most comprehensive expression of his concept of the per­
son— of manhood.
He begins the series with a discussion of methodology.
18Life, Vol. II, p. 563.
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He criticizes the four approaches trudition^lly used for 
the study of moral philosophy. the first two approaches^- 
declaiming on the blessing of virtue and the mischief of 
vice p and comparative studies in raoxai philosophy^-aipe of
I
purely theoretical interest and generally devoid of any 
practical results, Maurice mutters his agreement with 
Macaulay who had said that "the most brilliant writer upon 
them did not deserve half the gratitude from mankind which 
is due to the maker of a substantial pair gf shoes,"19
The third approach, is to treat ethical studies as the 
describing of how things ought to be. However, complains 
Maurice,
If the moral teacher, , . says that his business is
what ought to be, that of other students with what 
is-^can there be a'clearer or fuller confession that 
he means to leave the actual world for some other 
world which he has i m a g i n e d ? 2 0
By this objection Maurice asserts that the prescriptive 
function of ethics is grounded firmly in an a priori, descrip­
tive function. The coinage of the casuist is minted in roal^ 
ity. If it is not, it is counterfeit.
But that is not to make the pursuit of the person a 
positivistic one such as locating an undiscovered planet. 
Collecting "data" in order to secure for casuistry a place 
among the sciences Maurice rejects as the fourth and futile 
approach of traditional ethical methodologies. Positivistic 
ethics presumes that persons will stand treatment as things.
1^The Conscience, p. i,
2QIbid.f p. 2.
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And whatever personhood may be shown to mean ^ it will not 
be that a person is a thing.
What then, one must ask, is to be the method which. 
Maurice chooses for himself and his students? His answer is 
beguiling. There is an objective approach to uncovering the 
meaning of the person through investigating the implications 
in reality expressed by the word "I ,"
Maurice's validation of this method is straightfor­
ward. Although there is no area of study where "I" is not 
presupposed, there is no academic discipline especially de­
voted to its interpretation. In the exact sciences the I is 
recognized to be an intruder. In language and literature, 
sensitivity to the I distinguishes the exalted from the 
drivel, In history the presence of a world of I*’s is per­
plexing for its variety a,s much, as for its uniformity, Yet 
not one of these academic pursuits chooses for its special 
subject what I means.
It is to this question, which is left with such 
testimonies to its significance, as a waif or 
estray, by all those who are not afraid to face 
other questions, that I believe the student of 
Morals must address himself. He ought to ex­
plain why this I is so troublesome to the physical 
student, why it casts its shadow over all his 
enquiries into the order of the outward world.
He ought to show why it has struck, its roots so 
deeply into language. He ought to assist the his­
torian in casting off some of those vague generali­
ties which obscure the facts which he is describing 
and yet offer themselvys to him as such convenient 
modes of accounting for them. I do not think that 
the moralist can advance a step, can make out any 
reason for his existence, unless he girds himself 
to this task. 2-1 .............
2lThe Conscience, p, 6
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This portal Into eth.ical studies, Maurice names 
"the egotistical method," Back and forth through it he 
leads his Cambridge students to pursue the I, Indeed, 
after Maurice*'s first lecture at Cambridge, another Cambridge, 
man was heard to comment, "I am quite sure the undergraduates 
thought they had been listening to a lecture on the e y e , "22
Nevertheless, Maurice used this method to advantage,
So far as the subject/object problem is concerned, the ego­
tistical method was for him a portcullis with equal battle­
ments on either side, The egotistical method posed the 
question in this way: "who am I?" There is no chance that 
any serious challenge can be raised against the objective 
reality expressed by the word I. So the castle of objectiv­
ity is rendered secure, On the other side--the stronghold 
of subjectivity— no one will object to his refusal to pursue 
the meaning of I as if it were a thing, especially when the 
question "who am I" resounds with. such, undeniable subjectiv­
ity.
But the castle is not his pride. It is thrown up to 
defend the unity of the person as both, known and knower. It 
reminds the casuist that personality cannot be extrapolated 
in the general terms of academia, that a moral question re­
quires a moral approach and leads to a moral conclusion.
Thus to regard morality as external and imposed is not to 
storm the castle built around the egotistical method. It
22
Life, Vol. II, p, 633.
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is to ignore it. It is to set students of morals to the in­
vestigation of something other than the person and there­
fore something else than the only question which, according 
to Maurice, moral studies can either legitimately ask or 
answer.
"What do I mean by the word Morals? , , , I understand
by it the manners and habits which belong to us as human
beings," A better word than "morals" however, is "ethics,"
It expresses, I think a little more delicately and 
accurately than the other word that the manners are 
not outside manners, no mere deportment, It answers 
more nearly to what we call character.23
This usage of "character" reappears in Social Morality 
where he defends his interest in the ethos of human rela­
tions. That Greek word implies that morality "consists in 
habits, in a character, not in outward acts, still less in 
formal maxims,"24
This is the moral interest Maurice brings to his 
search for the person in his Lectures on the Conscience, 
Relations and their corresponding character (ethos) con­
stitute his concepton of what is to be studied and impel 
him to plead for "egotism," A true ethos will eyade 
strictly rational procedures. The egotistical approach 
helps to assure the personal involvement of whomever sets 
out to discover the meaning of the person,
It is not surprising, therefore, to discover material
^^The Epistles of St. John, p , 11,
24Social Morality, p. 18.
Din these lectures with, clearly emotional content^ Its effec­
tiveness is documented by the record of an enthusiastic out­
burst that shattered the decorum of the lecture hall on a 
day when Maurice illustrated devotion to duty with a senti­
mental poem. The lecture was on "The Conscience and its 
Masters." A former student in later years recalled that 
lecture.
The strain upon our feeling had been growing., more 
and more tense as verse after verse was read, in 
that voice that was alriQst broken with earnest­
ness, and yet so clear; as the last verses came 
you might have heard here and there, from young men 
not used to the melting mood, distinct sobs of emo­
tion, For my own part I could not pretend that I was 
not really crying, As the last word fell from your 
father's lips [this account is recorded in a let­
ter to Frederick Barton Maurice)., a hush came over 
us ; we alriost seemed to be in the presence of the 
noble dead, A pause of a few seconds, and then, 
all in a body, we leapt up, some even pn the forms
and c h e e r e d , 25
Maurice, far from being disturbed by an outburst so 
patently unobjective, could have felt nothing but satis­
faction, He was convinced that the egotistical approach was 
not less, but more scholarly, Asks Maurice^
Must not the scholar's vocation be to give as many 
as he could the sense of their rights to be men; 
their right not to be lost in a crowd; their right 
to be verily and indeed au I?26
The advantage of the egotistical method is that it
strengthens the appreciation for reality over against the
temptation to specualte and theorize,
It is that each of us may reverence his own life 
and the life of his fellowman above all theories
2^Life, Vol. II, p. 633,
The Conscience, p, 20,
ly /
that any have formed about him or them. It is that 
we may study the problems of life seriously and . 
truthfully, whether wo. cau make out a theory about 
them or n o t . 27
To answer the question "Who am I?" is therefore the 
course upon which Maurice sets himself in order to discover 
the true law of individual life, But, says Maurice, as soon 
as one speaks of himself, another word springs to mind. It 
is the word "ought." ", , ,None of the things I see. or
handle suggest the word; , , , the moment I speak of myself
it starts forth full a r m e d ,  "28 h.ow this close affinity be­
tween I and ought has come to be for every person, Maurice 
is satisfied to leave to more speculative minds. He coun­
sels his students frankly to own it is so with them,
And steadily remember that the I and the ought are 
twin words. Like the Siamese Twins, they are not 
without violence or risk of death to be severed 
from each o t h e r , 2 9
Two other words are also inseparably linked with the 
word I, one of which bears also a distinct relation to the 
word "ought." These words are "consciousness" and "con­
science , "
Take away the I from language, and they must dis­
appear also, There is np demand for them in any 
of the things which I see pr taste or handle. They 
come into existence only because there is an I who 
sees, tastes, handles,
Within the wider term of consciousness the function of 
the conscience is specific. There is, for Maurice, a
2^The Conscience, p , 21.
29 i b i d , , p ,  4 4 ,
29ibid., p. 28.
20lbid.
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distinction to be drawn between the whole of consciousness,, 
and the part of conscience within that whole*
This distinction Maurice announced as accounting for 
the division of the subjects set for him to teach, As 
Knightbridge Professor his courses of lectures were to in»' 
elude casuistry, moral philosophy and moral theology. He 
recognized besides, a responsibility for lectures on "in­
tellectual philosophy" and logic, To all of these, the ego 
is inevitably related. But it is related to each of the 
former three in a different way from either of the latter 
two. That difference he describes with the words conscience 
and consciousness. "As the name, conscience was the watch­
word of the strictly casuistical course [moral philosophy), 
the word consciousness will be the watchword of this (in­
tellectual philosophy)."2^
The specific function of the conscience he. identifies 
in the early part of the Epistles of St. John.
/
When any of us is born into this world, he is sur­
rounded by objects which, he is by degrees to get 
acquainted with through his senses, But he has also 
human relations; a mother at all events, a father; 
perhaps brothers and sisters. He sees their faces, 
he hears their voices, sees the curtains Pf the bed 
and hears the noise in the streets. But his rela­
tion to them must be something different from this.
We are all sure that it is. All the seeing and hear­
ing in the world do not fulfil that relation. We 
speak, of affections. Evidently a man ^ s relation to 
his fellow-men fails utterly, is not fulfilled, un­
less he has these affections, They are as necessary
21"An Inaugural Lecture," delivered in the Senate House, 
Cambridge, on Tuesday, December 4, 1866. (London : Macmillan,
1866), p. 51f.
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to it as seeing and hearing are to his intercourse 
with anything that is not h u m a n .^2
There is a repudiation of Lockian epistemology implicit 
here. Such is to be expected from M a u r i c e . 22 in dealing with 
personal relationships it is even more inevitable,
Consciousness, therefore, means the cognizance of 
relationship. Insofar as a relationship can be described 
as being between oneself and a thing, the act of conscious­
ness is adequate for relation. Sensation is sufficient to 
describe the relation of the person who sees bed curtains or 
hears street sounds to the curtains or sounds per se.
As soon, however, as an interpersonal content consti­
tutes a part of the conscious moment--as soon as social re­
lationships are involved--sheer cognition is no longer ade­
quate to determine the relationship. Affections are re-r 
quired and affections imply considerations of "oughtness,"
The specific function of conscience has to do with this 
oughtness. "I am not sure whether there is a more exact 
description of the Conscience than this, It is that in me 
which says, I ought or I ought n o t , "24
Just how the conscience should be described further, 
Maurice is not prepared to say. That it directs the person 
with the instructions "I ought" or "I ought not" is a fairly 
ordinary description of its operation. Whether it is identi­
fied as a separate faculty or a distinctive exercise of the
22The Epistles of St, John, p. 11,
22see passim Brose, op. cit.
2‘^The Conscience, p. 27.
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reason does not detain his enquiry, The pertinent obser-r 
vation is that, for Maurice, cçnscience is definitive of 
personhood. Whatever else may be said atout conscience can 
be interesting and even useful to a man, "But after all he 
must be reminded that the Conscience in him Is the man In him; 
he cannot divide himself from it, , ,"25
This is the critical point to be made, For the per­
spective attained at the outset of this chapter was that 
the revolutionary achievement of human happiness requires 
an appreciation for the meaning of persons. Community without 
such an appreciation is an impossibility— an artificial 
imposition. Likewise, persons do not exist apart from com-r 
munity, To speak of the person then is to speak of an in­
dividual-social complex.
What has been demonstrated then [and will continue to 
be demonstrated), is that in just this way Maurice recognized 
and valued both the individual and social dimension of per­
sonhood, He recognized that the person consists in both 
individuation and participation. In an age as impoverished 
as our own for both conceptual and terminological tools to 
describe inter-personal relations, we would do well to ap­
preciate this not unfamiliar groping on the part of an 
earlier toiler with the issue, Maurice's vision of the 
person requires a continuous tension between social and in­
dividual elements. To resolve the tension in favor of
35ibld., p, 169,
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either annihilates the person. This is no sçhplactic con- 
conclusionf according to Maurice^ but the embossing of out 
s en sitiy i t ie s with the image of reality itself.
To verbalize this dialectic pf person and coimunity 
Maurice describes the. functioning of the conscience. The 
conscience brings into a critical juxtaposition the indivi­
dual and social dimension of the person and thus becomes the 
impulse pf creation for both, the person and the community.
First, make it clear what you mean by a Person; 
that you will do when you make it clear what you 
mean by a conscience; then treat these persons 
as if they did form real bodies ^ and tell us 
out of history, not out of your own fancy what 
these bodies are, 26
Since we have already stated the importance of the 
conscience as that specific consciousness which deals with
interpersonal relations--that it, the social function of the
conscience— we should also suggest its individuating function 
For Maurice, conscience is also the most authentic expres­
sion of individuality.
The conscience is that which tells each man he is 
a person, making him feel that which he has done, 
in past time to be his own, giving him an awful 
assurance, of identity, responsibility, p e r m a n e n c e , 27
Conscience is individuating also because there is an in-r
wardness about its function which renders it inviolable.
The act of conscience is an act in me. It means 
"I ought or I ought not." I. may pass judgment on
other men's acts ; but that is .another process; I . .
36ibid., p, 174,
3?The Kingdom of Christ, Vol, II, p, 75,
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am abusing terms and what the terms represent if 
I, identify it with Conscience, °
One's conscience may be aroused on behalf of another's 
actions. But one cannot effect any alteration of that action 
without first arousing the other's conscience, And COU’^ 
science will not be coerced, eyen into activity, and still 
be conscience. The very formula^ of conscience testify to 
this inviolability, I ought and I ought not are "a self- 
assertion, a denial of the claim of external powers to rule 
oyer me,"29
There is therefore, as Maurice understands the con- 
science, besides the social focus implied in its relational 
function, a focus too of a radically individual nature implied 
in the particularity of its obligatory function. It is 
emphatically I who ought or ought not, Maurice recognizes 
this double focus as corresponding to the double focus of 
personhood, and early in the lectures on the conscience re­
marks upon the word I, with its property of being demanded 
by a whole, community and yet being only capable of denoting 
a single u n i t , ^9 conscience, therefore, serves Maurice to 
express the social-individual complex that constitutes the 
reality of personhood, It is the enigmatic answer to the 
question, "who am I."
One says "enigmatic" because this does not yet tell
22lhe Conscience, p, 29.
29xbid., p. 48.
^Qlbid., p. 14.
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the. whole story of the conscience as Maurice would hav^ it, 
The sense of ought or ought not remaius to be explained^ By 
what means does this sense arise? That the conscience exer­
cises a legitimate control over one's actions and attitudes 
is not disputed. The Knotty problem is what shall exexr 
cise control over the conscience? Anything so completely 
inviolable poses a constant threat of individual tyranny 
through the ordinary subjective processes of human psyr 
chology,
Philology sheds light on this question. Con as the 
prefix of scientia indicates that the knowledge of con­
science is not taken in isolation. That is, it is knowledge 
with something. The question must arise, what is that 
something?
Alternative answers with currency in Maurice's day 
prepare the way for him to raise this question in the lecture 
on "The Conscience and Its Master." Three courses toward 
answering the question are represented by the names of Joseph 
Butler, Jeremy Bentham and Alex Bain,
From Butler's sermons on human nature, Maurice draws
the conclusion that Butler's 'interest in the conscience
springs from his interest in the natural order.
He seeks to find out what human nature is, not what 
it might be or ought to be. Though a preacher, he 
is anxious to exclude all notions of divinity which 
would interfere with this design. And therefore, 
the office which he assigns to the Conscience is 
primarily that of. warning us that we should not do 
acts which, disturb the harmony of the Nature.—  
what Shakespeare calls "unproportioned acts." 41
‘^^Ibid. , p. 46.
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As we shall see, this tenet, which holds order to be in some
way a determinant for the conscience occurs in Maurice as well
as in Butler. In fact, Maurice in What Is Revelation? avows
indebtedness to Butler at this very point.
. . . What I owe more than anything else to Butler,
and to Butler, so far as I can trace and define 
obligations, more than to almost any other man, is 
the sense of being in such a Constitution,— one 
that I did not create, and have no power to alter, 
but with which I must be in conformity, or suffer
the penalty of being at war with it.42
But he objects to Butler's use of the word "nature" in
regard to the conscience. In the first place, it smacks too
much of naturalism to suit Maurice. A stricture later to
appear against Alex Bain is applicable here, too.
I have contended that the words "I" and "Ought" 
do not belong to the vocabulary of savages as 
they belong to the vocabulary of civilized men.
. . . The distinction of the civilized man from
the savage is, as it seems to me, that he is 
not to the same extent the victim of external 
influences, that he rises above them and tries 
to rule them.43
Here Maurice is maintaining with consistency his convic­
tion that no facts, however natural, are so fundamental to hu­
man existence as is the fact of relationship.
Maurice also objects to Butler's attempt to exclude the
divine from his examination into the conscience.
Butler we have seen, did his utmost to confine 
the Conscience within the limits of human na­
ture. The experiment was an interesting one,
42What Is Revelation? A Series of Sermons on the Epiph- 
any; To Which Are Added Letters to a Student of Theology on 
the Bampton ~Lectures of Mr. Hansel {.London: Macmillan, 1859),
p. 170.
43The Conscience, pp. 56f
most ably conducted. But it involved him in evi­
dent perplexities.44
Butler, according to Maurice, found himself obliged to
invest the idea of human nature with a superhuman significance.
Conscience defined in a collective way as human nature, leads
to the manufacture of an ideal conscience. When it is thus
defined individualistically it makes "every man a judge in
his own case" (Bain's words1— subjectivism. Referring again
to the obvious fact of relationships Maurice says :
My position is that instead of conjuring with "a 
law of nature" which is itself either a theo­
logical or metaphysical phrase— and a very treach­
erous one whichever it is— we may understand from 
an obvious condition of our existence how we are 
led to look beyond ourselves that we may account
for what we are.45
The "obvious condition of our existence" is the con­
dition of relationship, a condition which presupposes a determi­
nation of origins, and hence points truly and directly to God. 
Butler, says Maurice, omits God in the premise and is forced 
to substitute for Him with "human nature" in the conclusions.
Maurice's opposition to Benthamism was one of long-stand­
ing. It first appeared in print in the Metropolitan Quarterly 
Magazine which Maurice co-edited through its three editions 
in 1825-2 6. The article, "A Supplementary Sheet to Bentham's 
Book of Fallacies" was an outright attack on Benthamism. 
Maurice's biographer notes that
It must have been at this time a very great relief 
to him to be able to speak out strongly on a sub­
ject on which his mother and father were fully
44ihe Conscience, p, 63,
45social Morality, p. 92,
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agreed, namely, that .it is well to do right because 
conscience commands it, and not because it answers, 
or because it tends to the greatest happiness of 
the greatest number.46
The rather simplistic criticisms of utilitarian philosophy 
found there were the reflections of a simplistic interpreta­
tion of the same.
Maurice was capable of a more profound critique of 
Bentham as he proves in his lecture on "The Conscience and Its 
Masters". Referring back to the original question of the en­
tire series of lectures on the conscience— i.e., what am I—  
Maurice insists that personal being is prior to considera­
tions of pain and pleasure. Conscience, since it is implied 
in personal being may be cognizant of pain or pleasure. It 
is not mastered by considerations of pain and pleasure. "If 
I were not they would not be. They have no business there­
fore to set themselves above m e . ”47
In a social setting pain and pleasure are not to be
trusted as masters of the conscience. Society negotiated under 
their guidance is the epitome of disorder.
. . . When we speak of persons we cannot forget the
affections which we have for them. How precious 
these are, how closely they are intertwined with 
the roots of our social existence. . . But there 
is a danger of treating those affections as if 
they created the Order which calls for them. If 
we fall into that mistake, the affections will 
become merely a part of our pleasure or pains.
As long as we like a person we shall suppose we
are bound to him; our dislike will dissolve the 
tie. We shall live in a circle of what is called
46Life, W l .  I, p. 66.
4?The Conscience, p.48.
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elective affinities; the grand old name of Rela­
tions will be treated as o b s o l e t e . 48
Conscience, then, when it is held to be subject to the
decrees of pain and pleasure, is not only incompatible with
the notion of personal being, it also makes the appreciation
of community, as anything more than an adventitious imposition,
impossible. Maurice again—
When Mr. Bentham speaks of a Community he says 
that "it is a fictitious body composed of the 
individuals who are considered as constituting 
as it were its members." A man who abhorred 
fictions and figures of speech falls into these 
strange expressions, because he cannot quite divest 
himself of the old belief that a community is a
body, real and not fictitious, consisting of indi­
viduals who are its actual members. There is in 
his phraseology the after-glow of a sun which 
has set.
In Maurice’s estimation, Bentham has achieved no better 
result than the elevation of pain and pleasure "into two super­
human powers, to which man must needs be in subjection." As in 
Butler, these powers were in turn subjected to nature. How­
ever, the nature to which pleasure and pain "do homage" is not
human nature as in.Butler, but some nature more mystical yet-- 
"A very awful, mysterious, 'unproducible' d e i t y .
Alex Bain, who was to become professor of logic and, 
later, the rector of the University of Aberdeen, had startled 
Maurice with what Maurice took to be "denials. , . of individual
responsibilities and f r e e d o m . "21 What Bentham had taught was
48The Conscience, p. 49. 
49ibid., p. 62.
2Qlbid., p. 63.
21bife, Vol. II, p. 563.
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pushed nearer its logical limits by Bain, according to Maurice 
An unusually lengthy excerpt from Bain's work Emotion and Will 
constitutes a part of the lecture on "The Conscience and Its 
Masters." A critical exegesis of the passage follows. In it 
Maurice condemns Bain with his own words showing how pain and 
pleasure as governing principles are reduced by Bain to punish­
ment and its avoidance.
Bentham, Maurice says, may be confused by the contra­
diction between the claims of individuals and the claims of 
society as it is constituted. But Bentham, at least, achieves 
something of a safeguard for the claims of individuals. In­
deed, according to Maurice, Bentham "puts those claims higher 
than anyone who recognises a conscience would dare to put 
them."22
Not so with Bain:
Mr, Bain is free from any such perplexity. The 
work of the community is deliberately to coerce 
the individual by punishment (which Mr. Bain 
identifies with authority), till in the matur­
ity of a well-disposed mind he enters into the 
company of the majority. Mr. Bain has there­
fore not the slightest objection to a Conscience.
So far from disliking it, he values the Consci­
ence as that in each man which leads him to trem­
ble at the decrees of a majority. It has nothing 
to do indeed with "the primitive cast of our 
mental constitution." But by cultivating "a 
strong ideal avoidance" "of the pains imposed by 
the persons about us, not unaccompanied perhaps 
with the perturbation of fear," the "newly in­
troduced member of society is indoctrinated with 
the sentiment of the forbidden." And thus hav­
ing his own Conscience properly corrected and 
shaped under this discipline, "he joins with 
the other members of the community in imposing
22The Conscience, p. 56.
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and enforcing the prohibitions that have been 
stamped and branded in his own e d u c a t i o n . " 53
The result of Bain's defense of conscience is the loss 
of both realities, community and individual. "Whether the Com­
munity be fictitious or real signifies little to him. It serves 
equally, in either character to extinguish the i n d i v i d u a l . " 54 
What emerges instead of either is something called Society. The 
effect of Bain's idea of conscience is to reduce it to little 
more than the reflection of majority opinion. But majority 
opinion may raise qualms of conscience in opposition;
I say there are moments when such qualms come over 
every one; and further that those individual men 
in whom they become most strong are not those who 
find their luxury in arrogant independence, but 
are those who have the liveliest sense of their 
obligations to their fellowman, the greatest de­
sire that the laws of the Nation to which they 
belong may not be violated, but m a i n t a i n e d . 25
Like Butler, and Bentham before him, Bain with his 
notion of "Society" is brought to an admission of some abstract 
reality upon which to base his notion of conscience. "There­
fore," says Maurice, "we should face .the question whether the 
Conscience bears witness of any,actual living superhuman power 
to which it owes homage."25 Having completed his critique of 
these three, Maurice concludes
Such opinions, which are specially the opinions of 
our day, leave one who is discussing the question 
of Conscience no choice. He is hemmed in by
22ibid.
^4%bid., p. 62.
22ibid., pp. 75f.
56Ibid., p . 63 .
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superhuman influences of some kind. If those which 
great philosophers bid us tremble at appear to him 
of a very oppressive kind, ministering to weakness, 
to superstitution, to slavery, he must ask if there 
is no other which may be stronger than these, which 
may be a deliverer from them. " •
The superhuman is not banished, as we have seen, 
from the speculations of"its most approved sages; 
it is certainly not banished from the entertain­
ments of its most refined and- most skeptical 
triflers. That which, is not allowed a. place in 
our inmost conviction will float about us in fan­
tastic shapes, which we dare not ask whether they 
bring with them airs from Heaven or blasts from 
Hell. The Conscience will make cowards of us all, 
if it does not lead us to the source of c o u r a g e . 2 7
What source, then, does Maurice propose to provide in­
formation for the conscience? There is, of course, the possi­
bility of two rather mundane sources for the conscience. One 
is the notion that the conscience is informed in automaton 
fashion by rules. This idea is presuppositional for the work 
of the strict casuist. Yet Maurice confesses of rules to set- 
tie cases of conscience that "none such ever have been found, 
or will be f o u n d , C a s e s  of conscience arise out of rela­
tionships. It is possible to "plead a, law to hide a crime." 
Thus, "the relations must be closer to the man than the rules 
can ever be; if he makes them dependent upon rules he renounces, 
them."29
The other possibility is that in some way, the conscience 
itself is its own source of information. In other words, one 
simply denies any significance to the con-prefix. Supremacy
^^Ibid. , pp. 63f.- 
28ibid., p. 90. 
29ibid., p. 99.
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in that case belongs to the conscience. But Maurice insists 
that the function o f .conscience is not the assertion of its 
own right— its own supremacy. "The Conscience is that in a 
man which points to what is above him, which'declares the 
supremacy of a right that he did not mould and cannot al­
ter. The implication of this understanding of conscience
is clear; "the Conscience in itself has no authority; its 
authority begins when it goes out of itself, its. supremacy 
consists in its abdication of supremacy." "A .Conscience," 
writes Maurice, in .The Commandments, ' "which does not own a 
ruler and a Judge has lost its meaning and d e f i n i t i o n 52
Three other, more sophisticated sources are suggested 
by his work. But in the end only one of these will do for 
him.
The first source is the relation itself. As was 
seen earlier, the singular function of the conscience is the 
cognizance of a personal element in the context of conscious 
relation. The question "What am I?" is answered by describ­
ing what one is in his social conbexts. "I am certainly a 
son, I æn a brother, I m  a citizen. Perhaps I am a hus­
band, perhaps I am a father." The protest of conscience is 
against acts which violate these relationships and others 
to which conscience bears its witness.
2Qlbid., p. 138.
5^Ibid.
52pp, cit., p. 11.
52The Conscience, p. 47,
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But from where, one must insist, does the conscience 
draw its sense of an order violated? The conscience may be 
sensitive to the bare fact of relationships without any ap­
preciation of the content of that relationship. Because the 
residents of Mizituni in Chile are human beings, I can 
recognise with all conscience that I stand with them in a 
personal context. But conscience does not tell me what con­
tent ought to fulfil that relationship. Whether they need 
shoes or missionaries or privacy from invading American 
tourists, conscience has no means of informing me. Remote­
ness, doubtless, bears much of the responsibility for my 
ignorance. But when a few years ago, I paid a hasty visit 
to the settlement, high on the altiplano, proximity in no 
way enlightened my conscience, I was aware more distinctly 
that I was related as a human being to them and they to me, 
But how that relationship would best be fulfilled I left, as 
I had come, still not knowing.
For the content of human relations, the conscience is 
not altogether self-sufficient. We are driven back upon the 
con-prefix. With the aid of what or whom is my conscience 
more fully informed and activated?
A second source, Maurice suggests, might be found in 
the collective judgment of conscientious men. Although he 
speaks of a nation’s conscience, the conscience of a people, 
etc., the notion of a collective conscience is for him no 
more than a rhetorical device. Even so, he does not
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hesitate to emphasize the importance of collective judgment 
in the case of d u t y , 54
In the Macmillan's Magazine article, "The Neopolitan 
Revolution and the Fugitive Slave Law," the issue enjoys ■ 
some prominence. Having, in the previous number of the 
magazine commented on Froude's History, Volumes V and VI, 
Maurice felt constrained in this latest article to buttress 
his previous attempt at vindicating what he had perceived 
to be the spirit of Froude's work and to free it from pos­
sible misconstructions. In particular, he was concerned 
with the determination of duty.
The question was how to determine where a soldier's 
duty lay in time of civil war, Maurice felt of Froude's 
work that by too hastily adopting a prevalent confusion be­
tween the claims of conscience and the claims of private 
judgment, the writer had suggested the thought that the 
duties of a citizen, and especially of a soldier, must be 
tried by a different law from that which we apply to the 
highest questions of all.
In the case of the English Civil War, Parliament came 
at last to invoke the name of the King against the King for 
doubts about legitimate authority abounded. But, says Maurice,
That question wa,s not settled by private judgments,
A conscience of law', of its unutterable sacredness, 
of the obligation which it imposes--a conscience 
rising out of that of an actual personal Lawgiver 
and King to whom all rulers must bow— gives that 
period its unspeakable interest for all generations 
of Englishmen, When that conscience gave place,
54consider Maurice's own willingness to submit to the 
Christian Socialists' desire to publish a newspaper because 
of the unity of the others on the matter.
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after the deposition of Richard,-to an anarchy of 
private judgments, the interest ceases. . .55
Although Maurice is at pains to distinguish the 
issues in the English Civil War from those of the Nea­
politan revolution he finds the blurring of private judg­
ment with the claims of conscience just as threatening.
His response is emphatic.
It is the conscience of the people and of each 
man that has decided in favour of Garibaldi -
and against the King. All evidence appears to 
show that if the patriot leader forgets that 
fact,— if he suffers private judgment about 
forms of government to interfere with the ver­
dict of that conscience,— if he is not pre­
pared to sacrifice his own private judgment—  
the great cause for which he has fought and 
suffered so magnificently may be utterly marred.
Modern revolutions, then, like those of other
days, bear witness to the permanence of that
distinction which we in our ease and careless­
ness are continually tempted to o b l i t e r a t e . ^5
Thus he emphasizes the relevance of the collective 
judgments of conscientious men. When weighed against 
a private judgment this concurrence of consciences must 
count for a great deal.
But one must notice also, the concurrence of conscience 
is not, as it were, automatic. Maurice is insisting not 
upon some collective conscience. He is saying that the in­
formation of the conscience is communicable in a public way.
But it is not communicable directly from conscience to 
conscience. As the center of individuality the conscience
55pp. cit., p. 66. 
G G i b i d . , p .  5 7 .  ,
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is inviolable. One is forced back upon trying to rouse the 
conscience of another. But one cannot coerce it into activ­
ity . Concurrence of conscience is always coincidental,
Thus again, the information of the conscience is left 
to another source. Its barriers are moral ones, impregnable 
even to the information of another's conscience. For Maurice, 
in spite of his words about "public c o n s c i e n c e ,"57 and other 
similar expressions, there can be no such entity as a col­
lective conscience. For example, in his defense of a national 
conscience in Lectures on the Conscience he makes it clear 
that the whole idea depends upon the protection of the pre^ 
mise that "the nation is composed of I ' s . "58 The validity 
of the uniform judgment of a number of consciences is not 
in the number involved nor even so much in the unanimity of 
their judgment. Rather it is to be credited to the source 
of their information.
Since, therefore, the conscience is not informed by 
the mere relationship itself, and since the "collective 
conscience" of men is a mathematical rather than a moral 
value, the real source of the conscientious information 
must be something else, That "something" else is God,
He is the third- and acceptable informer of the conscience 
for Maurice,
Thus Maurice attributes to conscience a function 
beyond the bare recognition of personal relationships.
^^The Conscience, p . 5 9,
58ibid., p. 40.
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Now he tells us that its fuller function implies the re­
ception of revelation. Conscience^ according to Maurice, 
is the mediator between those relations in which one 
stands, and by which both the individual and the society 
are constituted, and the purpose and order to which those 
relations are intended to conform. In the Doctrine of 
Sacrifice Maurice writes;
The Conscience is that thing which is set in con­
trast with the flesh. This is that in man which 
is related to heaven, to the invisible, to God 
the Judge of all; as' the hands and feet are re­
lated to the earth on which we t r e a d , 5 9
Referring to the words of John, "God is greater
than our hearts and knoweth. all things," Maurice stresses
the meaning of conscience thus conceived.
He knows-what has set me wrong, as I do not know 
it* He can set me right, though I cannot set 
myself right. This is the comfort of not merely 
believing in a conscience, but in a God who speaks 
through my conscience ; this is the comfort of not 
thinking that ^  is my lawgiver, but that He is 
my lawgiver, , ,70
. This, according to Maurice, is the belief and com­
fort without which human life is depreciated. It is a 
confession of the deepest personal need toward which the 
human heart in all of its gropings is guesting,
We have not recognised the cry for liberty of con­
science as a genuine divine cry; as a cry to Him 
who has inspired it; as the cry of a spirit which 
feels that it cannot be tied and bound by rules 
which we have imposed upon it; and that it has
59Op. cit., p. 168.
7PThe Epistles of St, John, p, 212,
217
'an unseen Ruler whom it must feel after till it 
finds Him. *71
With the concept of the conscience free before God, 
Maurice describes the quality of life essential to human 
happiness. The conscience is not free in an absolute sense. 
But it is free as it responds to the urgings of its true 
Master. Only^when this is the case is true manhood pos­
sible and, alongside, true community.
Maurice*s thought, therefore, aligns with the modern 
revolutionary objective of freedom. His divergence from 
it arises from the point of asserting the substance of 
freedom. Political liberty was the primary characteristic 
of revolutionary freedom associated with the French revolu­
tion. Its meaning was individual liberty or self-determi­
nation in the political -sphere. Marx convinced the revolu­
tionary mind that individual liberty was a political mirage 
on a desert of whole societies oppressed through the manip- ' 
ulations of economic exploitation. The proper revolutionary 
task was social liberation. Social self-determination in 
the economic sphere would be the meaning of freedom.
The realization of both of these aims has at some time 
been declared keys to unlock the vaults wherein are hidden 
the precious treasures of person and community. Their prom­
ise is appealing. Their'objectives are noble and right.
But Maurice would not be convinced by either. Freedom 
is freedom of conscience. That the person is politically
^^Conflict of Good and Evil, p. 47
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self-determining does not necessarily mean that he enjoys a 
free conscience. Such freedom may be purchased with money 
or force of arms. Nor must one necessarily wait for oppres­
sive economic and social systems to be removed before one 
can be free. The very challenge to such systems may well 
constitute the substantial freedom that one could reasonably 
expect even if there were no such systems to challenge.
The willingness of the person to bear witness to the 
divine order is the evidence and presence of freedom. In 
bearing that witness, true community is revealed and the 
witnesser manifests his own personhood. For Maurice, 
therefore, the categories of person and community super­
cede, but do not deny, the relevance of materialistic con­
siderations for legitimating the revolution. They do affirm 
that freedom is a more truly revolutionary objective than 
food.
But, as with the issues raised in the previous two 
chapters, they do not easily solve the dilemma of participa­
tion in revolution for the Christian. Whether the objective 
of freedom, as Maurice understands it, is better served by 
joining, the revolution or opposing it is a question set to 
prove every other thing that one affirms about the, con­
science and therefore, about the meaning of persons and their
communities. Prospects of violence and of the subversion of 
an establishment certainly must be added to the scales of 
one's decision. But without the pursuit of the happiness
of persons in communities in the other pan, there would
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be nothing for them to weigh against. Involvement in vio­
lence, the disordering of a settled society, become irrele­
vant at best and positively iniquitous at worst.
Whether, in the end, the Christian casts his lot with 
the revolution or against it, must be determined therefore, 
in the humanizing arena of context arid conscience. Context 
is demanded because the conscience that is free to obey 
God is free both of the security and the bondage of rules. 
Such prescriptive casuistry.Maurice terms "quackery."72
Whatever the Christian decides, he will betray himself 
and the best of his cause if he ever repudiates as sacred to 
God and man, the inviolability of the processes of the con­
science. By it, he has arrived at his decision and through 
the exercise of it he has proved the meaning and dignity of 
being truly a person.
"^^The Conscience, p. 168.
CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION—
CONFLICT, CONTEXT, AND CONSCIENCE
The ordering of the last three chapters has been practi­
cal and psychological in the sense that one would likely en­
counter the issues dealt with in the order they have appeared. 
The most obvious problem is the issue of violence. The next 
is the question of law and order. Finally come the more so­
phisticated questions of personal and community values. This 
is the reverse of the logical order. The ultimate consider­
ation has to do with persons and communities. Violence and 
order are important as they effect the lives of persons and 
the fortunes of their communities.
What we have discovered in dealing with each of the 
issues is the tension imbedded in the deceptively simple com­
mand of Jesus to "render to Caes^ur the things that are, Caeso^r's 
and to God the things that are God's" (Mark 12;17). The prob­
lem is with Caesar who is representative of all of man's comm­
unities. Inasmuch as communities are essential to the develop­
ment of persons, Caesar is essential. If Caesar is essential, 
then he is bound up in what God has created and called "man." 
And thus to render to Caesar is apparently to render to God, 
and to render to God demands that one render to Caesar.
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And yet the sad experience of mankind is that Caesars 
are sometimes treacherous. Persons are made the victims of 
their communities. And communities are exploited to the de­
struction of persons. Then one senses that he can in no wise 
render to God while doing obeisance to such a Caesar. The 
potential of revolution to install a new Caesar (perhaps 
named Julius, or Charles I, or "the sovereignty of the people," 
or "all power to the workers") rises like the sun. And the 
Christian, desiring to render to Caesar is faced with a 
dilemma. He finds two Caesars, a community that is, and a 
community that might be. To which Caesar is he bound to 
render?
When comes the cry to arms he is torn still more. For 
he remembers that the Lord has said "all who take the sword 
will perish by the sword" (Matt. 26:52). But he also remem­
bers that the blessing is pronounced not upon the peace-lover 
but upon the peacemaker. And if the Christ can so divide 
men that one's enemies become even those of his own household, 
how can one escape the plain truth that Christ's coming has 
brought a sword to the earth (Matt. 10:34)? How can the peace­
maker avoid the clash of strife and the din of battle? Then 
he would become one of those who " . . .  have healed the wound 
of my people lightly saying, 'Peace, peace,' when there is no 
peace." (Jer. 8:11)
The tension in the command to render to Caesar what is 
his is the tension of human responsibility. The instant desire 
is for a sure word of prophecy, for some "authoritative
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theological literature." The concordance should show the 
resolution. Look under V.for "violence," or E for "establish­
ment," or even R for "revolution." But the Bible is not a 
political pharmacopeia. There is no prescription. There is, 
however, a demand for responsible thought and action.
And responsible it must be, for the case is that both 
the Caesar of the establishment and the Caesar of the revolu­
tion can be demonic. Each can b e ’a beast bearing wounds but 
boasting of resurrection. The problem for the Christian con­
science is to avoid the demonic, and still render to Caesar 
as if rendering to God. Just how the two caesars can be de­
monic is never more clear than in the account of the tempta­
tion of Jesus in the wilderness.
The real issue thrust upon Jesus by the tempter is the 
manner in which the kingdom of God is to be revealed. Food 
for the famished recluse and fulfillment of the messianic 
expectation of an earlier divine are only the symbols. They 
are the bread and wine. The substance is the real presence 
of the Christ, and in him, the Kingdom of God. Shall the king­
dom make its way along a social shortcut? Bread for the am ha 
eretz— would that not set in motion forces that could overthrow 
in a moment an oppressive system, that, in fact, is still not 
absent among men? Messianic charisma— give the people heart 
and hope. Boldly challenge to the point of personal dangers 
and thus expose the weakness- of the society that is, and the 
potency of the society that you are to bring. Cast yourself 
down from pinnacles.
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These are calls to revolution. They were demonic 
in the wilderness of temptation. They are still demonic.
The third temptation is the wooing voice of the demo­
nic establishment. The deceitful folly of the third tempta­
tion is that the tempter assumés the capacity to dispose of 
the kingdoms of the world. They should-, in exchange for a 
simple act of worship, become nominally, the kingdom of 
Christ. B at there axe no true kingdoms among men that are 
not received from the hand of God. No society that we can 
create is so important as the society which is given. Men 
relate to each other in true communities only by the grace 
of God.^
Just so, the establishment asserts the prerogatives 
attached to the originating and mediating community among 
men. It assumes to itself the power to dispense "com­
munity" among its devotees and artfully commands men, in 
the name of the establishment, to love one another in the 
vain hope that the precept will pass for the practice.
This is demonic.
The sickness of modern theology as it attempts to 
prove its relevance to revolution is a demonic sickness.
To opt for the establishment on the grounds that the 
Christian ought not to have to do with revolution with 
its disorder; or for the the revolution on the grounds 
that what is to come, and it is the. end of oppression,
^See D. Bonhoeffer’s discussion of "immediacy" in The 
Cost of Discipleship. It is both eloquent and accurate.
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is a facile solution and irresponsible. Such à decision is 
bound to be driven more by the demonic solicitation to es­
cape the ambiguity of human existence than by the desire 
to let what really is, be.
That is to say that such a decision incapacitates the 
Christian for living responsibly in the present.2 The temp­
tation to the church of the revolutionary movement is to 
discount the present in favor of some amorphous future 
reality— some set of ideal conditions inevitably wound in the 
threads of future history. To transmogrify, for example, 
the rule of the proletariat into the concrete expression 
of the Kingdom of God might not be an inconceivable task.
And'if the backlog of chiliastic fervor within the church 
could be set to serve such a concrete expression of the 
Kingdom of God, the task might be soon finished, and the 
Kingdom, thus perceived, fully realized. Thus the church 
is drawn to a present radicalism, whether responsible or 
not. It is the price of reality yet to come.
On the other hand the church is drawn through uncriti­
cal loyalty to the establishment to a position of conserv­
ative quietism. She is led to believe that while the present 
conditon of man is hampered by immediate circumstances, in 
fact, the foundations for realizing the best interests of
^Pascal lamented, "We do not rest satisfied with the 
present. We anticipate the future as too slow in coming, as 
if in order to hasten its course; or we recall the past, to 
stop its too rapid flight. So imprudent are we that we wan­
der in times which are not ours, and do not think of the only 
one which belongs to us." Cited in Jurgen Moltmann, Theology 
of Hope, Translated by James W. Leitch. (Edinburgh: SCM Press, 
1967), p. 26f.
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man have already been laid. They are clearly visible in the 
political and economic assumptions of the establishment it^ 
self. The task for the church is to encourage her members 
to build upon those foundations. Thus the church is lulled 
to sleep with the melodic myths of the world's political and 
economic superstructures. The present is forfeit to the past
In each of these temptations the church is called to 
focus her vison anew. The revolution bids her hail the 
furture. The establishment enjoins her veneration for some 
bygone, mythical past.
The commission of the church, however, is plain. She 
is called to bear witness neither to the peace of Eden nor 
to the triumphant glory of the millenium. She is, as Maurice 
so enthusiastically reminds us in virtually every one of his 
books and sermons, commissioned to bear witness to the 
presence of the Kingdom of God in the world and in the lives 
of persons. She is committed to witness to this order and 
promote its establishiaent everywhere. Her proclamation to 
the world is that it belongs to God now. His is its past 
and its future, its origins and destinies. - Thus, the world, 
as it is, is also his. And He is lovingly manifesting his 
claims to it through the worship of persons in their families, 
nations and in their transcendent brotherhoods under his 
own fatherhood.
But this is not yet the place to stop. The purpose of 
this paper is not simply to reassert the truism that Caesar 
can be demonic whether he embodies the establishment or the
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revolution. Except for the most fervent zealot, that goes 
without saying. Our task is more difficult and more impor­
tant. We must attempt a theology of revolution. That is to 
say that we must move about.without the emotive language of 
either side to drive us. And we must discover and elucidate 
the correspondence in principle of Christian theology to is­
sues raised by revolution. For the fact is, whatever the 
demonic potential of the establishment or the revolution, 
Christian theology has a positive interest in each. To ex­
press that positive interest is to utter a theology of revolu­
tion and to bring this thesis to a conclusion, and the writing 
to an end. With the examination of Maurice’s social theology 
such a conclusion is now possible. , .
The fundamental categories for considering revolution­
ary issues are state, or order, as in chapter seven, and dyna­
mic, or change, as in chapter six. Generally one thinks of the 
establishment as concerned primarily with state, and the revo­
lution with dynamism or change. Obviously a clear dichotomy 
is unrealistic and misleading. A major concern of the estab­
lishment is proportioned change. ‘None could survive without 
it. Likewise, the true revolution dreams of and drives for a 
state wherein men are happy because they are fulfilled. Never­
theless , the revolutionary dispute inevitably centers around 
what state is desirable and what dynamic process is required 
to achieve it.
With the correlative terms of order and sacrifice, Maurice 
has provided the Christian with a conceptual framework for
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dealing with the categories of state and dynamic. These 
are concepts integral to Christian theology that correspond 
to revolutionary contentions.
Maurice's doctrine of the divine order wrestles with 
the issue of state. It is sometimes regarded with the curios­
ity of the theological antiquary as a relic of quainter times. 
This is inappropriate because it is inaccurate. Such in inter­
pretation can be arrived at only by.mingling Maurice's per­
sonal prejudices with the explicit statements of his doctrine 
of the divine order. The result is an injustice to him and 
a loss to our own social theology. For examplebecause Maurice 
speaks of an order, and because he defends the place of the 
English aristocracy from time to time in his writings, one 
can casually assume that order, as Maurice uses it, implies 
a hierarchically-structured society, a most regressive idea 
indeed 1 Such an assumption we have shown to be false. He 
does not speak of hierarchies within the divine order. To 
account for his sympathy for.the aristocracy, or his defense 
of monarchy, or his understanding that kings reign by the grace 
of God, one will find no help in the explicit doctrine of the 
divine order. In the subcategory of government, under the head­
ing of "the nation," one can begin to account for these. They 
are of concern to Maurice not because they are given by God as 
is the nation. They are of interest to him because as an English­
man, these are the givens of his governmental structure. While 
he bends every effort to show the good uses to which these con­
siderations of class can be put, he is careful not to prescribe.
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these as the essential ingredients of every other government, 
and thus of every other nation. The point is that the•category 
of nation is a given in the.divine order. Subcategories of 
government, language, law, defense, and worship are inevitable 
national identifiers, but they are not given in the same sense 
as the nation, inasmuch as the forms these take can and should 
vary to express the distinctive qualities of the life of each 
nation. Thus, Maurice can defend the existence of an aristoc­
racy in England,, or the democratic government of the United 
States. These are idiosyncratic. He can appreciate them gen­
uinely because his fundamental appreciation is of the nation, 
and the nation is characterized by distinctiveness.
So it is with each of the elements of the divine order.
The family described by Maurice is clearly the Victorian fam­
ily. But he had first-hand experience of the divided family, 
and writes of familial relations with insight and tenderness 
that can still breathe a. flame' out of the embers of family 
ideals. Dominion and subjection would have served many a 
Victorian father to describe the relation of father and son.
But Maurice rejects that for an ethos of authority and obedience 
And one suspects that real fathers and sons in every age will 
understand why.
Again, with the concept of the universal society, Maurice 
is careful to limit his prescriptive prejudices. He could not 
see how the catholic or universal principle would escape an im­
perial spirit without the operation of the protestant principle 
of individual and national distinctiveness.
In every expression of the doctrine of the divine order, 
Maurice is affirming a most cordial pluralism. He asserts only 
that the family, the nation, and the universal society are the 
givens of,man's true social order.
Of particular interest to revolutionary issues is the 
place of the nation. The governmental function of the nation 
has sometimes been regarded in theology as a gracious expedient 
for keeping the depravity of man in check. This is emphati­
cally not Maurice's view of the nation, including its government 
The nation, with each of its identifiers(law, language, govern­
ment, war, and worship) is ordained of God not to keep sin in 
check, but as a part of the kingdom,of God wherein righteousness 
can abound. The nation is a social dimension required for the 
process of bringing men to live together within the kingdom of 
God. One cannot, therefore, opt out of the revolutionary fer­
ment by abandoning all politics in exchange for a pious inter­
est in the kingdom of God. The two are not distinguishable.
There is nothing archaic or irrelevant in this doctrine 
of divine order. If anything is true about interest in the 
essential place of the family, the nation, or the universal 
society, it is that it is on the upswing. We are certainly mem­
bers of families. And although libertarians complain that for 
6,000 years man has been demonstrating that he cannot live with 
the state, upon the same evidence one could adduce that men can­
not live without it. Third world nationalism is rife and re­
calls the modern history of Western nations. We are members 
of nations. And to the fact that we are members of a universal
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society, man needs no more distinguished witness than the con­
science. Furthermore, both the pluralism and the positive 
role that Maurice anticipates-from the nation are in greater 
demand than ever as our global community shrinks its peri­
meters. Here then is a serviceable starting point for re­
lating the Christian faith to the issue of state or order 
raised in a revolution.
But as Maurice describes the divine order he also 
describes its distortion. The family, the nation and the 
universal society are each subject to the imperialistic 
temptation, to a will to dominate others for their own pur­
poses, One cannot deny another's distinctiveness without 
denying the same opportunity to himself. And therein lies 
the destruction of society for it is the erosion of the 
divine order. The imperial spirit is demonic.
The questions that follow then, are these. What are 
the forces at work for the protection of the family, the dis­
tinctiveness of nations, the sense of a universal bond among 
men? What are the forces undermining such protection? What 
does one do to serve the cause of the divine order? How 
does one identify its foes and oppose them effectively? These 
questions inquire after the dynamic of society. They express 
the need for an effective force, i.e., a force capable of 
effecting conformity with the divine order.
The call to violence in the name of order is common to 
both revolution and establishment. So the Christian cannot 
avoid involvement in violence simply by opting for one or
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the other (usually for the "order" of the establishment 
over against the "violent" revolution). Even a commitment 
to non-violent tactics, so-called, can hardly be guaranteed 
to issue in an absolute exemption from involvement in vio­
lence in a revolutionary setting. The choice open to the 
Christian confronting revolution is not a choice of violence 
or; no violence. It is the choice to attempt to think and act 
responsibly in situations replete with the potential of 
violence.
The major concern is that living by the sword yields 
dying by the sword. Violence is a prolific fountain filling 
beds of myth and memory's streams and splashing out upon an­
other generation a hundred years downstream. Violence can it­
self become a political style that is self-perpetuating. How 
to keep that from happening must temper the understanding one 
has of the place, use and legitimacy of violence. In other 
words, violence must be used responsibly or it will destroy 
the very aims toward which it is employed.
Violence used responsibly is effective force. That is 
to say that violence used responsibly will actualize the end 
toward which it is employed. Then violence is simply the abra­
sion created by the rub of distortion against reality. That 
does not make violence good. But if it is responsibly used, 
one assumes that the user has perceived it to be the inevit­
able (i.e., the only viable), option.
If the divine order is the static description accept­
able to the Christian, then it follows that any truly effective 
force must be able to actualize the divine order. Then, and
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only then, could the use of violence be considered responsi­
ble. What is needed is some effective force capable of com­
prehending violence in such a way that in the end it is- ab­
sorbed. The description of effective force acceptable to the 
Christian is sacrifice. This is Maurice's term. It is his 
understanding of the dynamic that preserves the divine order 
and produces its benefits.
Maurice understands sacrifice to mean submission of one's 
will. But to submit to an imperial power, he would not call 
sacrifice. To submit to sheer power is no sacrifice. To sub­
mit to a higher will that is all-good and all-righteous is.
To submit out of a sense of slavish dominion of the higher 
will over own’s own is no sacrifice. To submit in obedience 
is.
As the submission of the will of the eternal Son to the 
Father has conquered the rebel spirit of man before God, so the 
submission of the will of men to God will overwhelm the hostil­
ity and imperial designs of other men. The law of sacrifice 
is the true law of human existence both individual and social. 
Sacrifice is not calculation. The death of Christ did not ob­
tain from God something he was not otherwise willing to do. 
Rather it exposed in a violent vividness what He was already 
doing. It exposed a will, all-loving, all-righteous, and alto­
gether trustworthy. It revealed an omnipotence that will con­
quer but with no carnal force. Omnipotence is shown to be 
sacrifice.
Thus the Christian is called to follow his Master. He
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must deny self through sacrifice. Indeed, he will come to 
see ever more clearly that he has no self to save. He is a 
self only as he conforms to the divine order and responds in 
the uncalculating sacrifice of obedience.
But submission to the will of God is not always the 
same as submission to the will of men. Consequently, while 
the call for a man to sacrifice may send one man to lay down 
his life, it may shake another out of a comfortable torpor 
of self-indulgence with a call to arms. Submission to the 
will of God may lead a man to exclaim, "Blessed is the Lord 
God of Israel, who teacheth my hands to war, and my fingers 
to fight" (Ps. 144:1). The only disarmament absolutely de­
manded by the law of sacrifice is the putting off of self.
Self is the fundamental armament of the imperial spirit. Sac­
rifice is its antagonist and its vanquisher. Sacrifice is 
effective force. It is the dynamic that corresponds to order.
Still, a significant question remains to be answered. 
That order and sacrifice are thoroughly Christian categories 
cannot be denied. That they correspond well to the revolu­
tionary contentions around state and dynamic is obvious. But 
how does one determine that the cause in dispute will issue in 
a closer conformity to the divine order if one side wins in­
stead of the other?
What we have done in the discussion of state and dynamic 
in this paper is to lay the theological groundwork for the 
ethical issue that must emerge. The revolution is before me. 
The establishment is behind. What ought I to do? Ought I to
2join the revolution? Ought I to defend the establishment?
How do I escape the hubris that can, and probably does, 
drive either of them?
We have shown that the decision cannot follow the sim- 
plicism that one is obligated to one or the other just be­
cause it is the establishment or just because it is the revolu­
tion. A ..number of other, more sophisticated decisons must 
be made. These must condition a responsible loyalty to one 
or the:, other. But there are two other factors that will 
condition one's response as well. The first is context and 
the other is conscience.
The plethora of objections to any attempt to establish 
an abstract ethical norm for the Christian, response to revo­
lution has been documented in this paper with, the work of 
F. D. Maurice and others. Not even appeals to the presence 
of chaos or Violence constitute an adequate casuistry. There 
is no responsible determining in abstracto what one's re­
sponse ought to be to a real and particular revolution. The 
responsible Christian, whether conservative or radical, re­
quires the context of a particular revolution to determine 
his stance toward it.
The reason is that it is only in that context that the 
conscience can function. Maurice sees conscience as the only 
reliable guide to the ethics of human relationships. The 
sense of oughtness that it brings to each relation derives 
first from the sheer consciousness of relationship. Conscience 
is inviolable. While, therefore, the norms arrived at by others
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may find approval in one's own conscience and application in 
his practice, external norms cannot, and should hot, if they 
could, be imposed directly upon one's conscience. The con­
science testifies to the categorical impotency of external 
forces over the moral being of the individual. The conscience 
affirms that' guilt and obligation are unmistakably his. Thus, 
the conscience is the strongest witness to a human being of 
his individuality.
But context produces not only the social sense of re­
lationship and the inward conviction of individuality. Con­
text is the arena for the voice of God to the conscience.
The mere phenomenon of relationship is not sufficient to in­
form the conscience fully. The phenomenon of relationship 
raises the ethical conundrum, "what ought I to be or to do to 
affirm and fulfill this relationship?" For the answer to that, 
the voice of God is required. He is the source of the informa­
tion of the,conscience ; His voice speaking is both/ therefore, 
the source of one’s sense of individuality and of social re­
sponsibility. He commands us, and by commanding, calls us 
to live as persons, and shows us the' path to community 
with others.
Now, manifestly, the issue of the divine order must be 
men as persons,, alive with other persons in the fellowship 
of genuine communities. Persons cannot be, where true moral 
responsibility is forfeited to anything. Abstract radical­
ism and abstract conservatism will not do. For example, is 
the position of the Christian toward oppression always to 
be open defiance? Then the First Epistle of Peter must
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be expunged from the Christian scripture. Or shall we affirm 
the givenness of establishment no matter what kind? But in 
the crunch (i.e.,.the context), "we ought to obey God rather 
than men." There are obviously two legitimately Christian 
approaches to oppression. Both are enjoined. Neither is 
forbidden. To us is left the decision.
We are left responsible to discern in any situation which 
best characterizes our task as Christians. Maurice invites us 
to examine his convictions. We are asked reasonably if we 
would not like to escape the "rhetoric of revolution and counter­
revolution. We are led to sense the present kingdom of God 
as the concrete expression of the union of state or order, 
and dynamic or change. But to the Christian, he leaves the 
dilemma of immediate discernment. Casuistry will not do, con­
text will not do either, on its own. . The operation of the 
conscience is absolutely essential to the eventual issue of 
person and community within the divine order.
The conscience recognizes that Christian participation 
in revolution is a problem. It reveals that the real choice 
belongs to the Christian vis-a-vis a particular revolution.
Such liberty to choose is a fearful freedom. But it is the 
only freedom for which such an excruciating decision, and con­
sequent action, is worth the taking.
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